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Abstract
This thesis analyzes the interrelation between market structure and price formation in credit
derivatives markets. Traditionally, credit derivatives are traded in relatively opaque over-the-
counter markets in which trading is segmented and subject to many imperfections from which
illiquidity may arise. Recent regulatory reforms have brought transparency to some credit
derivatives markets without affecting their segmented structures.
The ﬁrst chapter, which is joint work with Anders B. Trolle, analyzes whether liquidity risk is
priced in the cross section of returns on credit default swaps (CDSs). The analysis is based on
a factor pricing model and a tradable liquidity factor that is constructed from returns on index
arbitrage strategies. The underlying presumption is that violations of simple no-arbitrage
relations between different CDS contracts reﬂect constraints on the risk-bearing capacity of
CDS market intermediaries and, in broad terms, CDS market illiquidity. The analysis reveals
priced liquidity risk in that credit protection sellers earn higher expected excess returns on
CDS contracts with higher liquidity exposures. The liquidity risk premium is signiﬁcant and
accounts for 24% of CDS spreads, on average. CDS risk premia correlate negatively with
proxies for the risk-bearing capacity of CDS market intermediaries, which is consistent with
intermediary frictions affecting the pricing of CDSs.
The second chapter, which is joint work with Pierre Collin-Dufresne and Anders B. Trolle,
analyzes transaction costs in the dealer-to-customer (D2C) and dealer-to-dealer (D2D) seg-
ments of the post-Dodd-Frank index CDS market. Dodd-Frank regulations that made all-to-all
trading possible had the potential to break up the market’s segmented structure but failed to
do so. This led to a controversy with some market participants arguing that the segmented
structure is optimal and other market participants arguing that dealers maintain the seg-
mented structure in order to limit competition by alternative liquidity providers. The analysis
reveals that D2C trades indeed have larger transaction costs than D2D trades but that the
differences in transaction costs reﬂect differences in price impacts rather than differences in
proﬁts from liquidity provision. D2C trades are even competitive relative to executable bids
and offers in the D2D segment, suggesting that the market structure delivers favorable prices
for customers who value immediacy.
The third chapter documents a decline of transaction costs and proﬁts from liquidity provi-
sion in the index CDS market over a two-and-a-half-year period during which Dodd-Frank
regulations were implemented. Transaction costs and proﬁts from liquidity provision de-
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clined around the introduction of so-called swap execution facilities (SEFs); i.e., regulated
trading platforms that offer pre-trade transparent methods of trade execution. Trades that
are executed on SEFs have lower transaction costs and are less proﬁtable from a liquidity
provider’s perspective in comparison to bilaterally negotiated trades, which is consistent with
better comparison shopping and stronger price competition on SEFs. Dodd-Frank regulations
mandating on-SEF trade execution that were implemented after the introduction of SEFs did
not affect transaction costs and proﬁts from liquidity provision, suggesting that there is no
incremental effect associated with mandatory pre-trade transparency.
Key words: Credit Default Swap; Dodd-Frank Act; Index Credit Default Swap; Liquidity Risk;
Over-The-Counter Markets; Swap Execution Facility; Transaction Costs
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Zusammenfassung
Thema dieser Dissertation sind Kreditderivate und insbesondere die Beziehung zwischen
Preisbildung und Marktstruktur bei deren Bewertung. Kreditderivate werden üblicherweise
in außerbörslichen und dezentralisierten Märkten gehandelt, die für Außenstehende nur
schwer einsehbar sind. In jüngster Vergangenheit haben Finanzmarktregulierungen zu mehr
Transparenz in einigen Märkten für Kreditderivate geführt, jedoch ohne deren dezentralisierte
Marktstruktur zu beeinﬂussen.
Das erste Kapitel, welches auf gemeinsamer Arbeit mit Anders B. Trolle basiert, geht der Fra-
gestellung nach, ob in den Renditen von Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) ein Liquiditätsrisiko
eingepreist ist. Die Untersuchung basiert auf einem Faktormodell und einem eigens für die
Untersuchung konstruierten Liquiditätsfaktor. Letzterer basiert auf einer Index Arbitrage Stra-
tegie. Die hinter der Konstruktion stehende Prämisse ist, dass Arbitragemöglichkeiten dann
auftreten, wenn diejenigen Akteure, die für gewöhnlich den Markt machen, nicht genügend
Kapital aufbringen können, um selbst von den Arbitragemöglichkeiten zu proﬁtieren und
somit generell wenig Liquidität im Markt zur Verfügung steht. Die Untersuchung ergibt, dass
Liquiditätsrisiko in den Renditen von CDSs eingepreist ist insofern, dass vom Gesichtspunkt
des Verkäufers der Kreditversicherung, CDSs mit höherem Liquiditätsrisiko eine höhere er-
wartete Rendite haben. Die Risikoprämie ist signiﬁkant und macht im Durchschnitt 24% der
CDS Prämie aus.
Das zweite Kapitel, welches auf gemeinsamer Arbeit mit Pierre Collin-Dufresne und Anders
B. Trolle basiert, untersucht Transaktionskosten in den zwei Segmenten des amerikanischen
Index CDS Marktes, in denen Kreditderivate-Händler mit ihren institutionellen Kunden (D2C)
bzw. untereinander (D2D) handeln. Finanzmarktregulierungen, die im Rahmen des Dodd-
Frank Act implementiert wurden, haben Marktbedingungen geschaffen, die eine solche, zwei-
geteilte Marktstruktur nicht unbedingt vorsehen. Da die zweigeteilte Marktstruktur aber
weiterhin fortbesteht, entbrannte eine Kontroverse darüber, ob dies die optimale Marktstruk-
tur sei oder ob sie, wie von einigen Marktteilnehmern behauptet, nur daher fortbesteht, weil
sich Kreditderivate-Händler einem Wandel zu einer zentralisierten Marktstruktur widersetzen,
um die Konkurrenz von alternativen Marktmachern zu unterbinden. Die Untersuchung er-
gibt, dass Transaktionenkosten im D2C Segment höher sind als im D2D Segment was jedoch
nicht auf höhere Gewinnmargen von Händlern zurückzuführen ist, sondern darauf, dass D2C
Transaktionen einen höheren Preiseffekt haben als D2D Transaktionen.
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Zusammenfassung
Das dritte Kapitel geht der Fragestellung nach, warum, wie in diesem Kapitel dokumentiert,
Transaktionskosten und Gewinnmargen im amerikanischen Index CDS Markt über einen
zweieinhalbjährigen Zeitraum hinweg gefallen sind, der die Implementierung der oben er-
wähnten Finanzmarktregulierungen einschließt. Ein Grund scheint der Handel auf regulierten
Handelsplattformen (SEFs) zu sein, die im Rahmen des Dodd-Frank Act eingeführt wurden.
Transaktionen, die auf SEFs ausgeführt wurden, haben geringere Transaktionskosten und Ge-
winnmargen als Transaktionen, die außerbörslich abgeschlossen wurden. Dies ist konsistent
damit, dass SEFs, im Vergleich zu außerbörslichem Handel, bessere Möglichkeiten bieten,
die Preise unterschiedlicher Händler miteinander zu vergleichen und somit zu direktem
Preiswettbewerb unter Händlern führen.
Stichwörter: Credit Default Swap; Dodd-Frank Act; Index Credit Default Swap; Liquiditätsrisi-
ko; Over-The-Counter Märkte; Swap Execution Facility; Transaktionskosten
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1 Liquidity Risk in Credit Default Swap
Markets
This chapter is based on joint work with Anders B. Trolle in which we show that liquidity risk
is priced in the cross section of returns on credit default swaps (CDSs). We measure CDS
market illiquidity by aggregating deviations of credit index levels from their no-arbitrage values
implied by the index constituents’ CDS spreads, and we construct a tradable liquidity factor
from returns on index arbitrage strategies. CDS contracts with higher liquidity exposures
have higher expected excess returns for sellers of credit protection; on average, liquidity risk
accounts for 24% of CDS spreads. Illiquidity and risk premia correlate negatively with proxies
for the risk-bearing capacity of CDS market intermediaries.
1.1 Introduction
A recent literature starting with Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) and Acharya and Pedersen
(2005) has shown that liquidity risk is priced within a variety of asset classes including stocks,
Treasuries, corporate bonds, hedge funds, and private equity.1 In this paper, we study whether
liquidity risk is priced in credit default swaps (CDSs). This issue is important for several
reasons. First, CDS contracts are exposed to many potential sources of illiquidity as they trade
in a relatively opaque, dealer-dominated, and decentralized market.2 In particular, illiquidity
stemming from funding and capital constraints of ﬁnancial intermediaries is likely to play
an important role for the pricing of CDS contracts. Second, in contrast to the asset classes
listed above, CDS contracts are in zero net supply, implying that the sign on any liquidity risk
premium is not given a priori. Third, from a practical perspective, liquidity risk is important
1 As discussed by Acharya and Pedersen (2005), liquidity risk can be deﬁned in several ways. The notion of
liquidity risk used in this paper (covariation between returns and a market-wide liquidity factor) has been shown
to be priced in stocks (see Sadka (2006) and Korajczyk and Sadka (2008) in addition to Pástor and Stambaugh
(2003) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005)), Treasuries (see Li, Wang, Wu, and He (2009)), corporate bonds (see Lin,
Wang, and Wu (2011)), hedge funds (see Sadka (2010) and Hu, Pan, and Wang (2013)), and private equity (see
Franzoni, Nowak, and Phalippou (2012)).
2 Recent regulatory reform has brought more transparency to the market for credit index contracts, the most
liquid of which must now be traded on so-called swap execution facilities. However, single-name CDS contracts
continue to trade with little transparency.
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for the trading, pricing, hedging, and risk-management of CDS contracts—recently illustrated
by J.P. Morgan’s six billion dollar trading loss on relatively illiquid CDS market strategies.3
Finally, from a regulatory perspective, liquidity risk is important given the potential systemic
nature of the CDS market.
Measuring the liquidity of the CDS market is challenging given the over-the-counter (OTC)
market structure and the absence of publicly available transaction data. In this paper we
propose to measure CDS market illiquidity by the extent to which simple no-arbitrage relations
in CDS markets are violated. Such violations reﬂect not only the direct transaction costs
associated with exploiting the arbitrage opportunities but also constraints on the risk-bearing
capacity of arbitrageurs and ﬁnancial intermediaries; therefore, illiquidity in this paper is
meant in broad terms.4
Speciﬁcally, we consider the law-of-one-price relation between a credit index and a basket
of single-name CDSs that replicates the cash ﬂow of the index. We denote the difference
between the level of the index and its CDS-implied level as the index-to-CDS basis, and we
construct a market-wide CDS illiquidity measure as a weighted average of absolute values of
index-to-CDS bases. The average is taken over the four most representative and liquid indices
of investment-grade and high-yield credit risk in North America and Europe. These indices
cover a substantial part of the overall CDS market.5
We ﬁnd time-varying index-to-CDS bases across all four credit indices during our sample
period from September 20, 2006 to February 1, 2012. In particular, bases widened signiﬁcantly
in the period following the collapse of Lehman Brothers and AIG. For instance, bases of credit
indices referencing North American investment-grade and high-yield names dropped to -61
basis points (bps) and -452 bps, respectively (corresponding to -25% and -38%, respectively, of
the index levels). Our illiquidity measure suggests that CDS market liquidity was relatively high
and stable in the early part of the sample period, deteriorated somewhat around the time of
the collapse of two Bear Stearns structured-credit hedge funds in late June 2007, deteriorated
signiﬁcantly in the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers default and the AIG bailout in September
2008, and then recovered substantially since early 2009—although not reaching the level of
liquidity that prevailed prior to the crisis. We show that the illiquidity measure correlates not
only with bid-ask spreads and price impact measures in the CDS market but also with funding
costs and the equity capital of the main dealers in the CDS market.
A key advantage of our illiquidity measure is that its innovations can be closely tracked by
a tradable liquidity factor. For each credit index, we consider a trading strategy consisting
3 See “‘London Whale’ Rattles Debt Market,” Wall Street Journal, April 6, 2012.
4 Our notion of illiquidity is similar to that of Hu, Pan, and Wang (2013) who measure Treasury market illiquidity
by the extent to which Treasury yields deviate from fair-value. An important difference between the illiquidity
measures—apart from the fact that they pertain to different markets—is that their measure relies on a model to
obtain fair-value yields, while our measure is completely model independent.
5 In constructing the illiquidity measure, we use ﬁve-year on-the-run index series. Very similar results are
obtained when including additional maturities, off-the-run series, or sub-indices in the construction of the
illiquidity measure.
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of positions in both the credit index and its replicating basket that proﬁts from a narrowing
of the index-to-CDS basis. The tradable liquidity factor is the excess return on a portfolio of
these credit index arbitrage trades. The correlation between the tradable liquidity factor and
innovations to the CDS market illiquidity measure is -0.80.
Next, we study whether exposure to our liquidity factor—i.e., liquidity risk—is priced in the
cross section of returns on CDSs. This is motivated by the connection between our liquidity
factor and changes in the risk-bearing capacity of ﬁnancial intermediaries, and the recent
literature on intermediary asset pricing, which predicts that proxies for the risk-bearing
capacity of ﬁnancial intermediaries show up as pricing factors (see, e.g., Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2009), He and Krishnamurthy (2013), and Kondor and Vayanos (2014)). Models of
intermediary asset pricing seem particularly relevant for the CDS market because it is highly
concentrated around a group of global credit derivatives dealers (often referred to as the G14
dealers), who participate in virtually all transactions.6 Given that dealers in aggregate are net
sellers of credit protection to end-users7 we expect that, from a protection seller’s perspective,
(i) realized excess returns on CDS contracts correlate positively with the liquidity factor (since
CDS spreads widen when dealers become more constrained); (ii) expected excess returns
are higher on contracts with higher liquidity exposures; and (iii) risk premia increase when
intermediary constraints tighten.
We estimate a factor pricing model which, in its basic formulation, has two systematic factors:
a default factor and the tradable liquidity factor.8 The underlying data set is a large panel of
single-name CDS contracts referencing 666 North American and European entities. These
contracts are sorted into portfolios that exhibit variation in credit quality and the level of
illiquidity. Across all portfolios, unconditional expected excess returns are positive from a
credit protection seller’s perspective, ranging from 0.35% per year for a portfolio of the most
liquid high-credit-quality CDSs to 5.80% per year for a portfolio of the most illiquid low-
credit-quality CDSs.9 Factor exposures (i.e., betas) are estimated from time-series regressions
of realized excess returns on the factors. Consistent with prediction (i), liquidity betas are
6 Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014) ﬁnd empirical support for intermediary asset pricing models in the context of
the stock market.
7 The aggregate positions of dealers and end-users can be obtained from the Depository Trust & Clearing
Corporation’s Trade Information Warehouse (TIW). On the ﬁrst date that TIW data is available (October 31, 2008),
the gross notional amount of credit protection sold by dealers to end-users was 171 billion USD larger than the
gross notional amount bought by dealers from end-users. At the end of our sample period, the difference was 102
billion USD.
8In principle, counterparty risk could also be a determinant of CDS returns. However, Arora, Gandhi, and
Longstaff (2012) ﬁnd that the effect of counterparty risk on CDS spreads is negligible, which is consistent with
the widespread use of collateralization and netting agreements. Indeed, from the annual “Margin Surveys” by
the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), we infer that the fraction of credit derivatives trades
covered by collateral agreements averaged more than 80% over the sample period. Hence, we do not take
counterparty risk into account in our factor pricing model.
9 Sample means of realized excess returns on CDSs are very imprecise estimates of expected excess returns
because of the short sample period and the peso problem that arises when computing returns on securities that are
subject to credit risk (as credit events are rare and have a dramatic impact on returns when they occur). Therefore,
we follow Bongaerts, de Jong, and Driessen (2011) in obtaining forward-looking estimates of conditional expected
excess returns by using Moody’s KMV Expected Default Frequencies to calculate expected default losses.
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positive (realized excess returns for credit protection sellers correlate positively with the
liquidity factor).
Factor prices of risk are estimated from a cross-sectional regression of unconditional expected
excess returns on betas.10 Consistent with prediction (ii), liquidity risk is priced, and sellers of
credit protection earn higher expected excess returns on CDS contracts with higher liquidity
exposures. The price of liquidity risk is not only statistically signiﬁcant but also economically
important. For instance, considering the expected excess return differential of 5.45% per year
between the portfolio of the most illiquid low-credit-quality CDSs and the portfolio of the most
liquid high-credit-quality CDSs, 2.21% per year is due to liquidity risk, while 3.30% is due to
default risk (the remainder is a pricing error). Alternatively, considering the average expected
excess return across all portfolios, 0.59% per year is due to liquidity risk, while 1.08% is due to
default risk. We also decompose CDS spreads instead of expected excess returns. Averaging the
relative contributions across portfolios, liquidity risk accounts for 24% of model-implied CDS
spreads, while default risk and expected default losses account for 47% and 29%, respectively.
We also consider a conditional version of the factor pricing model in which time-varying factor
prices of risk are estimated from cross-sectional regressions of conditional expected excess
returns on betas. Consistent with prediction (iii), we ﬁnd that factor prices of risk increase
when intermediary equity capital decreases. Speciﬁcally, prices of default and liquidity risk
have correlations of -0.71 and -0.32, respectively, with a proxy for intermediary equity capital.
Factor prices of risk are particularly high in the aftermath of the default of Lehman Brothers
and the bailout of AIG. Other periods during which factor prices of risk are high include
the initial phase of the ﬁnancial crisis as well as the last part of the sample period when the
European sovereign debt crisis intensiﬁed.
We conduct a range of robustness checks; we control for the contract-speciﬁc level of illiquidity,
consider an alternative construction of the tradable liquidity factor, and add additional risk
factors to the asset pricing model. These include a factor that correlates with the availability of
arbitrage capital, corporate bond and stock market illiquidity factors, as well as stock market
and volatility factors. Across the robustness checks, the contribution of liquidity risk to the
expected excess return differential mentioned above ranges from 1.59% to 2.22% per year.
A number of studies have documented liquidity effects in the pricing of CDS contracts but
mainly focus on the effect of the contract-speciﬁc level of illiquidity. Most studies ﬁnd that CDS
spreads increase with contract-speciﬁc illiquidity; see, e.g., Bühler and Trapp (2009) who infer
the liquidity component in CDS spreads via an intensity-based pricing model and Tang and
Yan (2007), Qiu and Yu (2012), Lesplingart, Majois, and Petitjean (2012), and Pires, Pereira, and
Martins (2014) who run panel regressions of CDS spreads on various illiquidity proxies.11 Our
10 Standard errors are adjusted for errors-in-variables, heteroscedastic and autocorrelated errors, and potential
model misspeciﬁcation as in Kan, Robotti, and Shanken (2013). They show, along with other recent papers, that
taking into account potential model misspeciﬁcation is crucial for reliable statistical inference.
11 Chen, Fabozzi, and Sverdlove (2010) also use an intensity-based pricing model to estimate the magnitude of
the liquidity component in CDS spreads; however, the sign of the liquidity component is hard-wired into their
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paper differs from these papers by instead focussing on the pricing of systematic liquidity risk.
We ﬁnd that once systematic liquidity risk is accounted for, the effect of the contract-speciﬁc
level of illiquidity on the pricing of CDS contracts becomes much less pronounced.12
Bongaerts et al. (2011) investigate the effect of both the contract-speciﬁc level of transaction
costs and liquidity risk on the expected excess return on CDS contracts. However, they use
a very different deﬁnition of liquidity risk; they focus on covariation between innovations
to transaction costs on individual CDS contracts and systematic default risk, while we focus
on covariation between CDS returns and market-wide CDS liquidity. They ﬁnd that their
notion of liquidity risk is not signiﬁcantly priced in the cross section of CDS returns, leading
them to attribute most of the variation in expected excess returns to variation in the levels of
transaction costs. In contrast, we ﬁnd that our notion of liquidity risk is signiﬁcantly priced in
the cross section of CDS returns and largely subsumes the effect of the levels of transaction
costs.13
Finally, our ﬁnding that risk premia increase when intermediary equity capital decreases is
consistent with recent work by Siriwardane (2015) who shows in a post-crisis sample that
capital losses for sellers of credit protection lead to wider CDS spreads. In a similar vein,
Froot and O’Connell (1999) show that capital losses for sellers of catastrophe insurance lead
to higher insurance premia, and Greenwood and Vayanos (2014) ﬁnd that capital losses for
arbitrageurs in the Treasury market lead to higher bond risk premia.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 1.2 describes the construction of the CDS market
illiquidity measure and the tradable liquidity factor, Section 1.3 investigates the pricing of
liquidity risk, and Section 1.4 concludes.
1.2 Measuring CDSMarket Illiquidity
This section presents the construction of the CDS market illiquidity measure and the tradable
liquidity factor. Furthermore, it explores determinants of CDS market illiquidity and it brieﬂy
describes credit indices and the replication argument on which index arbitrage is based.
1.2.1 Credit Indices
Credit indices are standardized credit derivatives that provide insurance against any defaults
model.
12 Tang and Yan (2007) and Lesplingart et al. (2012) also provide tentative results on the effect of systematic
liquidity risk by augmenting their panel regressions with the betas that appear in Acharya and Pedersen’s (2005)
liquidity-adjusted CAPM. However, their results are somewhat inconclusive. Moreover, the Acharya and Pedersen
(2005) model is based on the assumption that assets are in positive net supply, making it not directly applicable to
CDS contracts that are in zero net supply.
13 We verify that Bongaerts et al.’s (2011) notion of liquidity risk is also not priced in our more recent and broader
sample of CDSs. We also argue that the frequent marking to market of CDS contracts makes their notion of liquidity
risk less relevant in case of the CDS market.
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among their constituents. They allow investors to gain or reduce credit risk exposure in certain
segments of the market. Due to their widespread use and standardized terms, credit indices
are more liquid than both single-name CDSs and corporate bonds.14 Credit indices trade in
OTC markets for maturities between one and ten years. The ﬁve-year maturity is typically the
most liquid and is the focus of our empirical analysis.15
Each credit index is a separate CDS contract with a speciﬁc maturity, ﬁxed spread, and un-
derlying basket of reference entities. Over the life of the contract, the seller of protection on
the index provides default protection on each index constituent, with the notional amount
of the contract divided evenly among the index constituents. In return, the seller of index
protection earns the ﬁxed spread. In case of default, the seller of index protection pays the
loss-given-default and the notional amount of the contract is reduced accordingly. If the
quoted level of the index differs from its ﬁxed spread, counterparties initially exchange an
upfront payment equal to the contract’s present value.
As a clarifying example, suppose that on September 21, 2007 an investor sells a 10 million
USD notional amount of protection on the main North American investment-grade credit
index (CDX.NA.IG.9) with a maturity of ﬁve years and a ﬁxed spread of 60 bps.16 On that date
the index traded at 50 bps which translates into a 46,183 USD upfront charge for the seller of
protection. Over the next three quarters he receives quarterly spread payments each being
approximately equal to 1/4×0.0060×10,000,000= 15,000 USD (for the purpose of illustration,
we abstract from the actual day-count convention). On September 7, 2008, Fannie Mae and
Freddy Mac, both reference names of the CDX.NA.IG.9, were placed into conservatorship by
their regulator. Creditors recovered 91.51 cents and 94 cents per dollar of senior unsecured
debt issued by Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac, respectively. Thus, the seller of index protection
compensates the losses incurred, paying 1/125× (1−0.9151)×10,000,000+1/125× (1−0.94)×
10,000,000= 11,592 USD.17 Due to the credit events, the spread payment on September 20,
2008 is reduced to 1/4×123/125×0.0060×10,000,000= 14,760 USD. Until expiry of the index
on December 20, 2012, another two credit events occured: ﬁrst, the default of Washington
Mutual on September 27, 2008 triggers a 1/125× (1−0.57)×10,000,000= 34,400 USD payout
and reduces subsequent spread payments to 1/4×122/125× 0.0060× 10,000,000 = 14,640
USD. Second, the Chapter 11 ﬁling of CIT Group on November 1, 2009 triggers a 1/125×
(1−0.68125)×10,000,000= 25,500 USD payout and reduces successive spread payments to
14 For example, the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation’s “Market Activity Report” for the three-month
period from June 20, 2011 to September 19, 2011, shows that the average daily notional amount of trades is 29
million USD, on average, across single-name CDSs referencing corporate names that belong to the 1000 most
actively traded single-name CDSs. In contrast, the average daily notional amount of untranched index transactions
is approximately one billion USD.
15 Using CDS transaction data, Chen, Fleming, Jackson, Li, and Sarkar (2011) ﬁnd that 84% of all index transac-
tions are in the ﬁve-year maturity.
16The number following the index name is referred to as the index’s series and uniquely identiﬁes the underlying
basket of reference names.
17In this example, we assume that cash settlement, the standard settlement method of credit index transactions,
applies. Furthermore, we ignore accrual payments on default and the fact that recovery values are determined in
credit event auctions that usually do not take place on the credit event dates.
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1/4×121/125×0.0060×10,000,000= 14,520 USD.
Twice a year, on the so-called index roll dates in March and September, a new series of each
credit index is launched, with the basket of reference entities revised according to credit
rating and liquidity criteria. Entities that fail to maintain a credit rating within a speciﬁed
range, due to either an upgrade or a downgrade, and entities whose CDS contracts have
deteriorated signiﬁcantly in terms of their liquidity are replaced by the most liquid reference
names meeting the credit rating requirements. Liquidity is typically concentrated in the most
recently launched series, which are referred to as the on-the-run series. Consequently, these
are the subject of our empirical analysis.
In case of a credit event, a new version of the index series starts trading, with the entity that
triggered the event having been removed from the index. Because triggered CDSs usually
continue to trade in the market until their recovery values are determined, multiple versions
of the same index series can trade at the same time. In such cases, we focus on the most liquid
version.
All the credit indices considered in this paper are administrated by Markit. It sets the rules
and procedures that govern the index revisions on the roll dates. In addition, it determines a
group of licensed dealers, who actively make markets for credit indices. Based on their spread
quotes, Markit computes index levels that are published on a daily basis.
1.2.2 Index Replication
Investors can gain credit risk exposure either by selling protection on the index contract or by
selling protection on a basket of single-name CDSs that replicates the cash ﬂow of the index
contract. Thus, an alternative index level can be implied from single-name CDS quotes on
the index constituents. This gives rise to what we call the index-to-CDS basis, deﬁned as the
difference between the index level and the CDS-implied level. In perfect capital markets, index
arbitrage will keep index-to-CDS bases close to zero.
Suppose that on date t an investor wants to sell index protection with a ﬁve-year maturity,
ﬁxed spreadC , and notional amount A. This involves an initial upfront payment equal to the
contract’s present value.18 Instead of selling index protection, the investor can sell protection
on the index constituents via single-name CDSs. In particular, to replicate the payments of the
index contract, the investor must sell protection on each of the It index constituents that, prior
to the inception of trade, have not triggered a credit event. Each single-name CDS must have a
ﬁve-year maturity, ﬁxed spreadC , and notional amount A/I , where I denotes the number of
reference entities at the launch of the index’s series. As for credit indices, upfront payments are
necessary when trading single-name CDSs at off-par spreads. Hence, the investor faces costs
18In addition, there will be an accrual payment. The seller of index protection is entitled to a full spread payment
on the ﬁrst payment date after inception of trade, regardless of the actual time of opening his position. Therefore,
he has to compensate the buyer of protection for the ﬁxed spread accrued between the last spread payment date
and the inception of trade. We abstract from these accrual payments in our discussion of the index replication.
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equal to the aggregate amount of all upfront charges from the single-name CDS transactions.
Until the earlier of the maturity date and the ﬁrst credit event by one of the remaining index
constituents, the seller of index protection earns quarterly spread payments of d/360×C ×
It/I × A, while the seller of protection via single-name CDSs receives quarterly spread pay-
ments of
∑It
i=1d/360×C × A/I . Here, It/I × A is the index’s adjusted notional amount, and
d/360 denotes the accrual time during a given quarter determined by ACT/360 day-count
convention. Obviously both payment streams are identical.
In case that one of the remaining reference names, say i∗, defaults prior to maturity, the seller
of index protection has to make a payment of 1/I × (1−Ri∗)× A, where Ri∗ is the recovery
per dollar of notional on i∗’s debt. This payment coincides with the one that the seller of
protection via single-name CDSs has to make.19
Following the credit event, the notional amount of the index is adjusted to (It −1)/I × A and
quarterly spread payments earned by the seller of index protection decrease to d/360×C ×
(It − 1)/I × A. Because there is also one single-name CDS less in the basket, the seller of
protection via single-name CDSs collects quarterly spread payments of
∑It−1
i=1 d/360×C × A/I .
Thus, payments coincide in this case as well.
Because the same reasoning applies to any possible credit event that may occur prior to
maturity, it follows that the cash ﬂows for the seller of index protection and the seller of
protection via single-name CDSs are identical. The CDS-implied index level, CCDSt , can be
thought of as that ﬁxed spread on the single-name CDSs that makes the replicating basket
have zero net present value.20 The index-to-CDS basis, Bt , of a credit index is then deﬁned as
Bt =CIDXt −CCDSt , whereCIDXt denotes the index level as of date t .
1.2.3 Data
The credit index data are obtained from Markit and comprise index levels, CDS-implied levels,
and the corresponding upfront amounts. In addition, the number of licensed dealers that
submit spread quotes for the computation of the index level is reported. We use the four
most representative and liquid indices of investment-grade and high-yield credit risk in North
America and Europe, always focusing on the ﬁve-year maturity. For each index, we splice
together on-the-run series to create continuous time series for the period from September
20, 2006 to February 1, 2012. Whenever multiple versions of the on-the-run series trade
simultaneously, we choose the version with the largest number of contributing dealers.
19Upon default, both the seller of index protection and the seller of protection via single-name CDSs will receive
an accrual payment. This payment compensates for the protection they provided on the defaulted reference name
since the last spread payment date prior to the credit event.
20Because the ISDA CDS Standard Model is used to convert between upfront amounts and index levels, the
CDS-implied index level is the par spread on a hypothetical single-name CDS contract whose upfront amount
equals that of the replicating basket of single-name CDSs. The contract terms of the hypothetical single-name
CDS and the recovery rate used for conversion are speciﬁed in the index’s contract terms.
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Figure 1.1: Credit Index Levels, CDS-Implied Index Levels, and Index-to-CDS Bases.
The ﬁgure displays daily observations of credit index levels of the ﬁve-year on-the-run series (thin black lines,
left hand scales), CDS-implied index levels (thick gray lines, left hand scales), and index-to-CDS bases (light gray
shaded areas, right hand scales) from September 20, 2006 to February 1, 2012. Index levels and bases are in basis
points and dashed vertical lines correspond to index roll dates.
The four credit indices are CDX.NA.IG, CDX.NA.HY, iTraxx Eur, and iTraxx Xover. CDX.NA.IG
and iTraxx Eur each comprise 125 investment-grade reference names from North America
and Europe, respectively. CDX.NA.HY comprises 100 high-yield reference names from North
America, while iTraxx Xover comprises up to 50 high-yield reference names from Europe.
Table A.2 at the end of Appendix A summarizes index rules and contract terms for these
indices.
Figure 1.1 displays time series of the on-the-run index levels (thin black lines). Each of the
indices increased shortly before the March 2008 roll date when Bear Stearns was on the brink
of bankruptcy and, after a short period of relief, peaked in the aftermath of the September
2008 credit events of Fannie Mae, Freddy Mac, Lehman Brothers, and Washington Mutual.
The iTraxx indices again sharply increased in July 2011 as the European sovereign debt crisis
intensiﬁed.21 Descriptive statistics of the credit index levels are reported in Panel A of Table 1.1.
21 This month saw a sharp sell-off in non-core European sovereign bonds, partly triggered by downgrades of the
sovereign debt of Portugal and Ireland to non-investment-grade status (see “Italy Fears Jolt Markets,” Wall Street
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Panel A: Credit Index Levels
CDX.NA.IG CDX.NA.HY iTraxx Eur iTraxx Xover
Mean 106.5 630.9 97.6 514.0
Standard Deviation 49.7 312.6 48.4 217.8
Minimum 28.9 208.5 20.1 170.8
Maximum 279.7 1893.6 215.9 1150.3
N 1338 1337 1357 1356
Panel B: Index-to-CDS Bases
CDX.NA.IG CDX.NA.HY iTraxx Eur iTraxx Xover
Mean -4.9 2.4 -3.8 3.6
Standard Deviation 11.6 68.3 9.0 16.5
Minimum -61.1 -451.9 -58.5 -106.1
Maximum 12.2 172.4 13.9 49.9
Corr(CIDXt ,σt (|B |)) 0.85 0.91 0.73 0.87
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics of Credit Index Levels and Index-to-CDS Bases.
The table displays descriptive statistics of credit index levels and index-to-CDS bases. Panel A provides descriptive
statistics of credit index levels of the ﬁve-year on-the-run series. Panel B provides descriptive statistics of the
corresponding index-to-CDS bases. Mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum are in basis points, and
Corr(CIDXt ,σt (|B |)) denotes the time-series correlation between the index level and the conditional volatility of
the index-to-CDS basis’ absolute value. For each index, the conditional volatility is inferred from a GARCH(1,1)
model for the conditional variance of the error term in an ARMA(1,1) speciﬁcation of the absolute value of the
index-to-CDS basis. The sample period is from September 20, 2006 to February 1, 2012. N denotes the number of
daily observations.
1.2.4 CDSMarket Illiquidity Measure
In addition to index levels, Figure 1.1 also displays CDS-implied levels (thick gray lines) and
the corresponding index-to-CDS bases (light gray shaded areas). Nonzero index-to-CDS
bases frequently arise; in particular, between the September 2008 index roll and the next
index roll in March 2009, i.e., at the height of the ﬁnancial crisis, bases are wide and very
volatile. Bases of the investment-grade indices CDX.NA.IG and iTraxx Eur drop to -61.1 bps
and -58.6 bps, respectively, while bases of the high-yield indices CDX.NA.HY and iTraxx Xover
drop to -451.9 bps and -106.2 bps, respectively.22 These numbers correspond to -25.3%,
-33.4%, -38.0%, and -9.8% of the index levels. Descriptive statistics of the index-to-CDS bases
are reported in Panel B of Table 1.1. Sample means of bases are negative for investment-grade
indices and positive for high-yield indices, and standard deviations of bases are higher for the
high-yield indices than for the investment-grade indices.
Journal, July 12, 2011).
22 One explanation for the negative index-to-CDS bases at the height of the ﬁnancial crisis is the following:
because index contracts traded signiﬁcantly above their ﬁxed spreads, a seller of credit protection via an index
contract would have received a large upfront payment. On the other hand, because most single-name CDSs
were typically executed at par spreads during that time, a seller of credit protection via a portfolio of single-name
CDS contracts would often not have received an upfront payment. This created an incentive for funding- and
capital-constrained dealers to sell protection via index contracts, helping to push index-to-CDS bases deep into
negative territory.
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As explained below, we measure illiquidity from absolute values of index-to-CDS bases. We
observe a strong relation between index levels and volatilities of absolute bases. The table
shows that the time-series correlations between index levels and conditional volatilities of
absolute bases range from 0.73 to 0.91 across indices. Furthermore, the cross-sectional
correlation between average index levels and unconditional volatilities of absolute bases is
0.74.
To measure market-wide CDS illiquidity, we aggregate absolute values of index-to-CDS bases
across indices. We use absolute values because positive and negative bases are equally infor-
mative about illiquidity in the CDS market. Given the signiﬁcant cross-sectional variation
in the volatilities of absolute bases, taking an equally weighted average of absolute bases
would cause variation in the CDS market illiquidity measure to be driven mostly by the bases
of high-yield indices. One option would be to weight absolute bases by the inverse of their
conditional volatilities; however, this has the disadvantage that the sample period is shortened
by the window over which the initial conditional volatilities are estimated. Instead, we opt to
weight absolute bases by the inverse of the index levels, exploiting the strong relation between
the index levels and the volatilities of the absolute bases. Thus, the CDS market illiquidity
measure, CDSILLIQt , is given by
CDSILLIQt =
nt∑
i=1
wi ,t |Bi ,t |, (1.1)
where wi ,t = (1/CIDXi ,t )/(
∑nt
j=1 1/C
IDX
j ,t ) and nt is the number of indices with available data on
date t .
Figure 1.2 shows the time series of the CDS market illiquidity measure at a weekly frequency.
As can be seen from the ﬁgure, the illiquidity measure is very persistent with a 0.93 ﬁrst-order
autocorrelation. The measure suggests that liquidity was relatively high and stable until June
2007. The deterioration in liquidity towards the end of that month coincided with the high-
proﬁle collapse of two Bear Stearns structured-credit hedge funds, which was followed by
further turmoil in credit and funding markets.23 Liquidity deteriorated signiﬁcantly in the
aftermath of the Lehman Brothers default and the AIG bailout in September 2008, and the
illiquidity measure peaked at 79 bps at the end of December 2008. Since then, liquidity has
recovered substantially, but, within our sample period, did not reach pre-crisis levels.
The construction of our CDS market illiquidity measure is very robust. We have considered
three alternative constructions that use a larger number of indices or index series. First, we
include sub-indices (on-the-run series with ﬁve-year maturities) of the four credit indices, in
which case the average in Equation (1.1) is taken over ten indices.24 Second, we include the
23The two funds—the High Grade Structured Credit Strategies Fund, and the High Grade Structured Credit
Strategies Enhanced Leverage Fund—were largely invested in collateralized debt obligations tied to subprime
mortgages (see “Two Big Funds At Bear Stearns Face Shutdown,” Wall Street Journal, June 20, 2007).
24 The sub-indices are CDX.NA.IG.HVOL, CDX.NA.HY.BB, CDX.NA.HY.B, iTraxx Eur HiVol, iTraxx Eur Sr Finls, and
iTraxx Eur Sub Finls. CDX.NA.IG.HVOL (iTraxx Eur HiVol) comprises the 30 reference names from the CDX.NA.IG
(iTraxx Eur) with the widest ﬁve-year CDS spreads. iTraxx Eur Sr Finls comprises the 25 ﬁnancial sector reference
11
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Figure 1.2: CDS Market Illiquidity Measure.
The ﬁgure displays the CDS market illiquidity measure (in basis points). The time series consists of 281 weekly
observations from September 20, 2006 to February 1, 2012. Dotted vertical lines correspond to (from left to right)
the collapse of two Bear Stearns structured-credit hedge funds on June 20, 2007, the Bear Stearns near-bankruptcy
on March 17, 2008, the default of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, and July 1, 2011 marking the beginning
of a month in which a sharp sell-off in non-core European government bonds intensiﬁed the European sovereign
debt crisis.
full term structure of on-the-run series of the four credit indices, in which case the average
in Equation (1.1) is taken over 16 index series. Third, we include the immediate off-the-
run series, i.e., the series that most recently became off-the-run, of the four credit indices
(with ﬁve-year maturities), in which case the average in Equation (1.1) is taken over eight
index series. The original CDS market illiquidity measure is very highly correlated with these
alternative constructions both in levels (correlations between 0.97 and 0.99) and weekly
changes (correlations between 0.87 and 0.98). We prefer the original construction because it is
more parsimonious.
1.2.5 Determinants of CDSMarket Illiquidity
An advantage of our illiquidity measure is that it captures many dimensions of illiquidity in
the CDS market, including constraints on the risk-bearing capacity of ﬁnancial intermediaries.
Here, we investigate the relation between our illiquidity measure and alternative measures
of CDS market illiquidity as well as measures of intermediary constraints. Exact deﬁnitions
of all variables are provided in Appendix A.1 and their time-series dynamics are exhibited in
names from the iTraxx Eur. iTraxx Eur Sub Finls comprises the same reference names as the iTraxx Eur Sr Finls, but
reference obligations are subordinated. CDX.NA.HY.BB and CDX.NA.HY.B comprise, respectively, BB- and B-rated
reference names from the CDX.NA.HY.
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Figure A.1 at the end of Appendix A.
We consider three alternative measures of CDS market illiquidity. The ﬁrst measure is the
average bid-ask spread of single-name CDSs. When average bid-ask spreads are wider, index
arbitrage is more expensive, and index-to-CDS bases can drift further away from zero before
index arbitrage becomes proﬁtable. The second measure is the absolute spread change per
contributed quote, averaged across single-name CDSs. To the extent that volume can be
proxied by the number of contributors, this captures the price impact of CDS trades much like
the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure. The third measure is the absolute change in the index
level per contributed quote, averaged across on-the-run credit indices. This captures the price
impact of index trades. We expect higher CDS market illiquidity the higher the price impact of
trade for single-name and index contracts.
We consider several measures of funding and capital constraints of ﬁnancial intermediaries.
Unsecured funding costs are proxied by the LIBOR-OIS spread (see, e.g., Filipovic´ and Trolle
(2013)), secured funding costs are proxied by the spread between Agency MBS and Treasury
general collateral repo rates (see, e.g., Bartolini, Hilton, Sundaresan, and Tonetti (2011)), and
intermediary equity capital is proxied by the market capitalization of the ﬁnancial institutions
that make up the G14 group of major credit derivatives dealers. We also include indirect
measures of the risk-bearing capacity of the intermediary sector including market volatility
proxied by the VIX index (see, e.g., Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)), the Hu, Pan, and Wang
(2013) “Noise” measure of deviations of Treasury yields from a smooth yield curve, and the
CDS-bond basis averaged across U.S. investment-grade bonds (see, e.g., Dufﬁe (2010) and
Mitchell and Pulvino (2012)).
We run univariate regressions of monthly changes in the CDS market illiquidity measure on
monthly changes in the explanatory variables. We run regressions in ﬁrst differences to avoid
spurious results due to persistence of the dependent and explanatory variables (unit root tests
are available upon request). For those measures that are available at a daily frequency, we
obtain the monthly time series by averaging daily observations within each month. Panel A of
Table 1.2 shows the regression results with Newey and West (1987) t-statistics given in brackets,
and Panel B reports correlations of monthly changes in the explanatory variables.25 All slope
coefﬁcients have the expected sign. The CDS market illiquidity measure is signiﬁcantly related
to bid-ask spreads (t-stat of 4.29, R2 of 0.36), the price impact of credit index trades (t-stat
of 3.04, R2 of 0.18), unsecured funding costs (t-stat of 2.06, R2 of 0.08), intermediary equity
capital (t-stat of -2.42, R2 of 0.12), the VIX index (t-stat of 2.68, R2 of 0.12), the “Noise” measure
(t-stat of 6.27, R2 of 0.46), and the CDS-bond basis (t-stat of -3.24, R2 of 0.26).26 This conﬁrms
the multidimensional nature of our CDS market illiquidity measure, including its relation to
25 As can be seen from Panel B of Table 1.2, many of the explanatory variables are relatively highly correlated.
Thus, a multivariate regression including all variables will be subject to multicollinearity. Collectively, all variables
together explain 67% of the time-series variation of the CDS market illiquidity measure.
26 That the CDS market illiquidity measure is not signiﬁcantly related to secured funding costs indicates that
index arbitrage traders primarily fund their trades in unsecured interbank markets, which is consistent with the
fact that CDSs cannot be used as collateral in repo transactions.
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1.2. Measuring CDSMarket Illiquidity
the risk-bearing capacity of the intermediary sector.
1.2.6 Tradable Liquidity Factor
An additional advantage of our illiquidity measure is that its innovations can be closely tracked
by a tradable liquidity factor based on index arbitrage strategies. For each index, we consider
a trading strategy that proﬁts from a narrowing of the index-to-CDS basis. If the index trades
above its CDS-implied level, the strategy sells protection on the index contract and buys
protection via the replicating basket of single-name CDSs. If the index trades below its CDS-
implied level, the strategy is the reverse trade. As shown in Section 1.2.2, if held to the index’s
maturity, this strategy is an arbitrage in a textbook sense. However, for a shorter holding
period, the strategy is risky. For some index i , the holding period excess return on the strategy
is given by
sgn
(
Bi ,t−1
)(
r IDXi ,t − r CDSi ,t
)
, (1.2)
where r IDXi ,t and r
CDS
i ,t denote holding period excess returns from selling protection on the index
contract and via its replicating basket of single-name CDSs, respectively, and Bi ,t−1 is the
index-to-CDS basis at the beginning of the holding period.27 Because excess returns on the
strategy are positive when index-to-CDS bases narrow, excess returns should be negatively
correlated with changes in the absolute basis.
We construct the tradable liquidity factor, LIQt , by aggregating the excess returns on the
individual index arbitrage strategies using the same weighting scheme as for CDSILLIQt ; that
is,
LIQt =
nt∑
i=1
wi ,t−1 sgn
(
Bi ,t−1
)(
r IDXi ,t − r CDSi ,t
)
, (1.3)
where the weights, wi ,t−1, are given in Section 1.2.4. We use a one-week holding period
because the asset pricing model in Section 1.3 is estimated at a weekly frequency. Descriptive
statistics of the returns on the individual index arbitrage trades are given in Panel A of Table 1.3.
There is considerable variation in the means and standard deviations of excess returns and
the annualized Sharpe ratios, using Lo’s (2002) correction for non-i.i.d. excess returns, are
between 1.15 and 2.42. These Sharpe ratios are not directly realizable for an index arbitrageur
because we ignore transaction costs.
Figure 1.3 displays the time-series evolution of the tradable liquidity factor. Its correlation
with changes in the CDS market illiquidity measure is -0.80. The factor’s annualized mean and
standard deviation are 2.65% and 1.20%, respectively, and its annualized Sharpe ratio, using
Lo’s (2002) correction for non-i.i.d. excess returns, is 2.52. The high Sharpe ratio of the factor
reﬂects the diversiﬁcation that comes from the moderate correlations between the excess
27We compute holding period excess returns fromupfront amounts on credit index contracts and their replicating
baskets of single-name CDSs, see Appendix A.2 for details.
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Panel A: Return Descriptive Statistics
CDX.NA.IG CDX.NA.HY iTraxx Eur iTraxx Xover
Mean 4.74 12.90 2.88 12.31
Standard Deviation 21.60 72.95 16.30 44.71
Sharpe Ratio 2.42 1.49 1.59 1.15
Skewness 0.67 0.25 0.84 0.70
Kurtosis 13.61 6.00 9.45 6.14
ρ1 -0.11 -0.06 -0.01 0.04
N 277 268 279 277
Panel B: Pairwise Correlations
CDX.NA.IG CDX.NA.HY iTraxx Eur iTraxx Xover
CDX.NA.IG 0.18 0.43 0.09
CDX.NA.HY 0.23 0.14
iTraxx Eur 0.28
Table 1.3: Descriptive Statistics of Index Arbitrage Returns.
The table displays descriptive statistics of one-week excess returns on the trading strategies underlying the
construction of the tradable liquidity factor. Mean and standard deviation are in basis points per week, the
Sharpe ratio is annualized using Lo’s (2002) correction for non-i.i.d. excess returns, and ρ1 denotes ﬁrst-order
autocorrelation. The sample period is from October 4, 2006 to February 1, 2012. N denotes the number of weekly
observations.
returns on the individual arbitrage trades, see Panel B of Table 1.3.
1.3 Pricing of Liquidity Risk
This section investigates whether exposure to our liquidity factor is priced in the cross section
of returns on CDS contracts. Recent models of intermediary asset pricing predict that proxies
for the risk-bearing capacity of ﬁnancial intermediaries show up as pricing factors; see, e.g.,
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), He and Krishnamurthy (2013), and Kondor and Vayanos
(2014). As argued above, our liquidity factor reﬂects ﬂuctuations in the risk-bearing capacity
of CDS market intermediaries, so we view it as a plausible candidate for a priced risk factor.
In particular, given that dealers/intermediaries are mostly net sellers of credit protection on
single-name CDSs, we expect that, from a protection seller’s perspective, liquidity betas are
positive (realized excess returns on CDS contracts correlate positively with the liquidity factor),
the price of liquidity risk is positive (expected excess returns are higher on contracts with
higher liquidity exposures), and factor prices of risk increase when intermediary constraints
tighten.
1.3.1 Asset PricingModel
We apply a parsimonious factor pricing model in which two systematic risk factors determine
CDS returns: default risk and liquidity risk. This may seem overly simplistic in light of the
multitude of risk factors brought forward in the empirical asset pricing literature in recent
16
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Figure 1.3: Liquidity Factor.
The ﬁgure displays one-week excess returns (in %) on the tradable liquidity factor. The time series consists of
279 weekly observations from October 4, 2006 to February 1, 2012. Dotted vertical lines correspond to (from
left to right) the collapse of two Bear Stearns structured-credit hedge funds on June 20, 2007, the Bear Stearns
near-bankruptcy on March 17, 2008, the default of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, and July 1, 2011
marking the beginning of a month in which a sharp sell-off in non-core European government bonds intensiﬁed
the European sovereign debt crisis.
decades, but we show below that our results are robust to adding a range of additional risk
factors, including a broad stock market factor, a volatility factor, and several liquidity factors
from other markets.28
Realized excess returns on the CDS contract referencing entity i , r ei ,t , are given by
r ei ,t =αi +βDEFi DEFt +βLIQi LIQt +i ,t , (1.4)
where DEFt denotes a default factor, LIQt is the tradable liquidity factor from Section 1.2.6,
βi s denote factor exposures, and i ,t denotes nonsystematic risk. DEFt is the realized excess
return from selling protection on the CDX.NA.IG and iTraxx Eur indices, with equal weights
on the two indices. Unconditional expected excess returns are given by
E [r ei ,t ]=βDEFi λDEF+βLIQi λLIQ, (1.5)
where λs denote factor prices of risk.
The factor pricing model is estimated by the standard two-step methodology in which full-
sample betas are estimated in the ﬁrst step and market prices of risk are estimated in the
28In addition, we ﬁnd that the Fama and French (1993) size and book-to-market equity factors are irrelevant for
the pricing of CDSs.
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second step from a single cross-sectional regression of expected excess returns on full-sample
betas.29 Speciﬁcally, in the ﬁrst step, we estimate full-sample betas from (1.4) using weekly
realized execess returns. These are computed from a protection seller’s perspective assuming
that CDS contracts are covered by collateral agreements and marked to market on a weekly
basis. In this case, each realized excess return is the weekly change in the mark-to-market
value of the contract relative to the collateral amount posted at the beginning of the weekly
period. We assume that this collateral amount equals the notional of the contract resulting
in an “unlevered” return.30 It is standard practice in the CDS literature to work with such
“unlevered” returns; see, e.g., Berndt and Obreja (2010), Bongaerts et al. (2011), and Bao and
Pan (2013). It also has the advantage of making returns comparable in magnitude to returns
on corporate bonds. Details of the return computation are given in Appendix A.2.
In the second step, we estimate factor prices of risk (and potentially an intercept c) from the
sample counterpart to (1.5); that is,
Ê [r ei ,t ]= c+ β̂DEFi λDEF+ β̂LIQi λLIQ+ui , (1.6)
where β̂i s denote the estimated factor exposures, Ê [r ei ,t ] denotes an estimate of the uncondi-
tional expected excess return, and ui denotes the pricing error. In the empirical asset pricing
literature, unconditional expected excess returns are typically estimated by sample means of
realized excess returns. However, because of the short sample period and the fact that credit
events are rare and have a dramatic impact on returns when they occur, sample means of
realized excess returns are very imprecise estimates of unconditional expected excess returns
on CDSs. Instead, we follow Bongaerts et al. (2011) in obtaining forward-looking estimates
of conditional expected excess returns by using Moody’s KMV Expected Default Frequencies
(EDFs) to calculate expected default losses, see Appendix A.2 for details.31 Unconditional
expected excess returns are then estimated by the sample means of conditional expected
excess returns. That is, Ê [r ei ,t ] in regression (1.6) is given by
Ê [r ei ,t ]=
1
T
T∑
s=1
Ês[r
e
i ,s+1], (1.7)
where T denotes the sample size.
We emphasize that the accuracy of the conditional expected excess return estimates depends
on EDFs being accurate estimates of conditional default probabilities. EDFs are unbiased
estimates of average default rates that are based on a structural model in spirit of Merton
29Kan et al. (2013) give a recent exposition of the two-step methodology and note that “some studies allow βˆ to
change throughout the sample period.... It has become more customary in recent decades to use full-period beta
estimates for portfolios formed by ranking ... on various characteristics.” We follow this approach.
30In reality, most counterparties post collateral amounts that are smaller than contract notionals.
31Our approach is similar in spirit to Campello, Chen, and Zhang (2008) who estimate factor pricing models
for equity returns. They estimate betas using realized returns and run cross-sectional regressions using forward-
looking estimates of conditional expected excess returns.
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(1974), book values of debt, and market values of equity.32 As shown in Dufﬁe, Saita, and
Wang (2007), there exist econometric speciﬁcations of conditional default probabilities that
have marginally higher predictive power than EDFs. However, EDFs have the advantage of
being readily available for reference names in our sample and widely used in practice. As such,
they are part of the information set of most market participants. Compared to credit ratings,
EDFs adjust faster to new information and, consequently, have superior predictive power.
Recent studies including Korablev and Qu (2009) and Crossen and Zhang (2011) conﬁrm the
performance of EDFs for predicting defaults during both the ﬁnancial crisis and the pre-crisis
period.
The empirical setup necessitates several adjustments to the standard errors in regression (1.6).
First, an errors-in-variables (EIV) adjustment arising from betas being estimated. Second, an
adjustment for heteroscedastic and autocorrelated errors. Third, an adjustment for potential
model misspeciﬁcation, arising from the possibility that, even in population, there is no combi-
nation of λs such that Equation (1.5) is satisﬁed. To make these three adjustments, we use the
approach of Kan et al. (2013). Adjusting standard errors for potential model misspeciﬁcation
allows one to draw inference on the relation between betas and expected excess returns in
cases where betas do not explain the entire cross-sectional variation in expected excess returns.
As shown in Kan et al. (2013), ignoring potential model misspeciﬁcation typically leads to an
overly positive assessment of the performance of an asset pricing model and the signiﬁcance
with which risk factors are priced (see also Gospodinov, Kan, and Robotti (2014) and the
discussion in Ludvigson (2013)). Details of the standard error computation are provided in
Appendix A.5. For comparison, we also report t-statistics based on generalized method of
moments standard errors, which adjust for EIV as well as heteroscedastic and autocorrelated
errors but not for potential model misspeciﬁcation.
1.3.2 Data and Portfolio Construction
Data
The daily data that we use in the construction of our sample come from Markit, Bloomberg,
and Moody’s Analytics and extend from June 1, 2006 to February 1, 2012. From Markit, we
collect ﬁve-year composite mid CDS spreads, consensus expected recovery rates, and the
average credit rating by Moody’s and S&P for all companies domiciled in North America and
Europe. We focus on CDS contracts written on senior unsecured debt and denominated
in either EUR or USD.33 From Bloomberg, we obtain composite bid and ask CDS spreads,
with the matching of CDS contracts from the two sources based on the reference entities’
32Berndt, Douglas, Dufﬁe, Ferguson, and Schranz (2005) and Vassalou and Xing (2004) give more detailed
accounts of the methodology on which EDFs are based.
33 We select those contract terms that, on a given date, were the market standard. That is, for EUR denominated
contracts, we select the modiﬁed-modiﬁed restructuring clause and for USD denominated contracts referencing
high-yield names, we select the no restructuring clause. For USD denominated contracts referencing investment-
grade names, we select the modiﬁed restructuring clause prior to 2009 and the no restructuring clause thereafter,
in order to account for a change in the market standard resulting from ISDA’s “Big Bang” Protocol.
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six-digit Reference Entity Database (RED) codes and the currency denominations. From
Moody’s Analytics, we obtain one-year and ﬁve-year EDFs for all public companies that are
contained in the Markit database. Thus, our sample consists of North American and European
reference names with data coverage by each of the three providers. Credit events in our sample
are identiﬁed from settlement auctions of CDSs, and we collect credit event data from the
corresponding settlement protocols and auction results.34
Because the key ingredients to our asset pricing tests, namely realized and expected CDS
excess returns, are inferred from mid CDS spreads, we ﬁlter those for stale quotes. A quote is
classiﬁed as stale, once it does not change over ﬁve or more consecutive trading days. In this
case, only the spread quotation on the ﬁrst of the consecutive days is retained in the sample,
while the remaining ones are excluded.
From the collected data, we compute weekly time series of realized and conditional expected
excess returns, bid-ask spreads, and price impact measures. Due to a considerable number of
missing bid-ask spreads, we use weekly averages of bid-ask spreads instead of end-of-period
observations. The price impact measure is constructed as in Section 1.2.5, with the exception
that we average absolute spread changes per contributed quote over one-week as opposed
to one-month periods. Weekly observations are sampled on Wednesdays and we exclude all
entities with less than ﬁfty joint observations. This leaves a sample of 666 reference entities,
of which 426 are domiciled in North America and 240 in Europe, and a total of 144,163 joint
observations.
Portfolio Construction
Because individual-asset betas are usually very imprecisely estimated, we conduct our analysis
on a set of 40 equally-weighted portfolios rather than at the level of individual CDSs. Portfolios
are rebalanced at a quarterly frequency and formed such that they exhibit variation across the
default risk and liquidity dimensions.
The portfolio formation is as follows: on month-ends of March, June, September, and Decem-
ber of a given year, we ﬁrst sort reference names from best to worst credit quality according
to the average issuer credit rating over the previous quarter, and then group them into ﬁve
credit rating categories: AAA–AA, A, BBB, BB, and B–CCC. Subsequently, we sort reference
names within a given default risk group from most liquid to least liquid either according to
the average bid-ask spread over the previous quarter or according to the average price impact
over the previous quarter. In both cases, we group reference names into illiquidity quartiles.
Because the ﬁrst quarter of data is used for portfolio formation, this procedure yields portfolio
time series from October 11, 2006 to February 1, 2012. During this period, we ﬁnd two weeks in
which only a small number of North American reference names have quoted bid-ask spreads.
34Creditex and Markit administrate credit event auctions and publish auction results on www.creditﬁxings.com.
Settlement protocols are published by the ISDA.
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DEF LIQ
Mean 0.46 5.13
Standard Deviation 41.78 16.74
Skewness -0.43 0.98
Kurtosis 4.93 14.85
ρ1 -0.13 0.01
Table 1.4: Descriptive Statistics of Factors.
The table displays descriptive statistics for the default and liquidity factors. Mean and standard deviation are
in basis points per week, and ρ1 denotes ﬁrst-order autocorrelation. Factor time series consist of 276 weekly
observations from October 11, 2006 to February 1, 2012.
We exclude the corresponding portfolio observations from the analysis, leaving a total of 276
one-week periods during the sample period.
1.3.3 Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.4 displays descriptive statistics for the two factors. During our sample period, the
average realized excess return on the default factor is positive, but not statistically signiﬁcant.
In contrast, the average realized excess return on the liquidity factor is positive and signiﬁcant,
with a Newey and West (1987) t-statistic of 5.06. The two factors are virtually uncorrelated,
with a correlation coefﬁcient of -0.01.
Table 1.5 displays descriptive statistics for the 20 portfolios formed by ﬁrst sorting CDS con-
tracts according to credit ratings and then according to bid-ask spreads. Descriptive statistics
for the remaining 20 portfolios are provided in Table A.1 at the end of Appendix A. Sample
means of expected excess returns are positive across portfolios and strongly signiﬁcant with
Newey and West (1987) t-statistics between 4.13 and 11.14.35 This reﬂects the fact that risk
neutral default probabilities, on average, exceed physical default probabilities. Expected
excess returns tend to increase with portfolio illiquidity and deteriorating credit quality. For in-
stance, among the bid-ask-spread-sorted portfolios, we observe a difference of 5.45% per year
in the expected excess return between a portfolio consisting of the most illiquid low-credit-
quality CDSs (B–CCCQ4) and a portfolio consisting of the most liquid high-credit-quality CDSs
(AAA–AAQ1). Sample means of realized excess returns are not signiﬁcantly different from zero,
underscoring the importance of using forward-looking information when estimating expected
35Overall, the portfolios exhibit ex-post the properties they were chosen to reﬂect ex-ante with CDS spreads (bid-
ask spreads) of the bid-ask-spread-sorted portfolios increasing from 45 bps (4 bps) for the portfolio consisting of
the most liquid high-credit-quality CDSs to 1710 bps (109 bps) for the portfolio consisting of the most illiquid low-
credit-quality CDSs. Similarly, CDS spreads (price-impact measures) of the price-impact-sorted portfolios increase
from 42 bps (0.12 bps per contributed quote) for the portfolio consisting of the most liquid high-credit-quality
CDSs to 1701 bps (8.86 bps per contributed quote) for the portfolio consisting of the most illiquid low-credit-quality
CDSs.
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Expected Excess Returns Realized Excess Returns
Bid-Ask Spread Bid-Ask Spread
Credit Rating Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
AAA–AA 0.35 0.40 0.40 0.64 -0.74 -0.25 -0.49 0.22
[6.75] [7.54] [6.22] [6.27] [-1.06] [-0.33] [-0.52] [0.14]
A 0.38 0.44 0.53 0.97 -0.62 -0.59 -0.18 0.85
[7.70] [7.17] [5.81] [4.13] [-0.80] [-0.60] [-0.12] [0.25]
BBB 0.53 0.69 0.92 1.58 -0.73 -0.43 0.38 2.22
[9.61] [7.27] [6.42] [4.95] [-0.78] [-0.29] [0.17] [0.48]
BB 1.32 1.75 2.19 3.07 -1.34 0.50 2.12 6.50
[9.96] [9.50] [8.84] [8.48] [-0.59] [0.17] [0.47] [0.91]
B–CCC 2.98 2.94 4.17 5.80 -2.54 6.72 6.67 25.38
[9.89] [11.14] [6.92] [5.19] [-0.45] [0.85] [0.66] [1.41]
CDS Spreads Standard Deviations
Bid-Ask Spread Bid-Ask Spread
Credit Rating Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
AAA–AA 0.45 0.52 0.74 1.20 1.33 1.75 3.11 4.38
A 0.53 0.67 0.86 1.97 1.55 1.99 2.57 5.51
BBB 0.74 1.00 1.35 2.68 1.98 2.57 3.33 5.76
BB 1.96 2.64 3.54 5.69 4.74 5.81 7.32 9.56
B–CCC 4.70 6.06 9.33 17.10 9.82 18.01 17.74 27.63
Table 1.5: Descriptive Statistics of Bid-Ask-Spread-Sorted Portfolios.
The table displays descriptive statistics for the 20 portfolios formed by ﬁrst sorting CDS contracts according
to credit ratings and then according to bid-ask spreads. The upper part of the table reports sample means of
conditional expected excess returns (in % per year) and realized excess returns (in % per year). In brackets are
t-statistics based on Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors
with 24 lags. The lower part of the table reports sample means of average ﬁve-year CDS spreads across portfolio
constituents (in % per year) and standard deviations of realized excess returns (in % per year). Portfolio time series
consist of 276 weekly observations from October 11, 2006 to February 1, 2012.
excess returns. Standard deviations of realized excess returns also increase with portfolio illiq-
uidity and deteriorating credit quality, and the resulting unconditional and forward-looking
annualized Sharpe ratios lie in a reasonable range from 0.13 to 0.32.
Factor Exposures
First-step regression results are displayed in Table 1.6. For ease of interpretation, instead of
reporting the raw beta estimates, we report the product of the beta estimates and the standard
deviations of the respective factors. Consequently, the table shows weekly realized portfolio
excess returns (in bps) in response to a one standard deviation shock to each of the factors.
Default betas are positive and statistically signiﬁcant throughout portfolios and almost mono-
tonically increasing along both the liquidity and credit quality dimensions. Default risk is
economically important with a one standard deviation shock to the default factor having an
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Panel A: Bid-Ask-Spread-Sorted Portfolios
DEF LIQ
Bid-Ask Spread Bid-Ask Spread
Credit Rating Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
AAA–AA 13.13 19.85 34.10 46.41 4.86 2.91 3.25 5.39
[11.78] [8.83] [7.08] [16.00] [2.30] [1.16] [0.95] [1.15]
A 17.36 22.20 30.45 59.52 5.30 8.25 8.92 14.21
[11.05] [18.61] [12.50] [10.55] [1.97] [2.26] [2.33] [1.80]
BBB 22.65 28.45 36.81 60.87 8.19 11.61 13.30 19.03
[16.55] [17.03] [13.03] [9.36] [3.42] [2.67] [2.46] [2.19]
BB 50.93 63.01 77.22 92.88 15.75 20.89 25.92 32.20
[8.02] [11.10] [8.56] [9.57] [5.95] [3.78] [2.89] [3.98]
B–CCC 75.70 106.22 155.65 198.60 58.40 26.48 46.38 80.51
[6.02] [8.38] [8.44] [4.93] [3.24] [1.92] [3.66] [1.89]
Panel B: Price-Impact-Sorted Portfolios
DEF LIQ
Price Impact Price Impact
Credit Rating Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
AAA–AA 10.52 19.94 30.35 51.12 4.20 4.61 4.17 2.93
[12.99] [8.00] [9.63] [11.99] [2.31] [1.76] [1.25] [0.64]
A 13.05 20.02 29.63 68.99 4.96 7.21 11.60 12.50
[13.51] [11.40] [11.37] [12.49] [2.31] [2.26] [2.28] [1.65]
BBB 17.10 24.98 41.10 66.26 6.17 11.46 13.55 21.59
[11.34] [14.53] [11.92] [12.78] [2.51] [2.76] [2.46] [2.47]
BB 35.63 66.15 82.18 108.10 10.64 22.22 32.03 26.98
[16.55] [11.75] [10.88] [8.99] [3.93] [3.55] [3.54] [3.96]
B–CCC 71.54 116.00 142.19 204.54 51.36 45.45 41.84 63.12
[8.88] [11.08] [7.65] [4.47] [3.22] [3.53] [3.22] [1.50]
Table 1.6: Results of Time-Series Regressions.
The table displays ﬁrst-step regression results at the level of individual portfolios. Reported are beta estimates
times the standard deviation of the respective factors; i.e., the weekly realized portfolio excess returns (in basis
points) in response to a one standard deviation shock to the factors. In brackets are t-statistics based on Newey
and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors with 24 lags. Time series consist
of 276 weekly observations from October 11, 2006 to February 1, 2012.
impact on portfolio excess returns between 11 bps and 205 bps.
Liquidity betas are positive throughout portfolios and statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve-
percent level for 29 out of the 40 portfolios. Liquidity betas also tend to increase along the
liquidity and credit quality dimensions. However, especially along the liquidity dimension
there are exceptions indicating that portfolios with higher bid-ask spreads or price impact
measures do not necessarily exhibit higher liquidity risk. Liquidity risk is also economically
important with a one standard deviation shock to the liquidity factor having an impact on
portfolio excess returns between 3 bps and 81 bps. Unreported adjusted R2s of the regressions
range from 19% to 78% across portfolios.36
36Unreported results for nested one-factor speciﬁcations of regression (1.4) show that, on their own, each of the
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Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6
c -0.39 0.25 -0.34
(-0.86) (0.61) (-1.01)
[-0.91] [0.50] [-1.03]
λDEF 2.23 1.43 2.40 1.60
(4.70) (6.26) (3.59) (4.20)
[4.84] [5.49] [3.70] [4.06]
λLIQ 2.53 0.94 2.42 0.92
(4.30) (4.82) (3.86) (5.07)
[4.47] [2.77] [4.00] [2.71]
R2 0.94 0.88 0.97 0.95 0.88 0.98
[0.89,0.99] [0.68,1.00] [0.95,0.99] [0.91,0.98] [0.70,1.00] [0.96,0.99]
Table 1.7: Results of Cross-Sectional Regressions.
The table displays results of several speciﬁcations of the second-step regression. Speciﬁcations of Ê [r ei ,t ] =
c + β̂DEFi λDEF + β̂
LIQ
i λLIQ +ui are estimated from expected excess returns and beta estimates inferred from
time series that consist of 276 weekly observations from October 11, 2006 to February 1, 2012. Reported are
factor price of risk estimates (in basis points), t-statistics based on asymptotic generalized method of moments
standard errors that account for error-in-variables problems (in parenthesis), t-statistics based on Kan, Robotti,
and Shanken’s (2013) asymptotic standard errors that account for error-in-variables problems and potential
model misspeciﬁcation (in brackets), cross-sectional R2s, and their 95% conﬁdence intervals. Standard errors are
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent through the use of Newey and West’s (1987) method with 24 lags.
Factor Prices of Risk
Second-step regression results for alternative speciﬁcations of the cross-sectional regres-
sion (1.6) are displayed in Table 1.7. The table shows regression coefﬁcients with t-statistics
that account for EIV and heteroscedastic and autocorrelated errors reported in parentheses,
and t-statistics that in addition account for potential model misspeciﬁcation reported in
brackets. The table also shows cross-sectional R2s with 95% conﬁdence intervals in brackets.
These conﬁdence intervals are computed along the lines of Kan et al. (2013), with details
deferred to Appendix A.5.
Factors carry signiﬁcant prices of risk in one- and two-factor models regardless of whether
standard errors are adjusted for potential model misspeciﬁcation or not. For instance, in the
two-factor speciﬁcation with an imposed zero-intercept restriction (speciﬁcation 3), the most
conservative t-statistics are 5.49 and 2.77 for the default and liquidity factors, respectively.
Restricting intercepts to zero is inconsequential because they are small in magnitude and not
statistically signiﬁcant (see speciﬁcations 4–6). In other words, model speciﬁcations cannot
be rejected based on the average abnormal expected returns that they produce. The positive
sign on the price of liquidity risk implies that sellers of credit protection earn higher expected
excess returns on contracts with higher liquidity exposures. Cross-sectional R2s are substantial
across model speciﬁcations, which is, in part, a consequence of using less-noisy and forward-
two factors constitutes a signiﬁcant explanatory variable of CDS portfolio excess returns.
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Spec. BM 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Def. Risk 3.30 2.69 2.72 5.13 3.59 2.92 3.35 3.12 1.75 2.78
[1.08] [0.88] [0.89] [1.68] [1.17] [0.97] [1.11] [1.02] [0.80] [0.88]
Liq. Risk 2.21 2.04 2.20 2.14 1.59 2.22 2.02 1.61 2.21
[0.59] [0.55] [0.59] [0.59] [0.43] [0.59] [0.54] [0.46] [0.59]
Charact./ 1.14 0.93 0.00 1.32 -0.13 0.52 2.49 0.33
Add. Risk [0.21] [0.15] [0.00] [0.24] [-0.02] [0.09] [0.35] [0.18]
Table 1.8: Decompositions of Expected Excess Returns.
The table displays decompositions of expected excess returns for the benchmark model speciﬁcation and the
robustness checks. Annualized expected excess returns are decomposed into contributions of characteristics/ad-
ditional factor risk premia. Reported are the contributions of these components (in % per year) to the difference
in the expected excess return between the bid-ask-spread-sorted B–CCCQ4 and AAA–AAQ1 portfolios and, in
brackets, the contributions of these components to the average expected excess return across the 40 portfolios.
Speciﬁcation identiﬁers are given in the second row of the table.
looking information when estimating expected excess returns. For instance, our preferred
model speciﬁcation (speciﬁcation 3; henceforth, the benchmark model or BM speciﬁcation)
has a cross-sectional R2 of 0.97, and the speciﬁcation test of Kan et al. (2013) cannot reject the
null hypothesis H0 :R2 = 1 (the p-value is 0.21).
To assess the economic importance of the risk factors, we use the benchmark model speciﬁca-
tion to decompose the annualized expected excess return on each portfolio into default and
liquidity risk premia (deﬁned as 52× β̂Fi × λ̂F , F ∈ {DEF, LIQ}). We summarize the results in
two ways. First, we consider the contributions of these components to the difference in the
expected excess return between the two extreme (bid-ask-spread-sorted) portfolios B–CCCQ4
and AAA–AAQ1. We use the term expected return differential to refer to this difference. Second,
we consider the contributions to the average expected excess return across all portfolios.
The ﬁrst column of Table 1.8 shows the contributions to the expected return differential and,
in brackets, the contributions to the average expected excess return. Default and liquidity
risk contribute 3.30% and 2.21% per year, respectively, to the expected return differential (the
remainder is a pricing error). In case of the average expected excess return, default and liquidity
risk contribute 1.08% and 0.59% per year, respectively. That liquidity risk is economically
important is in contrast to the ﬁndings in Bongaerts et al. (2011) and is addressed in more
detail below.
Financial Intermediaries and the Pricing of Risk
We now study time-variation in factor prices of risk and the relation to the risk-bearing capacity
of ﬁnancial intermediaries. On each observation date we estimate the following conditional
version of Equation (1.6):
Êt [r
e
i ,t+1]= β̂DEFi λDEF,t + β̂LIQi λLIQ,t +ui ,t , (1.8)
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Panel A: Default Risk
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Panel B: Liquidity Risk
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Figure 1.4: Factor Prices and Intermediary Equity Capital.
The ﬁgure displays three-month centered moving averages of time-varying factor price of risk estimates (black
lines, left hand scales) and the negative value of intermediary equity capital (gray lines, right hand scales). Panel A
displays the factor price of default risk and Panel B displays the factor price of liquidity risk. The factor price of risk
estimates are in basis points and obtained by cross-sectional regressions of conditional expected excess returns on
full sample beta estimates. Intermediary equity capital is in 100 billion USD and given by the aggregate market
capitalization of ﬁnancial institutions that make up the G14 group of major credit derivatives dealers. The time
series consist of 276 weekly observations between October 11, 2006 and February 1, 2012. Dotted vertical lines
correspond to (from left to right) the collapse of two Bear Stearns structured-credit hedge funds on June 20, 2007,
the Bear Stearns near-bankruptcy on March 17, 2008, the default of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, and
July 1, 2011 marking the beginning of a month in which a sharp sell-off in non-core European government bonds
intensiﬁed the European sovereign debt crisis.
where λi ,ts denote conditional factor prices of risk.37 Figure 1.4 displays time series of the
resulting factor prices of risk (black lines). Panel A shows the price of default risk, while Panel B
shows the price of liquidity risk, and for expositional purposes we display three-month moving
averages that smooth out higher frequency ﬂuctuations. The magnitudes of both factor prices
are particularly high in the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers default and the AIG bailout.
Other periods during which the factor prices of default and liquidity risk are high include
the initial phase of the ﬁnancial crisis as well as the last part of the sample period when the
European sovereign debt crisis intensiﬁed.
Many recent models of intermediary asset pricing imply that prices of risk (in absolute values)
correlate negatively with the risk-bearing capacity of ﬁnancial intermediaries. Moreover, in
most models the risk-bearing capacity of the intermediary sector correlates positively with
its equity capital. For instance, in the models of He and Krishnamurthy (2013) and Kondor
and Vayanos (2014), intermediaries have wealth-dependent (effective) risk aversion and their
risk-bearing capacity is increasing in equity capital. Alternatively, in the models of Gromb
and Vayanos (2002) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), intermediaries face funding
37 Note that because betas in Equation (1.8) are ﬁxed at their full sample estimates, sample means of factor
price of risk estimates in the conditional model coincide with those in the unconditional model; that is λDEF =
1
T
∑T
t=1λDEF,t and λLIQ = 1T
∑T
t=1λLIQ,t .
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Figure 1.5: CDS Spread Decomposition of Bid-Ask-Spread-Sorted Portfolios.
The ﬁgure displays ﬁve-year CDS spreads (in % per year) of the bid-ask-spread-sorted portfolios. CDS spreads are
decomposed into expected default losses, factor risk premia, and pricing errors implied by the benchmark model
speciﬁcation. The horizontal axis displays portfolio identiﬁers.
constraints and their risk-bearing capacity is increasing in equity capital and decreasing in
margin requirements.
To investigate the impact of intermediary frictions on the pricing of CDS contracts, we proxy
the risk-bearing capacity of the intermediary sector by the market capitalization of the ﬁ-
nancial institutions that make up the G14 group of major credit derivatives dealers, see
Section 1.2.5. In addition to factor prices of risk, Figure 1.4 also displays the negative value
of the G14 market capitalization (gray lines). Evidently, periods of low intermediary equity
capital coincide with high factor prices of risk. Indeed, the time-series correlations between
intermediary equity capital and the prices of default and liquidity risk are -0.71 and -0.32, re-
spectively. This is consistent with intermediary frictions affecting the pricing of CDS contracts
and with recent work by Siriwardane (2015) who shows in a post-crisis sample that capital
losses for sellers of credit protection lead to wider CDS spreads.
Decomposing CDS Spreads
As an alternative illustration of economic importance, we decompose CDS spreads instead of
expected excess returns. The CDS spread of each portfolio is decomposed into components
due to default and liquidity risk, as well as an additional component reﬂecting the expected
default loss. The decomposition is based on the conditional model described in the previous
section, and computational details are given in Appendix A.3. Figure 1.5 displays the resulting
decomposition for the 20 bid-ask-spread-sorted portfolios. The corresponding ﬁgure for the
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20 price-impact-sorted portfolios can be found at the end of Appendix A.
We ﬁrst consider the extreme (bid-ask-spread-sorted) portfolios. For the AAA-AAQ1 portfolio,
the average CDS spread is 45 bps of which expected default losses and the default risk premium
account for 7 bps (17%) and 25 bps (56%), respectively, while the liquidity risk premium
accounts for 15 bps (34%) (the remaining -3 bps is a pricing error). At the other end of the
spectrum is the B-CCCQ4 portfolio with an average CDS spread of 1710 bps of which expected
default losses and the default risk premium account for 830 bps (49%) and 537 bps (31%),
respectively, while the liquidity risk premium accounts for 347 bps (20%) (here the pricing
error is -4 bps). Averaging the relative contributions across all portfolios, we ﬁnd that expected
default losses and the default risk premium account for 29% and 47% of model-implied CDS
spreads, respectively, while the liquidity risk premium accounts for 24%.
That expected default losses only account for a relatively small fraction of credit spreads, in
particular for highly rated ﬁrms, is well known; see, e.g., Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann
(2001) and Driessen (2005) for corporate bond yield spreads, and Berndt et al. (2005) for CDS
spreads. There is some disagreement concerning the size of the default risk premium with
some papers using structural credit risk models to argue that only relatively small default
risk premia are consistent with historical default records and equity risk premia (again, in
particular for highly rated ﬁrms; see, e.g., Huang and Huang (2012)), while other papers,
mainly using reduced-form credit risk models, argue that default risk premia are sizable. Our
analysis indicates that the default risk premium is the largest component of CDS spreads.
Most importantly, however, we ﬁnd evidence for a sizable liquidity risk premium.
1.3.4 Robustness Checks
We conduct a range of robustness checks; we control for the contract-speciﬁc level of illiq-
uidity, consider an alternative notion of liquidity risk suggested by Bongaerts et al. (2011),
investigate an alternative construction of our tradable liquidity factor, and include additional
risk factors in the asset pricing model. For each robustness check, ﬁrst-step regression results
are summarized in the text, second-step regression results are reported in Table 1.9, and results
of the expected excess return decomposition are reported in Table 1.8.38 We only report results
for additional factors that are likely to capture similar effects as our liquidity factor. Because
our two measures of economic importance typically give similar results, we only comment on
the expected return differential.
Contract-Speciﬁc Level of Illiquidity
A number of studies have shown that CDS spreads increase with the contract-speciﬁc level
of illiquidity; see, e.g., Tang and Yan (2007), Bühler and Trapp (2009), Bongaerts et al. (2011),
38First-step regression results are available upon request. In the text, we summarize the number of portfolios
that load signiﬁcantly on each additional/alternative factor as well as the sign of betas. We also remark if betas
with respect to the default and liquidity factors change signiﬁcantly upon inclusion of an additional factor.
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Qiu and Yu (2012), Lesplingart et al. (2012), and Pires et al. (2014). Therefore, we control
for the contract-speciﬁc level of illiquidity when assessing liquidity risk. Speciﬁcally, we
separately add bid-ask spreads and the price impact measure as portfolio characteristics to
the second-step regression. Unreported results show that, on their own, both bid-ask spreads
and the price impact measure are signiﬁcantly and positively related to expected excess
returns, corroborating ﬁndings in previous papers. However, in conjunction with default and
liquidity betas neither bid-ask spreads nor the price impact measure are signiﬁcantly related to
expected excess returns (see speciﬁcations 1 and 2 in Tables 1.8 and 1.9, respectively). As such,
it appears that default and liquidity risk largely subsume the effect of the contract-speciﬁc
level of illiquidity. The statistical signiﬁcance and economic importance of liquidity risk are
very similar to the benchmark case.
Alternative Notion of Liquidity Risk
Bongaerts et al. (2011) also investigate the relative importance of contract-speciﬁc illiquidity
(measured by the level of transaction costs) and liquidity risk in the cross section of expected
excess returns on CDS contracts. However, they consider a notion of liquidity risk that is very
different from ours, namely covariation between innovations to contract-speciﬁc transaction
costs and the return on a nontraded default factor. When this covariance is negative—as
it is the case empirically—transaction costs rise in states with high aggregate default risk
and unwinding hedge positions becomes more expensive. This makes CDS contracts less
effective hedges against default risk and should lead to less demand for credit protection and
lower expected excess returns for credit protection sellers. However, the empirical analysis in
Bongaerts et al. (2011) reveals that the premium associated with this notion of liquidity risk is
economically negligible. To investigate if this result also holds true in our more recent and
broader sample of CDSs, we replace, in the cross-sectional regression, betas capturing our
notion of liquidity risk with betas capturing their notion (see speciﬁcation 3 in Tables 9 and
10).39 The price associated with this alternative notion of liquidity risk is both statistically
insigniﬁcant and economically negligible, conﬁrming the results of Bongaerts et al. (2011).40 A
possible reason for the lack of importance of Bongaerts et al.’s (2011) notion of liquidity risk
may be that the majority of CDS contracts are marked to market on a daily basis. This implies
that protection buyers realize gains when aggregate default risk increases without having to
unwind their positions and incur transaction costs.
Alternative Construction of CDSMarket Liquidity Factor
We consider an alternative construction of the tradable liquidity factor in which the excess re-
39 Speciﬁcally, we follow Bongaerts et al. (2011) in estimating single-factor betas of bid-ask spread innovations
with respect to the default factor. We use Bongaerts et al.’s (2011) time-series model of liquidity to compute bid-ask
spread innovations and orthogonalize innovations for stock market returns (i.e., returns on the “nonhedge” asset in
their terminology). These liquidity betas have the expected negative sign but are insigniﬁcant for most portfolios.
40 The same result obtains when adding the alternative liquidity betas to the benchmark model speciﬁcation in
which case the pricing of our notion of liquidity risk is virtually unaffected by the additional betas.
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Ê
[r
e i,
t]
=
β̂
D
E
F
i
λ
D
E
F
+
β̂
LI
Q
i
λ
LI
Q
+β̂
X i
λ
X
+u
i
(s
p
ec
iﬁ
ca
ti
o
n
s
3–
9)
ar
e
es
ti
m
at
ed
fr
o
m
ex
p
ec
te
d
ex
ce
ss
re
tu
rn
s,
b
et
a
es
ti
m
at
es
,a
n
d
sa
m
p
le
m
ea
n
s
o
f
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
in
fe
rr
ed
fr
o
m
ti
m
e
se
ri
es
th
at
co
n
si
st
o
f2
76
w
ee
kl
y
o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
fr
o
m
O
ct
o
b
er
11
,2
00
6
to
Fe
b
ru
ar
y
1,
20
12
.S
p
ec
iﬁ
ca
ti
o
n
id
en
ti
ﬁ
er
s
ar
e
gi
ve
n
in
th
e
se
co
n
d
ro
w
o
ft
h
e
ta
b
le
.R
ep
o
rt
ed
ar
e
fa
ct
o
r
p
ri
ce
o
f
ri
sk
es
ti
m
at
es
(i
n
b
as
is
p
o
in
ts
),
t-
st
at
is
ti
cs
b
as
ed
o
n
as
ym
p
to
ti
c
ge
n
er
al
iz
ed
m
et
h
o
d
o
f
m
o
m
en
ts
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
th
at
ac
co
u
n
t
fo
r
er
ro
r-
in
-v
ar
ia
b
le
s
p
ro
b
le
m
s
(i
n
p
ar
en
th
es
is
),
t-
st
at
is
ti
cs
b
as
ed
o
n
K
an
,R
o
b
o
tt
i,
an
d
Sh
an
ke
n’
s
(2
01
3)
as
ym
p
to
ti
c
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
th
at
ac
co
u
n
t
fo
r
er
ro
r-
in
-v
ar
ia
b
le
s
p
ro
b
le
m
s
an
d
p
o
te
n
ti
al
m
o
d
el
m
is
sp
ec
iﬁ
ca
ti
on
(i
n
b
ra
ck
et
s)
,c
ro
ss
-s
ec
ti
on
al
R
2
s,
an
d
th
ei
r
95
%
co
n
ﬁ
d
en
ce
in
te
rv
al
s.
St
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
h
et
er
os
ce
d
as
ti
ci
ty
an
d
au
to
co
rr
el
at
io
n
co
n
si
st
en
tt
h
ro
u
gh
th
e
u
se
o
fN
ew
ey
an
d
W
es
t’s
(1
98
7)
m
et
h
o
d
w
it
h
24
la
gs
.
30
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turns on the individual index arbitrage strategies are weighted by the inverse of their condi-
tional volatilities (see speciﬁcation 4 in Tables 1.8 and 1.9). This is akin to the construction of
the time series momentum factor in Moskowitz, Ooi, and Pedersen (2012), see Appendix A.4
for details. The resulting factor is very highly correlated with our original liquidity factor and
we obtain results that are similar to those in the benchmark case.
Additional Factors
The Hu, Pan, and Wang (2013) “Noise” measure. Hu et al. (2013) argue that their “Noise” mea-
sure is a broad illiquidity measure that captures the availability of arbitrage capital. Therefore,
we include innovations to their “Noise” measure as an additional factor in the model (see
speciﬁcation 5 in Tables 1.8 and 1.9).41 Seventeen portfolios load signiﬁcantly on this factor,
all with a negative sign. However, the factor price of risk is not statistically signiﬁcant, while
the price of CDS market liquidity risk remains statistically signiﬁcant when ignoring potential
model misspeciﬁcation. This is consistent with the analysis in Section 1.2.5, which identiﬁed
the “Noise” measure as the variable that is most strongly related to variation in CDS market
illiquidity. In terms of economic importance, the “Noise” factor contributes 1.32% per year to
the expected return differential, while the contribution of the CDS market liquidity factor is
reduced somewhat to 1.59%.
Corporate bond market illiquidity factor. Lin et al. (2011) ﬁnd that exposure to market-wide
corporate bond liquidity is priced in the cross section of corporate bond returns. Given the
relation between CDS spreads and corporate bond yields, such exposure may also be priced
in the cross section of CDS returns. Therefore, we include innovations to a corporate bond
market illiquidity measure as an additional factor in the model (see speciﬁcation 6 in Tables 1.8
and 1.9). The corporate bond market illiquidity measure is an aggregate of bond-speciﬁc
Amihud (2002) illiquidity measures, see Appendix A.4 for details.42 Seventeen portfolios load
signiﬁcantly on the corporate bond market illiquidity factor, all with a negative sign. However,
the factor price of risk is neither statistically signiﬁcant nor economically important, while
results for CDS market liquidity risk are almost identical to the benchmark case.
Stock market illiquidity factor. Both Acharya, Amihud, and Bharath (2013) and Bongaerts,
de Jong, and Driessen (2012) ﬁnd that exposure to aggregate liquidity in the stock market is
priced in the cross section of corporate bond returns. To investigate if this also holds true for
CDS returns, we include innovations to a stock market illiquidity measure as an additional
41Because the “Noise” measure is very persistent, we use its innovations as a factor rather than the measure itself.
Innovations are the residuals of an AR(2) model for the time series of the “Noise” measure. The reported results
are not sensitive to the choice of time series model and using ﬁrst-differences of the “Noise” measure gives very
similar results as well. The same comments apply to the corporate bond and stock market illiquidity factors and
the volatility factor that are analyzed in the robustness checks below. We do not take innovations of our liquidity
factor because it exhibits virtually no autocorrelation (see Table 1.4).
42 At a monthly frequency, the corporate bond market illiquidity measure is highly correlated with the corporate
bond market illiquidity measure of Dick-Nielsen, Feldhütter, and Lando (2012). Because Dick-Nielsen et al.’s (2012)
measure is only available at a monthly frequency, we construct our own corporate bond market illiquidity measure.
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factor in the model (see speciﬁcation 7 in Tables 1.8 and 1.9). The stock market illiquidity
measure is an aggregate of stock-speciﬁc Amihud (2002) illiquidity measures, see Appendix A.4
for details.43 Twenty-one portfolios load signiﬁcantly on the stock market illiquidity factor,
all with a negative sign. However, the factor price of risk is statistically insigniﬁcant and of
limited economic importance, while results for CDS market liquidity risk are similar to the
benchmark case.
Stock market factor. We control for stock market risk by including a factor which is the
excess return on an equally weighted portfolio of the S&P 500 and EURO STOXX 50 indices
(see speciﬁcation 8 in Tables 1.8 and 1.9). Fourteen portfolios load signiﬁcantly on the stock
market factor, all but one with a positive sign, and its price of risk is statistically signiﬁcant
and has the expected positive sign. Economically, the factor contributes 2.49% per year to the
expected return differential, and reduces the contribution of the default factor substantially to
1.75%.44 The price of liquidity risk remains statistically signiﬁcant, but the contribution to the
expected return differential is reduced somewhat to 1.61% per year.
Volatility factor. Several papers ﬁnd that volatility is an important risk factor in asset markets;
see, e.g., Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) and Bongaerts et al. (2012) for evidence from
the stock and corporate bond markets, respectively. Therefore, we include innovations to the
VIX index as a factor in the model (see speciﬁcation 9 in Tables 1.8 and 1.9). Twelve portfolios
load signiﬁcantly on the volatility factor, mostly with a negative sign, and its price of risk
is statistically signiﬁcant and has the expected negative sign. Economically, however, the
volatility factor is of limited importance. Results for liquidity risk are similar to the benchmark
case.
1.4 Conclusion
We analyze whether liquidity risk is priced in the cross section of returns on CDS contracts.
First, we construct a model-independent measure of CDS market illiquidity by aggregating de-
viations of credit index levels from their no-arbitrage values implied by the index constituents’
CDS spreads. Second, based on index arbitrage strategies, we design a tradable liquidity factor
that is highly negatively correlated with innovations to the CDS market illiquidity measure.
Third, we deﬁne liquidity risk as covariation between CDS returns and the liquidity factor and
show that liquidity risk is both statistically signiﬁcant and economically important for the
pricing of CDSs. In particular, liquidity risk increases CDS spreads and the expected excess
returns earned by sellers of credit protection. Consistent with recent models of intermediary
asset pricing, we ﬁnd that illiquidity and risk premia correlate negatively with proxies for the
43 Readily available measures of stock market illiquidity such as those of Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) and
Sadka (2006) are only available at a monthly frequency, which is why we construct our own stock market illiquidity
measure.
44 While the price of default risk is largely unaffected, the spread in default betas across portfolios shrinks
substantially when the stock market factor is included in the model.
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risk-bearing capacity of CDS market intermediaries.
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2 Market Structure and Transaction
Costs of Index CDSs
This chapter is based on joint work with Pierre Collin-Dufresne and Anders B. Trolle in which
we study the two-tiered structure of the index CDS market after the implementation of the
Dodd-Frank Act. We identify dealer-to-customer (D2C) trades and interdealer (D2D) trades.
Transaction costs and price impacts are larger for D2C trades and increase with trade size,
quoted bid-ask spread, and volatility. D2C trades Granger-cause D2D trades consistent with
the interdealer market being used for managing inventory risk. Unique order-book data show
the important role of mid-market matching and workup for reducing transaction costs and
price impacts of D2D trades. D2C trades are competitive relative to executable bids and offers
in the interdealer market, suggesting that the market structure delivers favorable prices for
customers who value immediacy.
2.1 Introduction
The index credit default swap (CDS) market constitutes an important component of the
corporate credit market. Index CDSs allow banks, asset managers, and other institutional
investors to efﬁciently hedge and trade aggregate credit risk in the economy. Unlike single-
name CDSs, index CDSs have remained popular since the ﬁnancial crisis with tens of billion
dollars of notional amount traded on a daily basis. Nevertheless, little is known about the cost
of trading in this important market.
The index CDS market is also interesting as a test case of how recent regulation introduced
in the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis affects the structure of swap markets. Since its inception
in 2003, the index CDS market has operated as a classical two-tiered over-the-counter (OTC)
market in which global derivatives dealers provide liquidity to their institutional customers in
the dealer-to-customer (D2C) segment of the market, and dealers trade among themselves
in the interdealer (D2D) segment of the market. New comprehensive regulation following
the Dodd-Frank Act had the potential to change this market structure by mandating trades
in the most liquid index CDSs to be executed on so-called swap execution facilities (SEFs).
These regulated trading platforms are required to offer trading in order books, thus opening up
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the market to all-to-all trading, in which customers could compete with dealers for liquidity
provision. However, SEFs are also allowed to offer trading via request for quote (RFQ), which
more closely mimics traditional trading in OTC markets. Several years after the new regulation
was fully implemented, all-to-all trading has yet to materialize. Instead, the two-tiered market
structure persists, with D2C trades taking place on one group of SEFs (almost exclusively via
name-disclosed RFQs) and D2D trades taking place on another group of SEFs (mostly via
order books) run by interdealer brokers (IDBs).1
The endurance of this bifurcated market structure could suggest that this is indeed the optimal
structure of a market in which trades occur relatively infrequently and in very large sizes;
see, e.g., Giancarlo (2015).2 On the other hand, some market participants have accused
dealers of resisting a transition to an all-to-all market structure in order to preserve their
“monopoly” on liquidity provision; see, e.g., Managed Funds Association (2015).3 In light of
this controversy, the purpose of the paper is twofold: ﬁrst, using transaction data, we provide
a detailed characterization of the two-tiered market structure. Second, we analyze transaction
costs and price impacts across market segments and different credit indices, and estimate
dealer proﬁts from liquidity provision.
We use transaction data from October 2, 2013 (the date on which the ﬁrst SEFs started op-
erating) to October 16, 2015 and we focus on the two most popular credit indices, CDX.IG
and CDX.HY, which cover the investment-grade and high-yield components, respectively, of
the North American corporate credit market. The transaction data include execution times-
tamps, transaction prices, and trade sizes up to certain notional caps. In addition, we develop
algorithms that allow us to identify, for each transaction, the SEF on which the trade took
place and the type of trade (outright trade, index roll, curve trade, or delta hedge of an index
swaption or tranche swap). The SEF on which the trade took place in turn reveals whether the
trade is D2C or D2D.4
Trading volumes are large. The average daily notional amount traded in the D2C segment is
USD 9.843 billion and USD 3.705 billion for CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively. In the D2D
segment, the corresponding numbers are USD 1.354 billion and USD 0.402 billion. Outright
1 Referring to both the index CDS and the interest rate swap markets, a recent article summarized the current
situation as “...dealer banks still trade together privately in one segment of the market and the buy side still
executes via RFQ to the dealers in another. Proponents of this view say that nothing really changed in terms
of how ﬁrms execute swaps except that the buy side has gone from RFQ-ing one dealer to RFQ-ing three. This
appears to be in stark contrast to the all-to-all trading model envisioned for the swaps markets by regulators under
Dodd-Frank.” See “SEFs: A Market Divided,” Proﬁt and Loss, October 22, 2015.
2 Even for the most liquid index CDSs, there are often not more than 100 trades per day and contract notional
amounts are frequently in excess of USD 100 million.
3Dealers are confronted with similar accusations pertaining to the single-name CDS market in which they
allegedly conspired to shut down emerging all-to-all trading venues. Recently, global derivatives dealers agreed to
settle a civil lawsuit brought by a group of institutional investors for USD 1.87 billion (see “Banks Near Pact on
Swaps Suit,” Wall Street Journal, September 12, 2015). Investigations by U.S. and European antitrust authorities
are ongoing as well.
4 Because we identify D2C and D2D trades based on the SEF on which the trade took place, our sample is
limited to the period during which SEFs were in operation and to trades executed on SEFs.
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trades account for the majority of trading volume. Index rolls constitute the second most
important type of trade. Among outright trades, trading activity concentrates in ﬁve-year
CDSs on the most recently issued (on-the-run) index. Among index rolls, trading activity
concentrates in rolls between ﬁve-year CDSs on the on-the-run index and ﬁve-year CDSs on
the previous on-the-run (immediate off-the-run) index. These trade types are the focus of the
paper.
We measure transaction cost as the difference between the transaction price and the contem-
poraneous value of Markit’s intraday mid-quote (the effective half-spread). We measure price
impact as the change in the mid-quote over a period of approximately 15 minutes following
a trade. In case of outright trades, transaction costs of D2C trades are signiﬁcantly higher
than those of D2D trades. For CDX.IG, average transaction costs are 0.137 basis points (bps)
and 0.088 bps for D2C and D2D trades, respectively. The corresponding numbers for CDX.HY
are 0.674 bps and 0.402 bps, respectively. The differences in transaction costs are mostly
due to D2C trades having larger price impacts than D2D trades. For CDX.IG, average price
impacts are 0.106 bps and 0.063 bps for D2C and D2D trades, respectively. The corresponding
numbers for CDX.HY are 0.508 bps and 0.246 bps, respectively. The larger price impact of D2C
trades likely reﬂects the institutional nature of the index CDS market in which customers are
sophisticated investors who may be better than dealers at interpreting public information
regarding aggregate credit risk in the economy.5 In contrast, D2D trades mainly serve to
manage dealers’ inventory risk (see, e.g., Reiss and Werner (1998)). After taking price impact
into account, there is no signiﬁcant difference in transaction costs of D2C and D2D trades.
In contrast to outright trades, index rolls are not informationally motivated but rather mo-
tivated by investors seeking to maintain a liquid credit exposure with a relatively constant
maturity proﬁle. Consistent with this, we ﬁnd that transaction costs and price impacts of index
rolls are both smaller than those of outright trades and similar across D2C and D2D index
rolls.
We investigate how trade characteristics and market conditions affect transaction costs and
price impacts. Transaction costs and price impacts increase with trade size, quoted bid-ask
spread, and volatility implied by index swaptions; i.e., options on index CDSs. Our ﬁndings
regarding differences in transaction costs and price impacts of D2C and D2D trades are robust
to controlling for these determinants in trade-by-trade regressions. Moreover, our ﬁndings
also prevail in subsamples of pairs of D2C and D2D trades with matching trade characteristics
that are executed at around the same time.
We also analyze the dynamics of D2C trades, D2D trades, and quotes using a vector autore-
gressive (VAR) model in the spirit of Hasbrouck (1991a, 1991b). Order ﬂow is persistent and
characterized by one-way Granger causality, with D2C trades Granger-causing D2D trades,
which is consistent with inventory management taking place in the interdealer market. In
5In support of superior information processing by institutional investors, Hendershott, Livdan, and Schürhoff
(2015) show that institutional order ﬂow predicts the occurrence and sentiment of news as well as news-
announcement-day equity market returns.
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line with our ﬁndings based on the above-mentioned 15-minute price impact measure, D2C
trades have larger contemporaneous and cumulative effects on quotes than D2D trades.
Finally, we investigate how the use of trading protocols that are only available in the interdealer
market contribute to the differences in transaction costs and price impacts of D2C and D2D
trades. To this end, we exploit unique order-book data from the main IDB SEF, the GFI Swaps
Exchange. In addition to a standard limit order book, this SEF offers two trading protocols—
mid-market matching and workup—that facilitate trade by means of size discovery; i.e., by
means of quantity exchange at a ﬁxed price (see, e.g., Dufﬁe and Zhu (2015)).6 In contrasts to
marketable orders that execute against the best bid or offer on the order book, the execution
of orders for matching and workup is uncertain because it depends on interests from the other
side of the market.
Mid-market matching is the dominant trading protocol and accounts for 52.2% and 58.6%,
respectively, of the trading volume in ﬁve-year on-the-run CDX.IG and CDX.HY. Workup is
also frequently used and accounts for 19.1% and 14.9%, respectively. Mid-market matches
have signiﬁcantly lower transaction costs and price impacts than order-book trades. This is
consistent with Zhu’s (2014) venue-selection model, in which liquidity traders prefer a mid-
point dark pool (essentially equivalent to continuous mid-market matching) that offers price
improvement but does not guarantee execution, while execution risk causes informed traders
to prefer an exchange that guarantees immediate execution at a market marker’s bid or offer.
By design, a workup is initiated by an order-book trade and occurs at the same transaction
price. However, we ﬁnd that price impacts of workups are close to those of order-book trades
implying that this trading protocol allows to expand the size of an order-book trade with little
additional price impact. These results suggest that size-discovery trading protocols attract
liquidity-motivated trading and contribute to lowering overall transaction costs and price
impacts of D2D trades.
We also use the GFI data to estimate dealer proﬁts from liquidity provision in ﬁve-year on-the-
run index CDSs. Assuming that dealers immediately close D2C trades by mid-market matches,
estimated proﬁts are USD 0.433 million and USD 0.808 million per day in case of CDX.IG and
CDX.HY, respectively. However, assuming that dealers instead close positions at the best bid or
offer on the order book, estimated proﬁts are negative. Because mid-market matching is only
possible when there is interest from the other side of the market, this suggests that dealers
only make proﬁts through their willingness to bear inventory risk.
From a regulatory perspective, our results show that the current two-tiered market structure
delivers favorable prices for customers who value immediacy. The prices that customers
obtain via RFQ are often better than those available on the order books of IDB SEFs. Indeed,
96.0% and 96.6% of the D2C trades in CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively, are executed at prices
6The two trading protocols differ in how the ﬁxed price is determined and in the time span over which quantity
can be exchanged. Mid-market matching is possible at a broker-determined price until the broker resets the price,
while workup is possible at the price of an initiating order-book trade for a short period of time following trade
execution.
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that are strictly more favorable than the best bid or offer on the order book of the GFI Swaps
Exchange. This suggests that regulators should not necessarily strive for all-to-all trading in
swap markets.7 While customers who value immediacy would not be able to save transaction
costs by executing their trades on the order books of IDB SEFs, transaction costs could be
reduced at the expense of execution certainty either through liquidity supplying order-book
trades or through mid-market matching.
The paper is related to a number of studies documenting the impact of the implementation
of Dodd-Frank Act provisions on swap market liquidity. Loon and Zhong (2016) show that
post-trade transparency has a positive impact on liquidity in the index CDS market. Benos,
Payne, and Vasios (2016) show that pre-trade transparency (SEF mandate) has a positive
impact on liquidity in the interest rate swap market. In contrast, we focus on the structure of
the index CDS market after the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act and compare liquidity
and transaction costs across the two segments of the market. Moreover, we contribute to the
literature by showing how some unique features of swap trading such as the packaging of
trades, mid-market matching, and workup affect the cost at which a swap can be traded.
Consistent with our results, Biswas, Nikolova, and Stahel (2015) ﬁnd that, in the single-name
CDS market, D2D trades have lower transaction costs than D2C trades. However, their trans-
action cost estimates are relatively imprecise due to a lack of transaction timestamps. Also,
they do not investigate the price impact of trades, a cost component that we show is crucial
for the comparison of D2C and D2D transaction costs.
In some respects, our results differ from those of studies that analyze transaction costs in
the corporate and municipal bond markets, in which dealers seem to exert market power,
and retail-sized trades have signiﬁcantly higher transaction costs than institutional-sized
trades (see, e.g., Harris and Piwowar (2006), Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007), and Green,
Holliﬁeld, and Schürhoff (2007)).8 Consistent with the institutional nature of the index CDS
market, we ﬁnd D2C transaction costs that increase with trade size.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes the structure of the index CDS market
and the regulatory reforms set forth by the Dodd-Frank Act. Section 2.3 discusses the data
and the identiﬁcation algorithms. Section 2.4 compares D2C and D2D transaction costs
and investigates how transaction costs vary with trade characteristics and market conditions.
Section 2.5 analyzes the dynamics of trades and quotes using VAR methods. Section 2.6 uses
GFI data to investigate transaction costs across different interdealer trading protocols and
to estimate dealer proﬁts from liquidity provision. Section 2.7 concludes, and data-related
details and robustness checks are contained in Appendix B.
7 The regulatory implications go beyond the index CDS market. For instance, the interest rate swap market—
which has been subject to the same set of regulatory reforms—remains two-tiered as well. Moreover, the Dodd-
Frank Act constitutes a template for over-the-counter derivatives market regulations that other jurisdictions are
going to implement in the coming years.
8In similar vein, Schultz (2001) ﬁnds that corporate bond trades of less active institutional investors have higher
transaction costs than those of the most active institutional investors.
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2.2 The Index CDSMarket
This section brieﬂy describes index CDSs and the structure of the market in which these
contracts trade. Furthermore, it discusses regulatory reforms set forth by the Dodd-Frank Act.
2.2.1 Index Credit Default Swaps
An index CDS is a standardized credit derivative contract on a diversiﬁed index of creditors.
Over the life of the contract, the credit protection seller provides default protection on each
index constituent and, in return, receives periodic premium payments according to the ﬁxed
spread of the contract. At initiation, counterparties exchange an upfront amount equal to the
present value of the contract. However, when quoting a contract, market participants often
use the “par spread” which is the ﬁxed spread that makes the upfront amount equal to zero.
We use these par spreads throughout. Typically, contract tenors between one and ten years
can be traded but the ﬁve-year contract tenor is the most liquid.
Twice a year, on the so-called index roll dates in March and September, a new index—or,
more precisely, a new series of an index—is launched, with creditors being revised according
to credit rating and liquidity criteria.9 Creditors that fail to maintain a credit rating within
a speciﬁed range, due to either upgrades or downgrades, and creditors whose single-name
CDSs have deteriorated signiﬁcantly in terms of their trading activity are replaced by the
most actively traded creditors meeting the credit rating requirements. Liquidity is typically
concentrated in the most recently launched index, which is referred to as the on-the-run index.
All previously launched indices are referred to as off-the-run indices.
The administrator of the most popular credit indices is Markit, and its benchmark credit in-
dices of investment-grade and high-yield credit risk in North America are CDX.IG and CDX.HY,
respectively. The former comprises 125North American creditors with investment-grade credit
ratings, and the latter comprises 100 North American creditors with non-investment-grade
credit ratings. These indices are the focus of the paper.
2.2.2 Pre-Dodd-FrankMarket Structure
Index CDSs used to be traded in a relatively opaque two-tiered OTC market. In the D2C
segment of the market, dealers traded with their institutional customers. D2C trades were
either negotiated over the phone or executed electronically on trading platforms such as
MarketAxess or Tradeweb.10 Electronic trade execution was typically via name-disclosed RFQs
that enable querying multiple dealers simultaneously for an executable one-sided market of a
given notional amount.
9An index’s series number uniquely determines the creditors in the index.
10Electronic trading platforms for index CDSs emerged in 2005 (see “MarketAxess launches CDS index trading
platform,” Risk Magazine, September 12, 2005 and “TradeWeb Launches its Global Online Market for Credit
Derivatives: TradeWeb CDS,” Press Release, October 26, 2005), but their share of trading volume is unknown.
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In the D2D segment of the market, dealers traded with each other typically involving IDB
intermediation. D2D trades were either voice brokered or executed electronically on an IDB’s
order book. IDB intermediation guaranteed that trades were executed anonymously and that
access to the interdealer market was restricted to dealers.
2.2.3 The Dodd-Frank Act and Current Market Structure
The Dodd-Frank Act tasked the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) with regulat-
ing the index CDS market in order to promote ﬁnancial stability as well as post- and pre-trade
transparency. Pursuing these objectives, the CFTC enacted a clearing requirement for in-
dex CDSs with standardized contract terms, a reporting requirement, and a trade execution
requirement.11
The reporting requirement mandates real-time trade reporting of all index CDS trades to
so-called swap data repositories (SDRs). SDRs publicly disseminate the received transaction
data; dissemination is immediate unless the trade qualiﬁes as a block trade in which case
dissemination is delayed by at least 15 minutes.12
The trade execution requirement mandates that the most liquid index CDSs trade on SEFs and
via one of two trading methods: the order book or an RFQ that is transmitted to at least three
other market participants on the SEF.13 Since the trade execution requirement took effect,
trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run and immediate off-the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY
have been subject to the requirement.14 Block trades are exempt from the trade execution
requirement.
The implementation of Dodd-Frank Act provisions for index CDSs was rolled out in stages over
a period of about one year. For dealers the reporting requirement took effect on December
31, 2012 and the clearing requirement took effect on March 11, 2013. By the time the ﬁrst
SEFs started operating on October 2, 2013, the trade reporting and clearing requirements were
in effect for all market participants. Finally, the trade execution requirement took effect on
February 26, 2014. Appendix B.1 provides a timeline with additional details concerning the
CFTC’s implementation of Dodd-Frank Act provisions.
Through the introduction of SEFs and the requirement that they offer trading in order books,
the new regulation had the potential to open up the index CDS market to all-to-all trading.
11See Part 50, Part 43, and Part 37 of Chapter I of Title 17 of the Code of Federal Regulations (17 CFR) and Section
2(h) of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA).
12Block trades have notional amounts that exceed certain minimum block sizes and are exempt from immediate
dissemination to protect liquidity providers in large transactions from front running. Minimum block sizes depend
on the index CDS spread and contract tenor (see Appendix F to Part 43 of Chapter I of 17 CFR for the mapping of
spread-contract-tenor pairs to block sizes).
13For an interim one-year period, it was sufﬁcient to transmit RFQs to at least two other participants.
14In addition, trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run and immediate off-the-run index CDSs on iTraxx Europe and
iTraxx Europe Crossover have been subject to the trade execution requirement. iTraxx Europe and iTraxx Europe
Crossover are Markit’s benchmark credit indices of investment-grade and high-yield credit risk in Europe.
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However, several years into the new regulatory regime, the index CDS market remains two-
tiered and all-to-all trading has yet to materialize.15
Dealers trade with their institutional customers on SEFs run by incumbent operators of
electronic trading platforms where the vast majority of trades are executed via name-disclosed
RFQs. These are Bloomberg SEF, ICE Swap Trade, MarketAxess SEF, and TW SEF; collectively
called D2C SEFs. Dealers trade with each other on SEFs run by IDBs where most trades are
executed on order books. These are GFI Swaps Exchange, ICAP SEF, tpSEF, and Tradition SEF;
collectively called IDB SEFs.
Several reasons have been given for the persistence of the two-tiered market structure. At one
end of the spectrum, some observers argue that this is the optimal structure of a market in
which trades occur relatively infrequently and in very large sizes (see, e.g., Giancarlo (2015)). At
the other end of the spectrum, some market participants argue that dealers try to build barriers
to entry to the interdealer market (see, e.g., Managed Funds Association (2015)). One such
barrier is post-trade name give-up on IDB SEFs; i.e., the practice of informing anonymously
matched traders about the identity of their counterparty after the trade is executed. This
makes participation on IDB SEFs unattractive for many customers because of the risk of
uncontrolled information leakage of proprietary trading strategies.16
2.3 Data and Identiﬁcation Algorithms
This section describes the transaction and quote data and the algorithms that identify SEFs
and package transactions.
2.3.1 Data
Our empirical analysis is based on trades and quotes over a two-year period from October 2,
2013 (when most SEFs started operating) to October 16, 2015. All trades are executed on SEFs.
The transaction data come from the three SDRs that disseminate trade reports of index CDS
transactions: the Bloomberg Swap Data Repository (BSDR), the Depository Trust & Clearing
Corporation Data Repository (DDR), and the Intercontinental Exchange Trade Vault (ICETV).
Trade reports contain execution timestamps, transaction prices, and trade sizes up to a cap of
15Implicitly, the CFTC had hoped that the introduction of SEFs would push the index CDS market, and other
active OTC derivatives markets, towards all-to-all trading. For instance, when discussing the beneﬁts of SEF rules,
the CFTC stated that the “...rules provide for an anonymous but transparent order book that will facilitate trading
among market participants directly without having to route all trades through dealers” (see 78 Federal Register at
33565 (Jun. 4, 2013)).
16 Trading via RFQ also entails a certain amount of information leakage, but in this case the customer has control
over which dealers receive the information. Because the vast majority of index CDSs are centrally cleared, there
is no reason for post-trade name give-up from a counterparty risk perspective. However, some dealers argue
that name give-up is needed to prevent predatory trading (see, e.g., “How to Game a SEF: Banks Fear Arrival of
Arbitrageurs,” Risk Magazine, March 19, 2014).
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at least USD 100 million,17 and they indicate whether the trade is centrally cleared, whether it
features non-standard (or bespoke) contract terms, and whether it is subject to an end-user
exception that exempts the trade from the clearing and trade execution requirements.18 The
trade reports also indicate whether the trade is executed on a SEF, but they do not specify
which one. They also do not specify whether the trade is part of a package; i.e., a transaction
that involves more than one index CDS or an index CDS and a related instrument such as
an index swaption or tranche swap (both of which are conventionally traded with delta, see
below).19 Fortunately, SEFs and package transactions can be identiﬁed from trade reports; the
details of the respective identiﬁcation algorithms are discussed in subsequent sections.
Intraday composite bid and offer quotes for index CDSs come from Markit. These quotes
constitute the main real-time reference in the index CDS market that is available to all market
participants. The composites average over quotes of individual dealers that Markit parses
from so-called dealer runs; i.e., e-mails that dealers send to their institutional customers
throughout the trading day to keep them up to date with indicative quotes of index CDSs and
other credit derivatives. A composite is computed whenever a dealer sends out a run and only
the quotes from each dealer’s latest run are eligible for composite computation.20
Figure 2.1 shows trades and the mid-point of Markit intraday quotes on a representative
trading day, May 6, 2015, for the ﬁve-year index CDS on the then on-the-run series of CDX.IG.
There are 401 quotes between 7:00 a.m. and 5:30 p.m., New York time, and 165 trades. Most
striking are the trades at 64 bps and 66 bps that appear to be outliers in comparison to the other
trades that tend to be relatively close to the mid-quote. After processing the data through our
identiﬁcation algorithms, these trades turn out to be delta hedges of index swaption trades, see
below. Data processing also shows that the trades are composed of 139 D2C trades executed
on D2C SEFs and 26 D2D trades executed on IDB SEFs.
2.3.2 Identiﬁcation of SEFs
In devising the SEF identiﬁcation algorithm, we use SEF-reported trading volumes from
Clarus FT.21 Each of the on-SEF trade reports must have been submitted by one of the eight
aforementioned SEFs. Bloomberg SEF submits trade reports to the BSDR and ICE Swap Trade
submits trade reports to the ICETV. The remaining SEFs submit trade reports to the DDR and
the trade-report-submitting SEF can be identiﬁed based on the format of the trade report.
17The actual cap size is the larger of USD 100 million and the minimum block size (see §43.4(h) of Chapter I of 17
CFR).
18This would be the case if one counterparty is a non-ﬁnancial entity that uses the trade to hedge commercial
risks (see Sections 2(h)(7) and 2(h)(8) of the CEA).
19There are other important trade characteristics that are not speciﬁed in the trade reports. For instance, trade
reports do not specify whether the trade is buyer- or seller-initiated, whether it is D2C or D2D, and whether it is
executed on an order book or via a RFQ.
20Quotes from runs older than 15 minutes are discarded from the computation and a ﬁve-minute memory
prevents repeated computations of the same composite.
21Clarus FT is the standard data source for SEF-reported daily trading volumes. In Appendix B.3, we describe the
Clarus FT data in detail.
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Figure 2.1: CDX.IG Trades and Mid-Quotes on May 6, 2015.
The ﬁgure shows transaction prices of all dealer-to-customer (D2C) and dealer-to-dealer (D2D) trades in ﬁve-year
on-the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG and the corresponding composite mid-quote on May 6, 2015. Circles indicate
trades that are identiﬁed as being outright and stars indicate trades that are identiﬁed as being delta hedges of
index swaptions. Unﬁlled symbols indicate D2C trades and ﬁlled symbols indicate D2D trades. Both transaction
prices and quotes are in terms of index CDS spreads and expressed in basis points (bps). Series 24 of CDX.IG was
on-the-run on May 6, 2015.
Speciﬁcally, we associate with each SEF the format of trade reports whose aggregate trade size
corresponds to the SEF-reported trading volume (Appendix B.2 contains the details).
Because of the two-tiered market structure, the SEF on which the trade took place reveals
whether the trade is D2C or D2D. It should be emphasized that focusing on trades executed
on SEFs is not restrictive because the most actively traded index CDSs are subject to the trade
execution requirement. The majority of trade reports that we do not capture come from the
period before the requirement took effect. These are most likely D2C trades because any D2D
trade facilitated by an IDB would have been on-SEF.
2.3.3 Identiﬁcation of Package Transactions
We identify four popular types of package transactions: index rolls, curve trades, delta-hedged
index swaptions, and delta-hedged index tranche swaps (Appendix B.2 contains the details). A
typical index roll involves an on-the-run and an off-the-run index CDS with the same contract
tenor. Protection is sold on one index series and simultaneously bought on the other. Index
rolls are popular because many institutional investors like to maintain liquid credit exposure
with a relatively constant maturity proﬁle. We identify index rolls as simultaneously executed
index CDS transactions on the same SEF that have the same contract tenor and reference two
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different series of the same index.
A typical curve trade involves two index CDSs with different contract tenors.22 Protection is
sold on one contract tenor and simultaneously bought on the other. Curve trades are popular
because they are relatively directional (index CDS term structures tend to become ﬂatter
when spreads widen and steeper when spreads contract; see, e.g., Erlandsson, Ghosh, and
Rennison (2008)) and require less capital outlay than outright index CDS trades. We identify
curve trades as simultaneously executed index CDS transactions on the same SEF that have
different contract tenors and reference the same index (but not necessarily the same index
series).
We also account for the fact that index swaptions and tranche swaps are conventionally traded
“with delta;” i.e., together with a delta hedge in the corresponding index CDS. Quotes of index
swaptions and tranche swaps incorporate both the delta and the so-called “reference level”
at which the delta hedge will be traded. Usually, the reference level is set close to the level at
which the index CDS trades at the beginning of the trading day (see, e.g., Hünseler (2013)), but
it might be updated throughout the trading day as the index CDS spread moves. For CDX.IG,
the reference level is usually set in spread multiples of 0.5 bps.23 We identify index swaption
and tranche swap delta hedges as index CDS transactions that have the same underlying index
and contract tenor as an index swaption or tranche swap transaction. Trade executions must
be near simultaneous and notional amounts must be reconcilable with a delta that is quoted
on the same trading day.
Index swaptions and tranche swaps can also be traded without delta, but usually at less favor-
able prices that incorporate the dealer’s cost of establishing the hedge. Therefore, investors
may ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to trade index swaptions and tranche swaps with delta and unwind the
hedge themselves (see, e.g., Hünseler (2013)). We identify such delta unwinds as trades with
the same transaction price and notional amount as a delta hedge of an index swaption or
tranche swap trade that occurs on the same trading day and SEF.
Whether a transaction is part of a package is important because package transactions are either
quoted in relative terms (index rolls and curve trades) or along with a price-forming quote
for another instrument (delta hedges of index swaption and tranche swap trades). Therefore,
transaction prices on the individual index CDS legs of package transactions do not necessarily
have to reﬂect the current level at which outright trades in the respective index CDSs would be
executed. This is clearly the case for most of the delta hedges in Figure 2.1.
2.3.4 SEF Order Flow
Table 2.1 displays descriptive statistics of the enriched transaction data that allows to distin-
22Typically, the underlying of both index CDSs is the same but there are also curve trades in which the two index
CDSs reference different index series.
23Because CDX.HY is quoted in terms of a price, the reference level is usually set in price multiples of 0.125%.
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guish between D2C and D2D trades and between outright and package transactions. Descrip-
tive statistics are computed separately for D2C and D2D trades in CDX.IG (Panels A1 and A2,
respectively) and CDX.HY (Panels B1 and B2, respectively) and, within these broad categories
of trades, descriptive statistics are computed separately for trades executed on a given SEF.
In terms of the notional amount traded, D2C trades in CDX.IG account for a daily trading
volume of USD 9.843 billion, on average, and those in CDX.HY account for a daily trading
volume of USD 3.705 billion, on average. In comparison, D2D trades in the two indices account
for average daily trading volumes of USD 1.354 billion and USD 0.402 billion, respectively.24
These averages appear in parenthesis in Table 2.1 because they are based on SEF-reported
daily trading volumes from Clarus FT instead of transaction data. They cannot be reproduced
with transaction data because trade reports contain capped trade sizes. Table 2.1 shows that
21.2% and 2.3% of D2C trades in CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively, are disseminated with
capped trade sizes, while the corresponding numbers for D2D trades are 6.8% and 1.4%,
respectively.25 As a consequence, transaction-data-based average daily trading volumes are
downward biased.26
The vast majority of trades are in the ﬁve-year contract tenor and around 90% of trades are in
on-the-run index CDSs. Almost all trades have standardized contract terms and are centrally
cleared.27 Outright trades account for most of the trading volume and, among package
transactions, index rolls are most popular, accounting for 5.0% and 8.9% (17.3% and 21.7%)
of D2C (D2D) trading volume in CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively. The fact that there are
24D2D trading accounts for 10% (for CDX.HY) to 12% (for CDX.IG) of total volume in the index CDS market. The
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (2014, ISDA) estimates that, in case of interest rate swaps, D2D
trading accounts for 35% of total volume. However, the ISDA (2014) argues that as much as two-thirds of D2D
trading is due to non-price-forming trades such as amendments, novations, and terminations, all of which are
excluded from our sample. This brings the ISDA’s (2014) estimate for interest rate swaps more in line with the one
we ﬁnd for index CDSs in our sample.
25In comparison to trades in CDX.IG, the percentage of trades that are disseminated with capped trade sizes
is lower for trades in CDX.HY because the latter tend to be of smaller size (in absolute terms and relative to the
cap). The median size of trades in CDX.IG is ﬁve times that of trades in CDX.HY but caps typically differ by USD 10
million only (for trades in CDX.IG the cap is typically USD 110 million and for trades in CDX.HY the cap is typically
USD 100 million).
26The actual volumes allow to impute by how much the size of trades that are disseminated with capped trade
sizes exceeds the cap on average. For instance, the size of D2C trades in CDX.IG that are disseminated with capped
notional amounts exceeds the cap by USD 141.17 (= 511×(9,843−6,433)/(0.212×58,222)) million, on average (511
is the number of trading days in the sample period). Most of these trades are capped at USD 110 million, suggesting
that, conditional on being capped, the average trade size of D2C trades in CDX.IG is approximately USD 250
million. Similarly, conditional on being capped, the average trade size of D2D trades in CDX.IG is approximately
USD 200 million. For CDX.HY, most trades are capped at USD 100 million and, conditional on being capped, the
average trade sizes of D2C and D2D trades in CDX.HY are approximately USD 225 million and USD 160 million,
respectively.
27Loon and Zhong (2016) ﬁnd that bespoke contract terms, central clearing, and a counterparty that qualiﬁes as
an end-user are trade characteristics that signiﬁcantly affect transaction costs of index CDSs. These characteristics
cannot be a main driver of eventual transaction cost differences between D2C and D2D trades because the vast
majority of both D2C and D2D trades are non-bespoke and centrally cleared. We observe an increasing share of
end-user exempt transactions prior to February 10, 2014 (around 80% of trades on February 7, 2014 are end-user
exempt) and not a single end-user exempt trade afterwards. We are not aware of no-action reliefs issued by the
CFTC that expired on February 10, 2014 and could explain the decline.
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CDX.IG CDX.HY
Type D2C D2D D2C D2D
Outright
Five-year on-the-run 90.0 79.9 91.2 85.5
Five-year immediate off-the-run 5.3 0.8 5.1 1.4
Other 0.7 1.2 0.2 2.1
Package
Roll ﬁve-year on-the-run immediate off-the-run 3.4 7.6 3.2 6.4
Other roll 0.1 2.9 0.1 1.0
Curve 0.1 3.0 0.0 0.0
Swaption delta hedge 0.3 2.4 0.2 2.2
Tranche swap delta hedge 0.1 2.1 0.1 1.4
Table 2.2: Percentages of On-SEF Index CDS Trades by Trade Type.
The table shows percentages of on-SEF dealer-to-customer (D2C) and dealer-to-dealer (D2D) index CDS trades
in CDX.IG and CDX.HY by trade type. The sample period is October 2, 2013 to October 16, 2015 and comprises
58,222 (12,396) and 83,771 (13,585) D2C (D2D) trades in CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively.
virtually no D2D block trades whereas about 20% of D2C trades are blocks is consistent with
D2D trades occurring on order books. This is because block-sized trades executed on order
books do not qualify as block trades.
As explained in Section 2.2.1, liquidity in the index CDS market concentrates in on-the-run
index CDSs and, in particular, those with a ﬁve-year contract tenor. Therefore, we separately
break down total D2C and D2D trades into fractions of transactions in speciﬁc contracts and
report results in Table 2.2. Speciﬁcally, the table shows fractions of outright trades in ﬁve-year
on-the-run and immediate off-the-run index CDSs, and fractions of transactions that are part
of index rolls between these contracts. For completeness, we also report fractions of outright
trades in other index CDS contracts, fractions of transactions that are are part of other index
rolls and curve trades, and fractions of index swaption and tranche swap delta hedges.
In case of both indices, trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run and immediate off-the-run index CDSs
make up almost the entire D2C on-SEF trading activity. More than 90% of D2C trades are
outright trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs, around 5% of D2C transactions are outright
trades in ﬁve-year immediate off-the-run index CDSs, and index rolls between these contracts
account for another 3%. The residual transactions account for less than 2% of D2C trades.
D2D on-SEF trading activity is a little more diverse but outright trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run
and immediate off-the-run index CDSs and index rolls between these contracts nevertheless
account for 88.3% and 93.3% of D2D trades in CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively.
From Table 2.1 it follows that outright trades account for 94.3% of D2C trading volume in
CDX.IG. Breaking down the volume share along the lines of Table 2.2 shows that outright trades
in ﬁve-year on-the-run and immediate off-the-run index CDSs account for 88.5% and 5.3%
of D2C trading volume, respectively, and D2C index rolls between these contracts account
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for another 4.9%. Thus, in aggregate these trades account for a comparable high amount of
both trades and volume. For D2D trades in CDX.IG, the aggregate share of outright trades in
ﬁve-year on-the-run and immediate off-the-run index CDSs and index rolls between these
contracts is slightly lower in terms of volume than in terms of trades. Nevertheless, trades in
these contracts account for 80.3% of D2D trading volume in CDX.IG. Similar results obtain for
trades in CDX.HY.
2.4 Transaction Cost Comparison
In order to analyze what determines transaction costs of D2C and D2D trades in the two-tiered
index CDS market, we focus on outright trades in on-the-run index CDSs and index rolls
between on-the-run and immediate off-the-run index CDSs, all with a ﬁve-year contract
tenor.28 As highlighted by the preceding discussion, together these trades account for the
majority of both transactions and trading volumes in the index CDS market.
2.4.1 Transaction Cost Decomposition
We measure transaction costs by effective half-spreads with respect to Markit’s intraday mid-
quote. Recognizing that spreads reﬂect both dealer revenue and the information content
of trade, we further decompose effective half-spreads into realized half-spreads and price
impacts. Speciﬁcally,
qt (pt −mt )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=EffcSprdt
= qt (pt −mt+Δ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=RlzdSprdt
+qt (mt+Δ−mt )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=PrcImpt
, (2.1)
where pt is the transaction price of the t-th trade in index CDS i (we suppress dependence
on i because all our analyses separately focus on one type of trade in CDSs on a given index),
mt is the mid-point of the latest composite quote in the 15-minute period prior to trade
execution, and mt+Δ is the mid-point of the ﬁrst quote in the 15-minute period that follows
trade execution by 15 minutes. In case of index rolls, pt is the difference in transaction prices
of the involved on-the-run and immediate off-the-run index CDSs,29 and mt (mt+Δ) is the
corresponding difference in quote mid-points.30 Trade direction, qt , is inferred by the Lee and
Ready (1991) algorithm and equals +1 (−1) in case of protection-buyer-initiated (protection-
28 In Appendix B.6, we provide an analysis of outright trades in immediate off-the-run index CDSs. Results are
consistent with those of outright trades in on-the-run index CDSs. For the other trade types there are too few
transactions to reliably measure transaction costs.
29Following market convention, pt is the on-the-run minus the immediate off-the-run index CDS spread.
30Speciﬁcally, mt is the corresponding difference in mid-points of the latest quotes prior to trade execution, with
the later of the two quotes occurring in the 15-minute period prior to trade execution and the earlier of the two
quotes occurring within 15 minutes from the later. Similarly, mt+Δ is the corresponding difference in mid-points
of quotes that occur after trade execution, with the later of the two quotes being the ﬁrst quote on either of the two
index CDSs that occurs in the 15-minute period that follows trade execution by 15 minutes and the earlier of the
two quotes being the latest quote on the other index CDS that occurs within 15 minutes from the later of the two
quotes.
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Figure 2.2: Weekly Average Effective Half-Spreads, Realized Half-Spreads, and Price Impacts.
Panels A and B, Panels C and D, and Panels E and F, show weekly sample means of effective half-spreads (EffcSprd),
realized half-spreads (RlzdSprd), and price impacts (PrcImp) of outright dealer-to-customer (D2C) and dealer-to-
dealer (D2D) trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively. EffcSprd is deﬁned
as qt × (pt −mt ), where pt is the transaction price and mt is the latest mid-quote in the 15-minute period prior
to trade execution. RlzdSprd is deﬁned as qt × (pt −mt+Δ), where mt+Δ is the ﬁrst mid-quote in the 15-minute
period that follows trade execution by 15 minutes. PrcImp is deﬁned as qt × (mt+Δ−mt ). Both transaction prices
and quotes are in terms of index CDS spreads and expressed in basis points (bps). Trade direction, qt , is inferred
by the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. The sample period is October 2, 2013 to October 16, 2015 and comprises
50,126 (8,881) and 71,697 (10,219) outright D2C (D2D) trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG and
CDX.HY, respectively.
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seller-initiated) trades.
Assuming that one counterparty of each trade is a liquidity providing dealer, Equation (2.1) can
be interpreted as follows: the effective half-spread measures the liquidity providing dealer’s
revenue if she were able to immediately close her position at the prevailing mid-quote. If
instead it takes the dealer Δ units of time to close her position (and again assuming that she is
able to do so at the then prevailing mid-quote), her revenue is the realized half-spread. The
revenue is less than the effective half-spread if the price moves against the dealer while she
is reversing the trade over time. Price impact captures such trade-induced price moves or
adverse selection costs.
2.4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 2.2 shows weekly averages of effective half-spreads, realized half-spreads, and price
impacts of outright D2C and D2D trades. Panels A and B show that, for both indices, D2C
trades have consistently higher effective half-spreads than D2D trades. Panels E and F show
that D2C trades also have consistently higher price impacts than D2D trades, suggesting that
transaction cost differentials reﬂect differences in price impacts. Panels C and D are consistent
with this in that there is no systematic difference between the realized half-spreads of D2C
and D2D trades.
Table 2.3 displays average effective half-spreads, realized half-spreads, and price impacts of
outright trades and index rolls. For outright trades the results conﬁrm the impression from
Figure 2.2. In case of CDX.IG, average effective half-spreads are 0.137 bps and 0.088 bps for
D2C and D2D trades, respectively, with the difference of 0.049 bps being statistically signiﬁcant.
The corresponding numbers for CDX.HY are 0.674 bps and 0.402 bps, respectively, with the
difference of 0.273 bps again being statistically signiﬁcant.
These transaction cost differentials are mostly due to D2C trades having larger price impacts
than D2D trades. For CDX.IG, average price impacts are 0.106 bps and 0.063 bps for D2C
and D2D trades, respectively, with the difference of 0.043 bps being statistically signiﬁcant.
The corresponding numbers for CDX.HY are 0.508 bps and 0.246 bps, respectively, with the
difference of 0.262 bps again being statistically signiﬁcant. After taking price impact into
account, there is no signiﬁcant difference in average per trade revenues (as captured by
realized half-spreads) across D2C and D2D trades.
As explained in Section 2.3.3, index rolls are liquidity motivated. Consistent with a non-
informational motive for trade, Table 2.3 shows that index rolls have lower average effective
half-spreads and price impacts than outright trades. For index rolls there are also no signiﬁcant
differences in average effective half-spreads and price impacts across D2C and D2D trades.
Table 2.4 focuses on outright trades only and displays average effective half-spreads, realized
half-spreads, and price impacts by quartiles of the trade size distribution. In case of both
indices and regardless of the quartile of the trade size distribution, effective half-spreads and
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Dealer-To-Customer Dealer-To-Dealer D2C-D2D
Effc Rlzd Prc Effc Rlzd Prc Effc Rlzd Prc
Type Sprd Sprd Imp Sprd Sprd Imp Sprd Sprd Imp
Panel A: CDX.IG
Outright 0.137 0.031 0.106 0.088 0.025 0.063 0.049∗∗ 0.006 0.043∗∗
Index roll 0.048 0.020 0.028 0.050 0.027 0.023 -0.002 -0.007 0.005
Panel B: CDX.HY
Outright 0.674 0.166 0.508 0.402 0.155 0.246 0.273∗∗ 0.011 0.262∗∗
Index roll 0.392 0.239 0.153 0.354 0.131 0.223 0.038 0.108∗ -0.070
Table 2.3: Effective Half-Spreads, Realized Half-Spreads, and Price Impacts by Trade Type.
Panels A and B show sample means of effective half-spreads (EffcSprd), realized half-spreads (RlzdSprd), and
price impacts (PrcImp) of dealer-to-customer (D2C) and dealer-to-dealer (D2D) trades in CDX.IG and CDX.HY,
respectively. Sample means are separately computed for outright trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs
and for index rolls between ﬁve-year on-the-run and immediate off-the-run index CDSs. EffcSprd is deﬁned as
qt × (pt −mt ), where pt is the transaction price (the difference between on-the-run and immediate off-the-run
transaction prices for index rolls) and mt is the latest mid-quote (the difference between the latest on-the-run and
immediate off-the-run mid-quotes for index rolls) in the 15-minute period prior to trade execution. RlzdSprd is
deﬁned as qt ×(pt −mt+Δ), where mt+Δ is the ﬁrst mid-quote in the 15-minute period that follows trade execution
by 15 minutes. PrcImp is deﬁned as qt × (mt+Δ−mt ). Both transaction prices and quotes are in terms of index
CDS spreads and expressed in basis points. Trade direction, qt , is inferred by the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm.
∗∗ and ∗ denote rejection of a regression-based t test for the null hypothesis that D2C and D2D sample means are
identical at the 1% and 5% level, respectively, with inference based on the Newey and West (1987) estimate of the
covariance matrix of coefﬁcient estimates. The sample period is October 2, 2013 to October 16, 2015 and comprises
50,126 (8,881) and 71,697 (10,219) outright D2C (D2D) trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG and
CDX.HY, respectively and 943 (338) and 1,094 (329) D2C (D2D) index rolls between ﬁve-year on-the-run and
immediate off-the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively.
price impacts of D2C trades are signiﬁcantly higher than those of D2D trades.
Effective half-spreads of D2C trades in both indices increase with trade size which is in contrast
to evidence from other dealer markets, such as the corporate and municipal bond markets,
where transaction costs typically decrease with trade size; see, e.g., Bessembinder, Maxwell,
and Venkataraman (2006), Edwards et al. (2007), Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2007), Harris
and Piwowar (2006), and Green et al. (2007). This reﬂects structural differences between these
markets: the index CDS market is purely institutional with sophisticated market participants
trading in large sizes; in contrast, bond markets have retail segments with unsophisticated
market participants trading in small sizes and with dealers who seem to exert market power.
Price impact of D2C trades in both indices tends to increase with trade size as well but only
up to the third quartile of the trade size distribution. The decrease of price impact for block-
sized trades in the fourth quartile of the trade size distribution is consistent with block trade
provisions that aim at mitigating the price impact of large transactions.
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Dealer-To-Customer Dealer-To-Dealer D2C-D2D
Effc Rlzd Prc Effc Rlzd Prc Effc Rlzd Prc
Trade Size Sprd Sprd Imp Sprd Sprd Imp Sprd Sprd Imp
Panel A: CDX.IG
≤ 25 0.121 0.031 0.090 0.082 0.017 0.065 0.039∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.025∗∗
25–50 0.131 0.022 0.109 0.095 0.022 0.073 0.036∗∗ 0.000 0.036∗∗
50–100 0.143 0.022 0.121 0.090 0.053 0.037 0.053∗∗ -0.031∗∗ 0.084∗∗
> 100 0.169 0.051 0.118 0.125 0.153 -0.028 0.044∗∗ -0.102∗∗ 0.146∗∗
Panel B: CDX.HY
≤ 5 0.603 0.169 0.434 0.383 0.108 0.275 0.220∗∗ 0.061 0.159∗∗
5–10 0.636 0.120 0.516 0.413 0.154 0.259 0.223∗∗ -0.034 0.257∗∗
10–25 0.700 0.118 0.582 0.394 0.204 0.190 0.306∗∗ -0.086∗ 0.392∗∗
> 25 0.800 0.287 0.513 0.468 0.478 -0.011 0.332∗∗ -0.191 0.523∗∗
Table 2.4: Effective Half-Spreads, Realized Half-Spreads, and Price Impacts by Trade Size.
Panels A and B show sample means of effective half-spreads (EffcSprd), realized half-spreads (RlzdSprd), and price
impacts (PrcImp) of outright dealer-to-customer (D2C) and dealer-to-dealer (D2D) trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run
index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively. Sample means are separately computed for quartiles of the
trade size distribution. EffcSprd is deﬁned as qt × (pt −mt ), where pt is the transaction price and mt is the latest
mid-quote in the 15-minute period prior to trade execution. RlzdSprd is deﬁned as qt × (pt −mt+Δ), where mt+Δ
is the ﬁrst mid-quote in the 15-minute period that follows trade execution by 15 minutes. PrcImp is deﬁned as
qt × (mt+Δ−mt ). Both transaction prices and quotes are in terms of index CDS spreads and expressed in basis
points. Trade size is in USD million. Trade direction, qt , is inferred by the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. ∗∗
and ∗ denote rejection of a regression-based t test for the null hypothesis that D2C and D2D sample means are
identical at the 1% and 5% level, respectively, with inference based on the Newey and West (1987) estimate of
the covariance matrix of coefﬁcient estimates. The sample period is October 2, 2013 to October 16, 2015 and
comprises 50,126 (8,881) and 71,697 (10,219) outright D2C (D2D) trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs on
CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively.
2.4.3 Accounting for Trade Characteristics andMarket Conditions
The evidence thus far does not account for the possibility that different trade characteristics
(other than trade size) of D2C and D2D trades and potentially different market conditions dur-
ing which these trades are executed can explain the observed differences in average effective
half-spreads and price impacts. In order to rule out such possibilities (or selection biases), we
estimate selection-bias-corrected averages from trade-by-trade regressions that control for
trade characteristics and market conditions and analyze pairs of trades with matching trade
characteristics that are executed at around the same time.
Trade-By-Trade Regressions
We estimate the following trade-by-trade regressions
yt =αD2CD2Ct +αD2DD2Dt +β′Xt +t , (2.2)
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where yt is the either the effective half-spread, the realized half-spread, or the price impact
of the t-th trade in index CDS i (as before, we suppress dependence on i ), D2Ct and D2Dt
are dummy variables for D2C and D2D trades, respectively, and Xt is a vector of control
variables.31 Continuous control variables are stated in deviations from their sample means for
ease of interpretation.
The continuous control variables include the bid-ask spread of the latest quote for the ﬁve-year
on-the-run index CDS prior to trade execution, the corresponding mid-quote, and end-of-day
three-month at-the-money implied index swaption volatility (the swaption’s underlying is the
ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDS). In addition, we include a set of dummy variables for trades
with sizes in the second, third, and fourth quartile of the trade size distribution, and a dummy
variable for trades with transaction prices at which reference levels of index swaption and
tranche swap trades tend to be set. The continuous control variables proxy for the prevailing
market conditions at trade execution. We account for trade size because Table 2.4 shows that
D2C transaction costs and price impacts tend to increase with trade size, and we include a
reference level dummy to account for potentially unidentiﬁed index swaption and tranche
swap delta hedges.32
Due to demeaned continuous control variables, αD2C andαD2D, respectively, estimate average
effective half-spreads (or, depending on the dependent variable used, realized half-spreads or
price impacts) of outright D2C and D2D trades that have trade sizes in the ﬁrst quartile of the
trade size distribution and non-reference-level transaction prices, and that are executed when
average market conditions prevail. Note that the estimates are directly comparable with those
reported in Table 2.3 because the latter correspond to coefﬁcient estimates of a restricted
version of Equation (2.2) which excludes control variables.
Table 2.5 displays regression results. Accounting for trade characteristics and market condi-
tions does not materially change the conclusions from Table 2.3. For CDX.IG, the difference
in effective half-spreads of D2C and D2D trades is 0.033 bps (in comparison to 0.049 bps in
Table 2.3) and statistically signiﬁcant. For CDX.HY, the difference is 0.219 bps (in comparison
to 0.273 bps in Table 2.3) and statistically signiﬁcant. For both indices, the estimated regression
coefﬁcients show that transaction costs increase with trade size, when bid-ask spreads widen
(i.e., when liquidity deteriorates), and when implied volatility increases. In addition, trades
with reference level transaction prices are more expensive.
31Comparing regression-based methods of addressing selection biases, Bessembinder (2003) concludes “...while
it is important to control for selection biases, the speciﬁc method of control has little practical effect on inference
regarding market quality. In particular, the simple technique of including in a regression framework economic
variables that are known to be related to trade execution costs appears to provide selectivity bias corrections that
work as well as more complex two-stage methods” (Bessembinder 2003, p. 8).
32One reason for unidentiﬁed delta hedges is that we only identify delta hedges of on-SEF index swaption and
tranche swap trades, but neither swaptions nor tranche swaps have to be traded on SEFs unless they are traded
with a delta hedge in a made available to trade index CDS. This requirement was temporarily overruled by a
no-action relief (see CFTC Letter No. 14–12 (Feb. 10, 2014) and its extensions CFTC Letter No. 14–62 (May. 1, 2014)
and CFTC Letter No. 14–137 (Nov. 10, 2014)). Typically, the delta hedge of an off-SEF index swaption or tranche
swap trade would nevertheless be executed on-SEF in order to satisfy other regulatory requirements.
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CDX.IG CDX.HY
EffcSprd RlzdSprd PrcImp EffcSprd RlzdSprd PrcImp
D2C 0.121∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.093∗∗ 0.609∗∗ 0.154∗∗ 0.455∗∗
(67.10) (11.84) (29.95) (74.40) (13.63) (30.27)
D2D 0.087∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.066∗∗ 0.390∗∗ 0.153∗∗ 0.236∗∗
(31.66) (5.16) (14.51) (28.62) (6.00) (9.48)
MDM 0.008∗∗ -0.007∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.014∗ -0.040∗∗ 0.054∗∗
(5.45) (-2.76) (5.24) (1.98) (-3.40) (4.51)
LRG 0.015∗∗ -0.004 0.020∗∗ 0.062∗∗ -0.041∗∗ 0.103∗∗
(8.39) (-1.39) (6.12) (8.16) (-3.36) (7.65)
BLCK 0.044∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.188∗∗ 0.122∗∗ 0.067∗∗
(17.70) (6.33) (4.84) (19.72) (7.13) (3.91)
RFRNC 0.021∗∗ 0.023∗∗ -0.002 0.111∗∗ 0.178∗∗ -0.067∗∗
(8.20) (4.98) (-0.44) (6.13) (6.17) (-2.61)
BAS 0.445∗∗ 0.034 0.410∗∗ 0.345∗∗ 0.069 0.276∗∗
(8.22) (0.53) (4.23) (10.91) (1.38) (4.58)
SPRD/100 0.022 0.089∗ -0.067 0.066∗ 0.015 0.051
(0.61) (2.05) (-1.00) (2.03) (0.43) (0.90)
VLTLTY 0.199∗∗ -0.166∗∗ 0.365∗∗ 1.220∗∗ -0.503∗ 1.722∗∗
(5.94) (-3.83) (5.72) (7.34) (-2.39) (5.36)
N 59,007 59,007 59,007 81,916 81,916 81,916
D2C−D2D 0.033 0.006 0.027 0.219 0.001 0.218
p-value <0.01 0.12 <0.01 <0.01 0.96 <0.01
Table 2.5: Regressions Controlling for Outright Trade Characteristics and Market Conditions.
The table shows OLS estimates of regression speciﬁcations that control for selection bias in the comparison of
effective half-spreads (EffcSprd), realized half-spreads (RlzdSprd), and price impacts (PrcImp) of outright dealer-
to-customer (D2C) and dealer-to-dealer (D2D) trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY
(t-statistics based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors are shown in parenthesis). EffcSprd is deﬁned as
qt × (pt −mt ), where pt is the transaction price and mt is the latest mid-quote in the 15-minute period prior
to trade execution. RlzdSprd is deﬁned as qt × (pt −mt+Δ), where mt+Δ is the ﬁrst mid-quote in the 15-minute
period that follows trade execution by 15 minutes. PrcImp is deﬁned as qt × (mt+Δ −mt ). Both transaction
prices and quotes are in terms of index CDS spreads and expressed in basis points (bps). Trade direction, qt , is
inferred by the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. The explanatory variables include dummy variables for D2C
trades (D2C), for D2D trades (D2D), for medium-sized trades (MDM; USD 25–50 MM for CDX.IG and USD 5–10
MM for CDX.HY), for large-sized trades (LRG; USD 50–100 MM for CDX.IG and USD 10–25 MM for CDX.HY),
for block-sized trades (BLCK; +USD 100 MM for CDX.IG and +USD 25 MM for CDX.HY), and for trades with
transaction prices at typical reference levels (RFRNC; index CDS spread multiples 0.5 bps for CDX.IG and price
multiples of 0.125% for CDX.HY), the bid-ask spread of the latest quote for the ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDS
(BAS), the corresponding mid-quote (SPRD), and the implied volatility of three-month at-the-money swaptions on
the ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDS (VLTLTY). Continuous explanatory variables are demeaned. The prior to last
row shows the difference between D2C and D2D coefﬁcient estimates and the last row shows the p-value of a Wald
test for the null hypothesis that D2C and D2D coefﬁcients are identical. ∗∗ and ∗ denote statistical signiﬁcance at
the 1% and 5% level, respectively. The sample period is October 2, 2013 to October 16, 2015 and comprises 50,126
(8,881) and 71,697 (10,219) outright D2C (D2D) trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY,
respectively.
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Again, transaction cost differentials are mostly due to differences in price impact. For CDX.IG,
the difference in price impacts of D2C and D2D trades is a statistically signiﬁcant 0.027 bps
that accounts for most of the 0.033 bps difference in effective half-spreads. For CDX.HY, the
difference in price impacts is a statistically signiﬁcant 0.218 bps that accounts for almost the
entire 0.219 bps difference in effective half-spreads. It follows that there are no signiﬁcant
differences in realized half-spreads of D2C and D2D trades. For both indices, the estimated
regression coefﬁcients show that price impacts increase when bid-ask spreads widen and
when implied volatility increases. Price impacts tend to increase with trade size; however,
for CDX.HY, block-sized trades have lower price impacts than large-sized trades in the third
quartile of the trade size distribution.
Finally, consistent with a non-informational motive for trade, regression results for index
rolls (displayed in Table 2.6) do not reveal signiﬁcant differences in effective half-spreads and
price impacts of D2C and D2D index rolls.33 The estimated regression coefﬁcients show that
index roll transaction costs are insensitive to the size rolled and increase when bid-ask spreads
widen.
Matched Pair Analysis
Alternatively, trade characteristics and market conditions can be controlled for by focussing on
pairs of D2C and D2D trades with matching trade characteristics that are executed relatively
close in time. To this end, we focus on those outright D2D trades for which we are able to ﬁnd
at least one matching outright D2C trade in the same index CDS and with trade size in the
same quartile of the trade size distribution (or, in one analysis, with exactly the same trade
size) that occurs within a 15-minute window bracketing the execution of the D2D trade. In
case of more than one matching D2C trade, the match is a hypothetical trade with effective
half-spread, realized half-spread, and price impact corresponding to the average value among
matching D2C trades.34
Table 2.7 shows the results. In case of CDX.IG, 52.7% of D2D trades have a matching D2C trade
with trade size in the same quartile of the trade size distribution, and 38.0% of D2D trades have
a matching D2C trade with exactly the same trade size. The pairs of trades with exactly the
same trade sizes consist of D2C trades with an average effective half-spread of 0.124 bps (which
is slightly less than in the full sample) and D2D trades with an average effective half-spread of
0.097 bps (which is slightly more than in the full sample). The average paired difference in
effective half-spreads of matching D2C and D2D trades is 0.027 bps and statistically signiﬁcant.
The average paired difference in price impacts is 0.019 bps and also statistically signiﬁcant.
There is no signiﬁcant difference in realized half-spreads of matching D2C and D2D trades.
33Because trade sizes of index rolls are relatively large (e.g., more than 50% of CDX.IG index rolls have capped
on-the-run leg trade sizes), the regressions for index rolls only include a dummy variable for block-sized index
rolls which is based on the trade size of the on-the-run leg.
34Similarmatchingmethods have, e.g., been used by Lee (1993) to construct a sample of New York Stock Exchange
trades that match the characteristics of a given set of OTC and regional exchange equity trades.
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CDX.IG CDX.HY
EffcSprd RlzdSprd PrcImp EffcSprd RlzdSprd PrcImp
D2C 0.047∗∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.373∗∗ 0.224∗∗ 0.149∗∗
(13.11) (5.97) (6.31) (16.52) (8.12) (5.52)
D2D 0.049∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.360∗∗ 0.134∗∗ 0.226∗∗
(9.70) (3.82) (3.17) (10.98) (3.09) (5.77)
BLCK 0.002 -0.007 0.009 0.022 0.017 0.004
(0.47) (-1.27) (1.89) (0.84) (0.52) (0.15)
BAS 0.356∗∗ 0.175∗ 0.181∗ 0.224∗∗ 0.223∗ 0.001
(3.96) (2.18) (2.30) (4.94) (2.37) (0.01)
SPRD/100 -0.062 -0.019 -0.043 -0.053 0.002 -0.055
(-1.69) (-0.58) (-1.17) (-1.33) (0.04) (-0.95)
VLTLTY 0.041 -0.061 0.102 0.632∗∗ -0.127 0.759
(0.68) (-1.33) (1.82) (2.58) (-0.29) (1.47)
N 1,281 1,281 1,281 1,423 1,423 1,423
D2C−D2D -0.002 -0.004 0.002 0.013 0.090 -0.077
p-value 0.72 0.61 0.79 0.65 0.02 0.06
Table 2.6: Regressions Controlling for Index Roll Characteristics and Market Conditions.
The table shows OLS estimates of regression speciﬁcations that control for selection bias in the comparison
of effective half-spreads (EffcSprd), realized half-spreads (RlzdSprd), and price impacts (PrcImp) of dealer-to-
customer (D2C) and dealer-to-dealer (D2D) index rolls between ﬁve-year on-the-run and immediate off-the-run
index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY (t-statistics based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors are shown in
parenthesis). EffcSprd is deﬁned as qt × (pt −mt ), where pt is the difference between on-the-run and immediate
off-the-run transaction prices and mt is the difference between the latest on-the-run and immediate off-the-run
mid-quotes in the 15-minute period prior to trade execution. RlzdSprd is deﬁned as qt × (pt −mt+Δ), where mt+Δ
is the ﬁrst mid-quote in the 15-minute period that follows trade execution by 15 minutes. PrcImp is deﬁned as
qt × (mt+Δ−mt ). Both transaction prices and quotes are in terms of index CDS spreads and expressed in basis
points (bps). Trade direction, qt , is inferred by the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. The explanatory variables
include dummy variables for D2C trades (D2C), for D2D trades (D2D), and for block-sized trades (BLCK;+USD 100
MM for CDX.IG and +USD 25 MM for CDX.HY), the bid-ask spread of the latest quote for the ﬁve-year on-the-run
index CDS (BAS), the corresponding mid-quote (SPRD), and the implied volatility of three-month at-the-money
swaptions on the ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDS (VLTLTY). Continuous explanatory variables are demeaned.
The prior to last row shows the difference between D2C and D2D coefﬁcient estimates and the last row shows
the p-value of a Wald test for the null hypothesis that D2C and D2D coefﬁcients are identical. ∗∗ and ∗ denote
statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. The sample period is October 2, 2013 to October 16,
2015 and comprises 943 (338) and 1,094 (329) D2C (D2D) index rolls between ﬁve-year on-the-run and immediate
off-the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively.
Most of these observations carry over to pairs of matched trades with trade sizes in the same
quartile of the trade size distribution and to pairs of matched trades in CDX.HY. Overall, the
results of the matched pair analysis are consistent with those of the trade-by-trade regressions,
both in terms of the magnitude of differences between D2C and D2D trades and in terms of
inference.
In Appendix B.7, we repeat this section’s analyses using an alternative intraday mid-quote
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Dealer-To-Customer Dealer-To-Dealer D2C-D2D
Matching Effc Rlzd Prc Effc Rlzd Prc Effc Rlzd Prc
Trade Size Sprd Sprd Imp Sprd Sprd Imp Sprd Sprd Imp
Panel A: CDX.IG
≤ 25 0.117 0.036 0.080 0.086 0.017 0.069 0.031∗∗ 0.019∗ 0.011
25–50 0.125 0.029 0.096 0.102 0.016 0.086 0.022∗∗ 0.013 0.010
50–100 0.124 0.010 0.114 0.099 0.055 0.044 0.025∗∗ -0.045∗ 0.070∗∗
> 100 0.153 0.097 0.056 0.114 0.163 -0.049 0.039 -0.066 0.105∗∗
Exact 0.124 0.026 0.098 0.097 0.019 0.078 0.027∗∗ 0.007 0.019∗
Panel B: CDX.HY
≤ 5 0.575 0.154 0.420 0.384 0.071 0.313 0.191∗∗ 0.083 0.108∗
5–10 0.580 0.117 0.464 0.448 0.179 0.269 0.132∗∗ -0.063 0.195∗∗
10–25 0.621 0.137 0.484 0.412 0.212 0.200 0.210∗∗ -0.075 0.284∗∗
> 25 0.690 0.140 0.550 0.377 0.392 -0.016 0.313∗∗ -0.253 0.566∗∗
Exact 0.596 0.109 0.488 0.432 0.149 0.283 0.164∗∗ -0.041 0.205∗∗
Table 2.7: Effective Half-Spreads, Realized Half-Spreads, and Price Impacts of Matched Pairs.
Panels A and B show sample means of effective half-spreads (EffcSprd), realized half-spreads (RlzdSprd), and price
impacts (PrcImp) of matched pairs of outright dealer-to-customer (D2C) and dealer-to-dealer (D2D) trades in
ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively. Sample means are separately computed for
quartiles of the trade size distribution. EffcSprd is deﬁned as qt × (pt −mt ), where pt is the transaction price and
mt is the latest mid-quote in the 15-minute period prior to trade execution. RlzdSprd is deﬁned as qt ×(pt −mt+Δ),
where mt+Δ is the ﬁrst mid-quote in the 15-minute period that follows trade execution by 15 minutes. PrcImp is
deﬁned as qt × (mt+Δ−mt ). Both transaction prices and quotes are in terms of index CDS spreads and expressed
in basis points. Trade size is in USD million. Trade direction, qt , is inferred by the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm.
A pair consists of a D2D trade and matching D2C trade in the same index CDS and with trade size in the same
quartile of the trade size distribution (or with identical trade size) that occur within a 15-minute window bracketing
the D2D trade. In case of more than one matching D2C trade, the EffcSprd, RlzdSprd, and PrcImp of the D2C trade
of the pair are averages of the matching D2C trades. ∗∗ and ∗ denote rejection of a regression-based t test for the
null hypothesis that the mean of the distribution of paired differences is zero at the 1% and 5% level, respectively,
with inference based on the Newey and West (1987) estimate of the covariance matrix of coefﬁcient estimates.
The sample period is October 2, 2013 to October 16, 2015 and comprises 4,683 (3,372) and 6,463 (5,115) (exactly)
matched pairs of outright D2C and D2D trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY,
respectively.
from Credit Market Analysis. The results we obtain are consistent with the ones reported
here. We also show that the results are robust to using both shorter and longer time periods
over which to compute realized half-spreads and price impacts and to using alternative time
windows when constructing pairs of trades with matching trade characteristics.
2.5 The Dynamics of Trades and Quotes
The evidence thus far has revealed that D2C trades have both higher transaction costs and
larger price impacts than D2D trades. In order to investigate the price discovery process
that gives rise to the differential price impact, we analyze a VAR model that accounts for the
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two-tiered structure of the index CDS market and the market-speciﬁc quote provision in form
of dealer runs. In comparison to the relatively simple ad hoc decomposition of the effective
half-spread that we used in the previous section, the VAR model accounts for persistence in
order ﬂow and dynamic interactions between quote revisions and trades.
2.5.1 VAR Framework andModel Estimation
Speciﬁcally, we estimate an event-time VAR model for mid-quote changes, Δmt , and D2C-
and D2D-trade-related variables, xD2Ct and x
D2D
t , respectively; that is,
Δmt =
10∑
j=1
α jΔmt− j +
10∑
j=0
β j x
D2C
t− j +
10∑
j=0
γ j x
D2D
t− j +Δmt , (2.3a)
xD2Ct =
10∑
j=1
δ jΔmt− j +
10∑
j=1
ζ j x
D2C
t− j +
10∑
j=1
η j x
D2D
t− j +x,D2Ct , (2.3b)
xD2Dt =
10∑
j=1
κ jΔmt− j +
10∑
j=0
λ j x
D2C
t− j +
10∑
j=1
ρ j x
D2D
t− j +x,D2Dt , (2.3c)
where t indexes the t-th quote revision (i.e., computation of a composite quote) and xD2Ct
(xD2Dt ) is the number of signed D2C (D2D) trades that occur between the t −1-th and t-th
quote revision (i.e., xD2Ct and x
D2D
t are sums of the above trade direction indicators, qu , with
u between the calendar time of the t −1-th and t-th quote revision). The error terms, Δmt ,
x,D2Ct , and 
x,D2D
t , are uncorrelated because we resolve contemporaneous effects by including
contemporaneous trade-related variables in Equations (2.3a) and (2.3c).35 Intuitively, the
D2C-trade-related variable may contemporaneously affect the D2D-trade-related variable
when dealers immediately ofﬂoad inventory in the interdealer market, and D2C- and D2D-
trade-related variables may contemporaneously affect mid-quote revisions when dealers
adjust quotes in response to trades.
Hasbrouck (1991a, 1991b) argues that VAR systems like the one in Equations (2.3a) to (2.3c) pro-
vide a ﬂexible and robust framework in which permanent (information-driven) and transitory
(microstructure-driven) quote changes can be separated. Speciﬁcally, because microstructure
effects fade away in the long-run, the system-implied long-run cumulative mid-quote change
in response to a shock of trade-related variables measures the information content of trade (or
the price impact). The latter can be conveniently estimated from the vector moving average
(VMA) representation of the VAR model; that is,
Δmt = a0Δmt +a1Δmt−1+·· ·+b0x,D2Ct +b1x,D2Ct−1 +·· ·+c0x,D2Dt +c1x,D2Dt−1 +·· · , (2.4a)
xD2Ct = d0Δmt +d1Δmt−1+·· ·+ z0x,D2Ct + z1x,D2Ct−1 +·· ·+h0x,D2Dt +h1x,D2Dt−1 +·· · , (2.4b)
xD2Dt = k0Δmt +k1Δmt−1+·· ·+ l0x,D2Ct + l1x,D2Ct−1 +·· ·+ r0x,D2Dt + r1x,D2Dt−1 +·· · . (2.4c)
35Moreover, error terms are assumed to be serially uncorrelated and homoscedastic.
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It immediately follows from Equation (2.4a), that the price impact of a single protection-buyer-
initiated D2C trade is
Λx,D2C = lim
n→∞
n∑
j=0
E
[
Δmt+ j
∣∣∣Ωx,D2Ct ]= limn→∞ n∑
j=0
bj =
∞∑
j=0
bj , (2.5)
where Ωx,D2Ct =
{
x,D2Ct = 1, Δmt = x,D2Dt = 0, Δms = x,D2Cs = x,D2Ds = 0, s < t
}
denotes the
event of an isolated unit-sized shock of the D2C-trade-related variable.36 Similarly, the price
impact of a single protection-buyer-initiated D2D trade isΛx,D2D =∑∞j=0 c j .
Moreover, the VAR model is consistent with a fairly general unobserved component model.
Accordingly, mt = p¯t + st , where p¯t is the (unobservable) efﬁcient price and st is (unobserv-
able) microstructure noise. The former is assumed to follow a random walk (which is, e.g.,
consistent with p¯t being the conditional expectation of some future payoff), while the latter
is a generic covariance stationary process with mean zero (which is, e.g., consistent with
the transient nature of most microstructure effects such as inventory-control-driven price
pressure). Hasbrouck (1991b) shows that the variance of efﬁcient price innovations, σ2Δp¯ , can
be explicitly expressed in terms of error term variances and VMA-representation parameters;
that is,
σ2Δp¯ =
( ∞∑
j=0
aj
)2
σ2Δm +
( ∞∑
j=0
bj
)2
σ2x,D2C+
( ∞∑
j=0
c j
)2
σ2x,D2D, (2.6)
where σ2Δm = V
(
Δmt
)
, σ2x,D2C = V
(
x,D2Ct
)
, and σ2x,D2D = V
(
x,D2Dt
)
. Equation (2.6) reﬂects a
decomposition of efﬁcient price innovations into three mutually orthogonal components: a
trade-unrelated component with variance given by the ﬁrst term on the right hand side of
Equation (2.6), and two trade-related components with variances given by the second and
third term. The ﬁrst trade-related component is associated with D2C trades and the second
one is associated with D2D trades. Equation (2.6) is the basis of our price discovery metric,
Hasbrouck’s (1991b) R2, that expresses each component’s variance as a fraction of σ2Δp¯ .
We estimate the VAR model using all quote changes between 7:00 a.m. and 5:30 p.m., New
York time, during our sample period.37 We splice together intraday quote changes of ﬁve-year
on-the-run index CDSs and the corresponding numbers of signed outright trades in order to
create a continuous vector-valued time series from which we can estimate the VAR model. We
exclude quote changes that span long periods of time presumably because of technical issues
with the composite computation.38 Finally, we winsorize quote changes at the 0.1% and 99.9%
36A single protection-buyer-initiated D2C trade is an event inΩx,D2Ct but obviously not the only event that gives
rise to a unit-sized shock of the D2C-trade-related variable. For instance, occurrence of two protection-buyer-
initiated D2C trades and one protection-seller-initiated D2C trade between the t −1-th and t-th quote revision
also result in a unit-sized shock of the D2C-trade-related variable.
37When estimating the VAR model, we assume that the system is in steady-state at the beginning of each trading
day.
38The fact that, over these time spans, there are typically neither quotes for CDX.IG nor for CDX.HY suggests
technical disruptions.
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quantile of their distribution.
2.5.2 Results
Panels A1 and A2 of Table 2.8 display VAR coefﬁcient estimates for CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respec-
tively. The results for both indices are similar and, therefore, the discussion focuses on CDX.IG.
The signiﬁcant coefﬁcients of contemporaneous trade-related variables in Equation (2.3a)
suggest that dealers immediately raise mid-quotes by 0.009 bps and 0.003 bps in response to
single protection-buyer-initiated D2C and D2D trades, respectively. Mid-quotes tend to be
raised further in subsequent revisions due to the generally positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcients
of lagged variables in the equation. The generally positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcients of lagged
D2C-(D2D-)trade-related variables in Equation (2.3b) (Equation (2.3c)) indicate positively
autocorrelated D2C (D2D) trades. This reﬂects persistence in order ﬂow, a pervasive feature
of trade in ﬁnancial markets.39 Consistent with dealers hedging customer trades in the inter-
dealer market, coefﬁcients of contemporaneous and lagged D2C-trade-related variables in
Equation (2.3c) are generally positive and signiﬁcant.
The generally positive coefﬁcients of lagged mid-quote changes in Equation (2.3b) suggest that
quote changes are positively related to D2C trades. This is in contrast to the negative relation
implied by inventory control considerations of an individual dealer who sets quotes so as to
elicit customer trades in the direction of inventory (i.e., who reduces quotes to elicit protection-
buyer-initiated customer trades when being a net protection buyer and, vice versa, when
being a net protection seller). Instead, the positive relation may reﬂect momentum-driven
trading by customers.
Granger causality tests reveal that the dynamic interaction between D2C- and D2D-trade-
related variables is characterized by one-way Granger causality with D2C trades Granger-
causing D2D trades. This is consistent with inventory management taking place in the in-
terdealer market. Many market participants, in fact, view D2D trades as primarily hedging
motivated. In support of this view, price discovery fractions of D2D trades in Panel C of
Table 2.8 are virtually zero.
Figure 2.3 shows trade-induced cumulative quote revisions implied by the estimated VAR
models. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁgure tracks the cumulative quote revision following single protection-
buyer-initiated D2C and D2D trades, respectively. Consistent with the evidence based on the
simple price impact measure of Section 2.4, we ﬁnd that a single protection-buyer-initiated
D2C trade has a larger cumulative effect on quotes than a single protection-buyer-initiated
D2D trade. A formal statistical test regarding the ultimate price impact of a trade—i.e., the
long-run limit of the cumulative quote revisions exhibited in Figure 2.3—is provided in Panel B
of Table 2.8 and rejects the hypothesis of identical price impacts of D2C and D2D trades.
39Persistence in order ﬂow has been found to characterize trade of many ﬁnancial securities after Hasbrouck
and Ho (1987) provided initial evidence for U.S. equities.
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Coefﬁcient Estimates Granger Causality Tests
10∑
j=1
Δmt− j xD2Ct
10∑
j=1
xD2Ct− j x
D2D
t
10∑
j=1
xD2Dt− j Δm x
D2C xD2D
Panel A1: CDX.IG
Δmt 0.344 0.009 0.017 0.003 0.005 4793.6 141.7
(67.08) (77.19) (48.00) (14.79) (8.67) [<0.01] [<0.01]
xD2Ct 2.069 0.239 0.022 1096.3 15.0
(22.07) (37.40) (1.91) [<0.01] [0.13]
xD2Dt -0.172 0.023 0.030 0.137 27.2 102.4
(-3.37) (19.87) (8.67) (21.96) [<0.01] [<0.01]
Panel A2: CDX.HY
Δmt 0.254 0.042 0.074 0.011 0.020 5351.7 84.5
(42.61) (81.68) (49.49) (9.48) (6.07) [<0.01] [<0.01]
xD2Ct 0.410 0.322 -0.007 851.6 11.7
(15.28) (48.10) (-0.49) [<0.01] [0.31]
xD2Dt -0.071 0.023 0.027 0.131 49.3 119.7
(-5.70) (21.21) (8.59) (19.49) [<0.01] [<0.01]
Panel B: Price Impact
CDX.IG CDX.HY
D2C D2D D2C−D2D D2C D2D D2C−D2D
Λ 0.060 0.019 0.041 0.256 0.049 0.207
(65.51) (12.24) (23.53) (68.47) (6.87) (25.80)
Panel C: Price Discovery
CDX.IG CDX.HY
D2C D2D Trade-Unrelated D2C D2D Trade-Unrelated
R2 28.61 0.83 70.56 37.73 0.30 61.97
Table 2.8: VAR Estimates.
The table shows coefﬁcient estimates of event-time vector autoregressive (VAR) models for mid-quote revisions
(Δm), the sum of signed dealer-to-customer (D2C) trades that occur between quote revisions (xD2C), and the sum
of signed dealer-to-dealer (D2D) trades that occur between quote revisions (xD2D). Panels A1 and A2 show VAR
coefﬁcient estimates (t-statistics based on OLS standard errors are shown in parenthesis) and Wald test statistics
(p-values are shown in brackets) for the null hypothesis that the column variable does not Granger-cause the
row variable. Coefﬁcient estimates of contemporaneous variables are separated from coefﬁcient estimates of
lagged variables and sums of the latter are reported in columns that show sums of lagged variables. Panel B shows
price impact estimates (Λ; t-statistics based on OLS standard errors are shown in parenthesis) as captured by the
model-implied long-run cumulative quote revision (in basis points) in response to either a single protection-buyer-
initiated D2C trade or a single protection-buyer-initiated D2D trade, as well as the difference in price impacts of
D2C and D2D trades. Panel C shows a model-implied variance decomposition of efﬁcient price innovations into
trade-related and trade-unrelated components (in percent of the variance of efﬁcient price innovations). Quotes
are in terms of index CDS spreads and trade direction used to sign trades is inferred by the Lee and Ready (1991)
algorithm. The sample period is October 2, 2013 to October 16, 2015 and comprises 216,280 and 187,871 quote
revisions for CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively.
We relegate estimation of VAR model speciﬁcations that take trade size into account to Ap-
pendix B.9. The results we obtain are consistent with the ones we report here. When estimating
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Panel A: CDX.IG 5Y on-the-run
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Panel B: CDX.HY 5Y on-the-run
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Figure 2.3: VAR-Model-Implied Price Impact.
The panels show cumulative quote revisions in response to either a single protection-buyer-initiated dealer-to-
customer (D2C; solid black lines) trade or a single protection-buyer-initiated dealer-to-dealer (D2D; solid light
gray lines) trade. The trades are outright ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDS trades in CDX.IG (Panel A) and CDX.HY
(Panel B). Cumulative quote revisions are implied by event-time vector autoregressive models for mid-quote
revisions, the sum of signed D2C trades that occur between quote revisions, and the sum of signed D2D trades that
occur between quote revisions. Dashed lines mark 95% conﬁdence intervals based on OLS standard errors. Quotes
are in terms of index CDS spreads and expressed in basis points (bps). The sample period is October 2, 2013 to
October 16, 2015 and comprises 216,280 and 187,871 quote revisions for CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively.
alternative VAR model speciﬁcations, we observe that the use of trade size does not add to the
explanatory power of VAR models. This is reminiscent of Jones, Kaul, and Lipson (1994) who
ﬁnd that in the equity market trade size has little incremental explanatory power above that
contained in the number of transactions.
2.6 Why is Trade in the Interdealer Market Cheaper?
In intermediating D2D trades, IDBs have developed a variety of trading protocols that are
not available in the D2C segment. These include mid-market matching and workup. The
distinctive feature of these two trading protocols is that trade occurs through size discovery;
i.e., through quantity exchange at a ﬁxed price (see, e.g., Dufﬁe and Zhu (2015)). Because the
price at which the exchange takes place is ﬁxed, the price is insensitive to price pressure and
allows for exchange of potentially large quantities with little price impact.
We use unique order-book data from the main IDB SEF, the GFI Swaps Exchange, to investigate
how the use of these trading protocols contributes to the low transaction costs and small
price impacts of D2D trades.40 We also use this data to estimate dealer proﬁts from liquidity
provision.
40Focusing on trades executed on the GFI Swaps Exchange is not restrictive because it is the IDB SEF facilitating
the majority of D2D trading volume (see Table 2.1). Other IDB SEFs also offer matching and workup, but order-book
data are unavailable.
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2.6.1 Size-Discovery TradingMechanisms
In addition to conventional order book and RFQ trading protocols (both of which are price-
discovery trading mechanisms), the GFI Swaps Exchange offers both matching and workup
trading protocols. For ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs, the primarily used size-discovery
trading mechanism is continuous mid-market matching. The mid-market level is set by a GFI
broker and is usually somewhere between the best bid and offer currently resting on the order
book but does not necessarily have to coincide with the mid-point implied by the best bid
and offer. The mid-market level is fed onto the trading screen that displays the order book
and the color in which the mid-market level is displayed informs market participants about
whether there is interest for matching or not. Market participants are not informed about
the direction and size of potential interests but they know that interests must be at least of a
minimum size.41 Any opposing interests for matching at the mid-market level immediately
result in a trade.
Workup sessions on the GFI Swaps Exchange are initiated by trades on the order book. During
these sessions, the parties to the initiating trade and other market participants joining the
trade can work up the size of the trade by submitting size orders that, in case of a match, result
in a trade at the transaction price of the initiating trade. The aggressor and liquidity provider
of the initiating trade are privileged by means of a 10-second exclusivity period during which
they are the only market participants that can work up trade size. Subsequent to the exclusivity
period, other market participants can join the trade for another 30 seconds before the workup
session terminates. In contrast to continuous mid-market matching, market participants are
informed about which side of the market has unﬁlled interests.
2.6.2 Data and Identiﬁcation of Mid-Market Matches andWorkups
The GFI data consist of the best bid and offer quotes that rest on the order book of the GFI
Swaps Exchange. In addition, the data include the mid-market levels that GFI brokers set for
mid-market matching. From this data we identify order-book trades, mid-market matches,
and workups (Appendix B.4 contains the details). Trades that are not identiﬁed as belonging
to any of the three categories are subsumed into their own category. Some of these trades are
likely voice-brokered RFQs.
Table 2.9 shows volume shares of the different trade categories. We separately report volume
shares for outright trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run and other index CDSs, for index rolls be-
tween ﬁve-year on-the-run and immediate off-the-run index CDSs, and for other package
transactions (excluding index swaption and tranche swap delta hedges for which we are un-
able to identify the trading protocol). For outright trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs,
mid-market matches account for 52.2% and 58.6% of trading volume in case of CDX.IG and
CDX.HY, respectively. 20.0% and 16.5% of trading volume in these contracts gets executed
at the best bid or offer and about the same share of volume is traded in ensuing workup
41Current minimum sizes are USD 25 million for CDX.IG and USD 10 million for CDX.HY.
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Mid-Market Order Trade Other
Matching Book Workup Method
Panel A: CDX.IG
Outright
Five-year on-the-run 52.2 20.0 19.1 8.8
Other 13.6 8.8 18.4 59.1
Package
Roll ﬁve-year on-the-run immediate off-the-run 20.1 18.8 26.4 34.8
Other 7.9 25.3 25.6 41.1
Total 42.6 20.4 20.6 16.4
Panel B: CDX.HY
Outright
Five-year on-the-run 58.6 16.5 14.9 10.0
Other 6.5 8.2 14.0 71.3
Package
Roll ﬁve-year on-the-run immediate off-the-run 31.2 20.3 14.9 33.6
Other 5.1 25.3 27.2 42.4
Total 49.3 17.3 15.4 18.0
Table 2.9: GFI Swaps Exchange Volume Shares by Trading Protocol.
Panels A and B show percentages of GFI Swaps Exchange trading volumes of index CDS trades in CDX.IG and
CDX.HY, respectively, by trading protocol. Row values add to 100% and delta hedges of index swaption and tranche
swap trades are excluded from the computation of volume shares. The sample period is October 2, 2013 to October
16, 2015 and comprises 8,253 and 8,199 (non-delta-hedge) trades for CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively.
sessions.42 Together size-discovery trading mechanisms account for the majority of trading
volume in ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs, with aggregate volume shares of 71.3% and 73.5%
in case of CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively.
2.6.3 Transaction Costs Across Trading Protocols
In order to compare effective half-spreads, realized half-spreads, and price impacts across
trading protocols, we estimate trade-by-trade regressions similar to those in Equation (2.2). As
before, we focus on outright trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs and, for comparability
with previous results, we continue to compute half-spreads and price impacts with respect to
Markit’s intraday mid-quote. Speciﬁcally, we estimate
yt =α+βMTCHMTCHt +βWRKUPWRKUPt +βOTHEROTHERt +γ′Xt +t , (2.7)
where yt and Xt are deﬁned as before and MTCHt , WRKUPt , and OTHERt are dummy vari-
ables for mid-market matches, workups, and trades with unidentiﬁed trading protocol. Thus,
42About half of the ﬁve-year on-the-run trades that occur on the order book are subsequently worked up.
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α estimates the average effective half-spread (or, depending on the dependent variable used,
realized half-spread or price impact) of an outright order-book trade with trade size in the ﬁrst
quartile of the trade size distribution that is executed when average market conditions prevail,
and βs estimate effective half-spread differences with respect to order-book trades.
Table 2.10 displays regression results. First, compare order-book trades and mid-market
matches. Effective half-spreads are signiﬁcantly lower for mid-market matches. This is unsur-
prising as the mid-market level is usually somewhere between the best bid and offer resting
on the order book. More importantly, price impacts are signiﬁcantly lower for mid-market
matches, and there are no signiﬁcant differences in realized half-spreads. That is, we observe a
partial segmentation of the order ﬂow, with a higher proportion of informed trades occurring
on the order book. This is consistent with Zhu’s (2014) model of strategic venue selection by
informed and liquidity traders. In his model, traders optimally choose between sending orders
to an exchange or a mid-point dark pool (essentially equivalent to continuous mid-market
matching). Sending an order to a mid-point dark pool involves a trade-off between potential
price improvement and the risk of no execution. Because informed traders face higher execu-
tion risk than liquidity traders, they concentrate on the exchange that guarantees immediate
execution at a market marker’s bid or offer.
Next, compare order-book trades and workups. There are no signiﬁcant differences in effective
half-spreads. This is by design as workups are executed at the transaction prices of the
initiating order-book trades. There are also no signiﬁcant differences in price impacts. Because
a workup follows the initiating order-book trade very closely in time, and because of the 15-
minute period over which price impact is measured, the price impact of a workup will include
most of the price impact of the initiating order-book trade. The result, therefore, indicates that
the additional price impact of a workup is close to zero.
Overall, our results show that size-discovery trading protocols attract liquidity-motivated
trading and contribute to lowering overall transaction costs and price impacts of D2D trades.
2.6.4 Estimates of Proﬁts from Liquidity Provision
We use the GFI data to estimate dealer proﬁts from liquidity provision in ﬁve-year on-the-run
index CDSs. Speciﬁcally, we assume that dealers provide immediacy on D2C SEFs and close
their positions on the GFI Swaps Exchange. For each index we compute, day by day, the trade-
size-weighted average proﬁts from all D2C trades and multiply them by the aggregate trading
volumes on D2C SEFs (from Clarus FT). Our estimates of proﬁts from liquidity provision
are sample means of daily proﬁts computed in this way. In computing per trade proﬁts, we
consider two scenarios: ﬁrst, that liquidity providers are able to immediately close D2C trades
at the mid-market level that prevails at trade execution. Second, that liquidity providers are
able to immediately close protection-buyer-initiated (protection-seller-initiated) D2C trades
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CDX.IG CDX.HY
EffcSprd RlzdSprd PrcImp EffcSprd RlzdSprd PrcImp
CONST 0.102∗∗ -0.013 0.115∗∗ 0.476∗∗ -0.043 0.519∗∗
(30.43) (-1.93) (15.75) (12.92) (-0.72) (9.50)
MTCH -0.040∗∗ 0.003 -0.043∗∗ -0.152∗∗ 0.008 -0.160∗∗
(-9.95) (0.47) (-5.72) (-5.10) (0.15) (-3.24)
WRKUP 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.016 -0.032 0.048
(1.29) (0.12) (0.53) (0.84) (-0.85) (1.27)
OTHER 0.040∗ 0.098∗∗ -0.058∗∗ 0.354∗ 0.575∗∗ -0.222∗∗
(2.04) (3.34) (-3.47) (2.11) (3.22) (-3.24)
MDM 0.010∗∗ 0.008 0.002 0.002 0.048 -0.046
(3.22) (1.31) (0.28) (0.08) (1.08) (-1.17)
LRG 0.007 0.019∗ -0.013 0.002 0.033 -0.030
(1.08) (1.97) (-1.29) (0.10) (0.66) (-0.61)
BLCK -0.002 0.063∗ -0.065∗∗ -0.025 0.345 -0.370∗
(-0.09) (2.24) (-2.75) (-0.34) (1.94) (-2.43)
RFRNC 0.015∗∗ 0.003 0.012 0.060 0.092 -0.032
(2.90) (0.22) (1.02) (1.33) (1.29) (-0.54)
BAS 0.312∗∗ 0.150 0.161 0.216∗∗ 0.079 0.137
(4.24) (1.50) (1.22) (4.96) (0.87) (1.50)
SPRD/100 0.119 -0.020 0.140 0.306 0.377 -0.071
(1.95) (-0.19) (1.95) (1.64) (1.73) (-0.77)
VLTLTY 0.138∗∗ -0.017 0.156 0.486 -1.347∗ 1.833∗∗
(3.22) (-0.20) (1.58) (1.44) (-1.98) (2.99)
N 6,623 6,623 6,623 6,844 6,844 6,844
Table 2.10: Regressions Controlling for D2D Trade Characteristics and Market Conditions.
The table shows OLS estimates of regression speciﬁcations that control for selection bias in the comparison of
effective half-spreads (EffcSprd), realized half-spreads (RlzdSprd), and price impacts (PrcImp) of outright order-
book trades, mid-market matches, workups, and other trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG
and CDX.HY (t-statistics based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors are shown in parenthesis). EffcSprd is
deﬁned as qt × (pt −mt ), where pt is the transaction price and mt is the latest mid-quote in the 15-minute period
prior to trade execution. RlzdSprd is deﬁned as qt × (pt −mt+Δ), where mt+Δ is the ﬁrst mid-quote in the 15-
minute period that follows trade execution by 15 minutes. PrcImp is deﬁned as qt × (mt+Δ−mt ). Both transaction
prices and quotes are in terms of index CDS spreads and expressed in basis points (bps). Trade direction, qt , is
inferred by the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. The explanatory variables include a constant (CONST), dummy
variables for mid-market matches (MTCH), for trade workups (WRKUP), for trades with an other method of trade
execution (OTHER), for medium-sized trades (MDM; USD 25–50 MM for CDX.IG and USD 5–10 MM for CDX.HY),
for large-sized trades (LRG; USD 50–100 MM for CDX.IG and USD 10–25 MM for CDX.HY), for block-sized trades
(BLCK; +USD 100 MM for CDX.IG and +USD 25 MM for CDX.HY), for trades with transaction prices at typical
reference levels (RFRNC; index CDS spread multiples 0.5 bps for CDX.IG and price multiples of 0.125% for CDX.HY),
the bid-ask spread of the latest quote for the ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDS (BAS), the corresponding mid-quote
(SPRD), and the implied volatility of three-month at-the-money swaptions on the ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDS
(VLTLTY). Continuous explanatory variables are demeaned. ∗∗ and ∗ denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%
and 5% level, respectively. The sample period is October 2, 2013 to October 16, 2015 and comprises 1,336 (3,640)
[1,187] {460} and 1,102 (4,261) [1,032] {449} outright order-book trades (mid-market matches) [trade workups]
{other trades} in ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively.
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at the best offer (bid) that prevails at trade execution on the order book.43
In the ﬁrst scenario estimated proﬁts are USD 0.433 million and USD 0.808 million per day
in case of CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively, or USD 1.241 million per day in total. However,
this presumes that the quoted mid-market level is executable, which is only the case if there
are opposing interests for matching. In the second scenario that uses executable bid and
offer quotes, estimated proﬁts are negative.44 This suggests that liquidity providers only make
proﬁts through their willingness to bear inventory risk (see, e.g., Grossman and Miller (1988)).
The results show that liquidity provision in the D2C segment is very competitive and that
institutional investors who value immediacy would not be able to save transaction costs
by executing their trades on the order books of IDB SEFs. Indeed, 96.0% and 96.6% of the
D2C trades in CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively, are executed at prices that are strictly more
favorable than the best bid or offer.45 Transaction costs can only be reduced at the expense
of execution certainty either through liquidity supplying order-book trades or through mid-
market matching.
2.7 Conclusion
Using transaction data, we study the market structure and transaction costs of index CDSs
after the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act. We identify D2C trades and D2D trades.
Transaction costs and price impacts are larger for D2C trades and increase with trade size,
quoted bid-ask spread, and volatility. D2C trades Granger-cause D2D trades consistent with
the interdealer market being used for managing inventory risk. Unique order-book data show
the important role of mid-market matching and workup for reducing transaction costs and
price impacts of D2D trades. D2C trades are competitive relative to executable bids and offers
in the interdealer market, suggesting that the current two-tiered market structure delivers
favorable prices for customers who value immediacy. While these customers would not be
able to save transaction costs by executing their trades on interdealer order books, transaction
costs could be reduced at the expense of execution certainty either through liquidity supplying
order-book trades or through mid-market matching.
43We require mid-market levels and quotes to come from within 15 minutes prior to trade execution. Therefore,
per trade proﬁts cannot be computed for a few trades and we drop these trades from the computation of daily
trade-size-weighted proﬁts. Similarly, when assuming that trades are closed at the best bid or offer, we drop trades
for which the side of the order book at which the trade would be closed is empty at trade execution.
44Trades can be closed at the prevailing best bid or offer provided that there is sufﬁcient depth. We abstract from
this issue when computing per trade proﬁts because the GFI data does not include the depth available at the best
bid and offer.
45In the computation of fractions, trades are signed based on Markit intraday mid-quotes. A more robust
approach is to consider only D2C trades for which, based on the latest order-book quote from within 15 minutes
prior to trade execution, neither side of the order book is empty at trade execution and report the fraction of D2C
trades with transaction prices that are strictly within the bid-offer spread. The corresponding fractions are 95.7%
and 96.4% for CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively.
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3 Index CDS Trading Costs around the
Introduction of SEFs
I document a decline of trading costs and proﬁts from liquidity provision in the index credit
default swap market over a two-and-a-half-year period during which Dodd-Frank Act provi-
sions were implemented. Consistent with better comparison shopping and stronger price
competition on regulated trading platforms, I ﬁnd lower trading costs and proﬁts from liq-
uidity provision for trades executed on swap execution facilities (SEFs) in comparison to
bilaterally negotiated trades. The results suggest that Dodd-Frank rules introducing SEFs had
a diminishing effect on trading costs and proﬁts from liquidity provision.
3.1 Introduction
In this paper, I document a reduction of trading costs in the billion dollar index credit default
swap (CDS)market over the course of a two-and-a-half-year period duringwhich theU.S. Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) implemented Dodd-Frank Act provisions that
regulate trade in this formerly unregulated over-the-counter (OTC) market. I provide evidence
in support of lower proﬁts from liquidity provision driving the decline in the cost of trading.
These results are consistent with a statutory goal of the Dodd-Frank Act to promote pre- and
post-trade transparency in that improving comparison shopping and increasing competition
among liquidity providers constitute key functions of pre- and post-trade transparency in OTC
markets.1
In this respect, the CFTC enacted three important requirements: the trade reporting require-
ment, the minimum trading functionality requirement, and the trade execution requirement.
The trade reporting requirement mandates real-time trade reporting for regulatory purposes
and public dissemination of trade details, the minimum trading functionality requirement
mandates that regulated trading platforms (so-called swap execution facilities (SEFs)) operate
order books for all the swaps in which they offer trading, and the trade execution requirement
mandates on-SEF trade execution of so-called required transactions in made available to trade
1Other key functions of pre- and post-trade transparency in OTC markets are price discovery and monitoring
agent-delegated trade execution.
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(MAT) swaps by prescribed methods of trade execution that are limited to the order book and
the request-for-quote (RFQ) trading protocol. The latter two requirements are the starting
point of this paper.
First, I ﬁnd a signiﬁcant decline of trading costs and proﬁts from liquidity provision around the
effective date of the minimum trading functionality requirement when SEFs were introduced.
Trading costs of both required and non-required (or permitted) transactions are larger in the
60-calendar-day period before the effective date of the minimum trading functionality require-
ment than in the period between the effective dates of the minimum trading functionality
and trade execution requirements. For instance, the trading costs of required transactions in
CDX.IG contracts (i.e., contracts on broad-based credit indices that are composed of North
American investment-grade companies) decrease from 0.287 bps to 0.180 bps and those of
permitted transactions decrease from 0.295 bps to 0.269 bps.
Second, using a difference-in-differences approach, I do not ﬁnd an effect of mandatory
on-SEF trade execution on trading costs. Trading costs of both required and permitted trans-
actions in CDX.IG decrease further to 0.156 bps and 0.215 bps in the 60-calendar-day period
after the effective date of the trade execution requirement. But trading costs of transactions
that are subject to the trade execution requirement do not decrease signiﬁcantly more than
those of transactions that are not subject to the requirement.
Similarly, proﬁts from providing liquidity in both required and permitted transactions are
higher in the period before the effective date of the minimum trading functionality require-
ment than in the period between the effective dates of the minimum trading functionality and
trade execution requirements. Per trade proﬁts from liquidity provision decrease further in
the period after the effective date of the trade execution requirement but, in comparison to
permitted transactions, not signiﬁcantly more for required transactions. Thus, a difference-
in-differences approach does not reveal an effect of mandatory on-SEF trade execution on
proﬁts from liquidity provision.
These results suggest that the minimum trading functionality requirement had an effect on
trading costs and per trade proﬁts from liquidity provision. But anecdotal evidence is that SEF
order books failed to attract liquidity.2 This suggests that, rather than the speciﬁc minimum
trading functionality, it is the pre-trade transparency provided for by regulated trading plat-
forms in general that drives the observed declines in trading costs and per trade proﬁts from
liquidity provision. In this respect, the results suggest that, once pre-trade transparency has
been provided for, there is no incremental effect on trading costs and proﬁts from liquidity
provision associated with mandatory pre-trade transparency in the form of a trade execution
requirement. The results are robust to controlling for trade characteristics as well as market
liquidity and volatility and also obtain for transactions in CDX.HY contracts (i.e., contracts on
broad-based credit indices that are composed of North American high-yield companies).
2See “RFQ vs. CLOB—The Battle So Far,” Blog post, TabbFORUM, May 27, 2015.
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SEFs provide for pre-trade transparency because they offer methods of trade execution that,
in comparison to bilateral negotiations, facilitate comparison shopping and create direct
price competition among liquidity providers. Therefore, I compare trading costs and proﬁts
from liquidity provision of trades that are executed on SEFs (on-SEF) with those that are not
(off-SEF). I focus on the period after the effective date of the minimum trading functionality
requirement but before the effective date of the trade execution requirement when trading
on SEFs was voluntary for both required and permitted transactions. The differences are
striking. For the most actively traded ﬁve-year on-the-run (5Y OTR) contracts, on-SEF trading
costs are 40%–50% lower than off-SEF trading costs and the per trade proﬁts from on-SEF
liquidity provision are less than 25% of those from off-SEF liquidity provision. Similarly, for
the less actively traded ﬁve-year immediate off-the-run (5Y OFF) contracts, on-SEF trading
costs are 37% lower than off-SEF trading costs and the per trade proﬁts from on-SEF liquidity
provision are 29%–54% of those from off-SEF liquidity provision. For other contracts, there are
no statistically discernable differences in on-SEF and off-SEF trading costs and proﬁts from
liquidity provision.
In contrast to many other OTC markets, the index CDS market is not characterized by a
complete absence of pre-trade transparency. Instead, credit derivatives dealers provide their
institutional clients via electronic pricing messages (usually e-mails) with indicative bid and
offer quotes on a variety of index CDSs. While quotes are indicative and for no particular
notional amount, there is an implicit understanding that an instrument’s standard notional
amount can be executed at or near these quotes without additional bargaining.3 The frequency
with which quotes are updated heavily depends on the particular contract. Quotes on 5Y
OTR and 5Y OFF contracts are updated several hundred times a day (on aggregate across
dealers) while other contracts are only quoted a few times per day, presumably upon a client’s
request. Consequently, in case of being directly contacted by a client for trade in a 5Y OTR or
5Y OFF contract, the dealer can be relatively sure that her indicative quotes were aggressive in
comparison to the rest of the market.4 Thus, the dealer is likely to win the trade and, therefore,
has no incentive to improve upon her quotes. In contrast, when queried for quotes via a SEF,
the dealer is simultaneously competing with other dealers and uncertain about her odds of
winning the trade and, therefore, may improve upon her quotes.5 Consistently, I ﬁnd that
on-SEF trades in 5Y OTR and 5Y OFF contracts are signiﬁcantly more likely to get executed
within the quoted composite bid-ask spread that prevails at trade execution than off-SEF
trades.
The results concerning differential trading costs and proﬁts from liquidity provision of on-SEF
3Some dealers even maintain so-called “dealer-run” platforms with two-sided-market streams that allow for
trade initiation at the streamed quotes. Trade execution is, however, at the dealer’s discretion and access to
platforms is usually restricted to a dealer’s most important clients.
4Many institutional investors have access to the quotes of several credit derivatives dealers.
5While during the period under consideration there has not been a requirement for querying a minimum
number of dealers in case of required transactions, best execution practice among market participants seems to
be seeking quotes from two to three dealers (see “The SEF RFQ Minimum is Moving to 3. Does it matter? Nope,”
Blog post, Greenwich Associates, July 17, 2014, for survey-based evidence from the interest rate swap market).
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and off-SEF trades are robust to controlling for trade characteristics and the endogenous
choice of trading venue. The choice model that I estimate reveals that the likelihood of on-SEF
trade execution decreases with trade size and that the more actively traded 5Y OTR and 5Y
OFF contracts are more likely to be executed on SEFs than other contracts. Despite the fact
that illiquidity and volatility tend to be highly correlated, they have opposite effects on the
likelihood of on-SEF trade execution: the likelihood decreases with the quoted bid-ask spread
of the 5Y OTR contract but increases with the at-the-money implied volatility of short-term
index options on the same contract. The rationale is that fast trade execution on SEFs is
important when volatility is high, while low information leakage in bilateral negotiations is
important when liquidity is low.
The paper is related to a number of studies analyzing the impact of Dodd-Frank Act provisions
on swap market liquidity and trading costs. Loon and Zhong (2016) document a positive
impact of various aspects of the Dodd-Frank reform package (such as, mandatory trade
reporting, central clearing, and trade on SEFs) on index CDS liquidity in the ﬁrst year following
the trade reporting requirement. Relative to what has been documented by Loon and Zhong
(2016), I provide evidence of a longer term trend of declining trading costs in the Dodd-
Frank regulatory regime that seems primarily due to lower proﬁts from liquidity provision. I
also consider an aspect of the Dodd-Frank Act that Loon and Zhong (2016) do not, namely,
mandatory pre-trade transparency due to the trade execution requirement. Benos et al.
(2016) ﬁnd positive impacts of the minimum trading functionality requirement and the trade
execution requirement on trading costs of interest rate swaps. In contrast, I do not ﬁnd an
effect of mandatory on-SEF trade execution on trading costs of index CDSs. My analysis also
differs from Benos et al. (2016) in how trading costs are measured. I directly measure trading
costs at the transaction level by effective half-spreads, thereby, exploiting trade report data
in a more comprehensive manner and being able to include per trade proﬁts from liquidity
provision in my analysis. Finally, Collin-Dufresne, Junge, and Trolle (2016) focus on the
structure of the index CDS market that, in spite of the implementation of Dodd-Frank Act
provisions, continues to be two-tiered. They show that differences in on-SEF trading costs
of client and interdealer trades are due to low price impact of interdealer trades that serve to
manage inventory risk. In comparison, I focus on differences in trading costs of on-SEF and
off-SEF trades and provide evidence in support of relatively stronger price competition on
SEFs, which is consistent with the competitive pricing of on-SEF client trades documented by
Collin-Dufresne et al. (2016).
The paper is also related to studies analyzing the effect of regulations that enforce transparency
upon OTC market. Bessembinder et al. (2006), Edwards et al. (2007), and Goldstein et al. (2007)
document positive effects of mandatory post-trade transparency on the costs of trading cor-
porate bonds. Asquith, Covert, and Pathak (2013), on the other hand, ﬁnd a differential effect
of mandatory post-trade transparency on the liquidity of thinly traded high-yield corporate
bonds in that both price dispersions and trading volumes drop upon trade reporting becom-
ing mandatory. In comparison, my results suggest that providing for pre-trade transparency
has an effect on trading costs, while there is no incremental effect of mandatory pre-trade
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transparency.
The results concerning the choice between on-SEF and off-SEF trade execution are consistent
with other studies of mechanism choice and venue selection in that (off-SEF) bilateral nego-
tiation tends to be chosen for off-the-run instruments (see, e.g., Barclay, Hendershott, and
Kotz (2006)), for larger and less standard trades (see, e.g., Hendershott and Madhavan (2015)),
and when spreads are wide and volatility is low (see, e.g., Bessembinder and Venkataraman
(2004)). However, in contrast to Bessembinder and Venkataraman (2004) and Hendershott
and Madhavan (2015), I do not ﬁnd evidence for strategic selection of the lower cost trading
venue. This could be due to signiﬁcant costs associated with SEF onboarding and compliance
that are not captured by the simple effective half-spread measure of trading costs used in the
analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 summarizes the relevant parts of the Dodd-
Frank Act and discusses their potential impact on proﬁts from liquidity provision. Section 3.3
provides institutional details about the index CDS market and describes the trade and quote
data. Section 3.4 presents results of the analyses of trading costs and proﬁts from liquidity
provision and, where necessary, supplements methodological details. Section 3.5 concludes
the paper.
3.2 The Dodd-Frank Act
Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act provides for a regulatory reform of U.S. OTC swap markets with
the objective to promote ﬁnancial stability, pre- and post-trade transparency, and the trading
on SEFs. For the majority of swaps, the regulatory agency charged with the implementation
of the Act was the CFTC. In order to promote post-trade transparency, the CFTC enacted a
trade reporting requirement providing for real-time trade reporting and public dissemination
of transaction data. Effective December 31, 2012, swap dealers were required to report their
trades to so-called swap data repositories that collect and publicly disseminate the transaction
data. Other market participants were required to report their swap trades in subsequent
months.6 In order to promote pre-trade transparency, the CFTC enacted a minimum trading
functionality and a trade execution requirement both of which are tightly linked to a new type
of regulated trading platform, the SEF, that was introduced in order to regulate trading in swap
markets.
3.2.1 MinimumTrading Functionality and Trade Execution Requirements
A SEF is “a trading system or platform in which multiple participants have the ability to
execute or trade swaps by accepting bids and offers made by multiple participants in the
6Speciﬁcally, so-called major swap market participants were required to report their swap trades from February
28, 2013 onwards, and all other market participants were required to report their trades from April 10, 2013 onwards.
The stated dates apply to interest rate and index credit default swaps only.
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facility or system” (see Section 1(a)(50) of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA)). Essentially,
the deﬁnition ensures that any person or trading platform that facilitates the execution of
swaps and is subject to CFTC oversight has to comply with SEF regulations. Compliance with
SEF regulations amongst others requires that SEFs operate order books as minimum trading
functionalities for the swaps that they list for trading. But trades on SEFs do not necessarily
have to be executed on the order book because SEFs are allowed to offer other methods of
trade execution in addition to the order book. In fact, trades, in general, do not have to be
executed on SEFs at all. Only some trades in MAT swaps, so-called required transactions, have
to be executed on SEFs due to the trade execution requirement. Speciﬁcally, the requirement
applies to all non-block trades in MAT swaps that are not packaged with a non-MAT swap and
where none of the counterparties is an end-user hedging commercial risks (see below). In
case that the requirement applies, it requires that trades are executed either against an order
resting on the order book or against a response to a RFQ which was transmitted to at least three
other market participants. Trade execution requirements come into effect whenever a swap
is made available to trade by means of a SEF-initiated MAT determination that is consistent
with the CEA and CFTC regulations. Once being in effect, the requirements apply to all SEFs
and not only the one that ﬁled the MAT determination. The minimum trading functionality
requirement came into effect on the compliance date of SEF regulations, October 2, 2013, and
and trade execution requirements for MAT swaps came into effect in February 2014.
As mentioned above, the trade execution requirement contains some exceptions. First, it
allows for off-SEF execution of so-called block trades.7 Block trades are large-sized trades
distinguished by notional amounts that exceed pre-deﬁned thresholds.8 A block-sized trade
executed on an order book would typically have a large price impact and, therefore, the
requirement allows for off-SEF trade execution. Similarly, a block-sized trade executed via
an RFQ that is disseminated to at least three other market participants would typically have
a larger price impact than if it were bilaterally negotiated because of information leakage
associated with requesting quotes from multiple dealers.
Second, end-users that trade swaps for hedging commercial risks are exempt from the trade
execution requirement and, therefore, do not have to execute their trades on SEFs. This
is because costly compliance with regulatory rules would discourage such end-users from
hedging via swaps.
Third, MAT swaps that are packaged with non-MAT swaps are temporarily exempt from the
trade execution requirement because SEFs and central clearing counterparties were unable
to handle the processing necessary to guarantee clearing of all legs of a package upon trade
execution when the trade execution requirements for MAT swaps came into effect. This would
7In fact, off-SEF trade execution is part of the deﬁnition of a block trade. This, however, does not mean that on-
SEF trade execution of block-sized trades is not allowed, it only means that such trades would not be disseminated
with a delay. Moreover, that part of the deﬁnition of a block trade was temporarily overruled by a no-action relief
that the CFTC granted on September 19, 2014.
8Notional thresholds are set by the CFTC with the intention that around 50% of the aggregate notional amount
traded is disseminated in real-time.
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leave the parties to the trade with the risk that one leg of their trade would not be accepted for
clearing and, as a consequence, be declared invalid from the beginning during the post-trade
processing stage. Because many packages involve legs that partially offset each other’s risk,
the parties’ risk proﬁle would ultimately be more risky than intended upon trade execution.
3.2.2 Potential Impact of Requirements on Proﬁts from Liquidity Provision
In order to understand how and why the two requirements might affect proﬁts from liquidity
provision, it is worth contrasting swap trading in the presence of SEF regulations with how
trading used to be when swap markets were OTC and, to a large extent, exempt from regulatory
oversight. The most obvious difference that trade in OTC swap markets was characterized by a
complete absence of post-trade transparency will not be discussed because real-time trade
reporting was already in effect when SEFs were introduced.
First, trade in OTC swap markets was dealer intermediated and, as a consequence, there was
at least one dealer counterparty on each and every trade. The minimum trading functionality
requirement in principle allows for liquidity provision by non-dealer market participants, with
an adverse effect on proﬁts from liquidity provision due to increased competition.
Second, the pre-trade information available to traders in OTC swap markets comprised of
indicative dealer quotes (alike the electronically distributed ones described in the introduc-
tion) as well as quotes collected by directly contacting a dealer over the phone. The latter
were in general only ﬁrm “as long as the breath is warm,” i.e., they could be subject to change
upon a repeat contact. Because a repeat contact signals less favorable valuations of compet-
ing dealers, it gives rise to strategic pricing behavior by dealers that generally leads to less
favorable terms offered upon a repeat contact (see, e.g., Zhu (2012)). In comparison, the trade
execution requirement ensures that a signiﬁcant share of trades takes place on electronic
trading platforms and by means of trading protocols ensuring that quotes are executable
and come from multiple liquidity providers simultaneously competing for the trade. This
eliminates the possibility for strategic dealer pricing upon a repeat contact and increases
dealer competition relative to traditional bilateral negotiations in OTC markets. Both effects
are likely to reduce proﬁts from liquidity provision.
3.3 Institutional Details and Data
Focus of the empirical analysis are index CDSs. This section provides the necessary institu-
tional background about the market in which these contracts trade. Moreover, it describes the
data that are used in the analysis.
3.3.1 The Index CDSMarket
An index CDS is a standardized credit derivative on an index of creditors (i.e., a credit index)
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that generates the same payoff as a diversiﬁed portfolio of the creditors’ single-name CDSs.
Speciﬁcally, over the life of the index CDS contract, the credit protection seller agrees to
compensate the credit protection buyer for the loss associated with each credit event that
pertains to one of the creditors in the index and with that fraction of the contract’s notional
amount which is proportional to the creditor’s weight in the index.9 In return, the credit
protection buyer agrees to make ﬁxed-rate quarterly premium payments on that fraction of
the contract’s notional amount which remains after all preceding credit events have been
written-off completely.10
Index composition follows a rules-based approach according to which creditors in the index
are revised every sixmonths. The revisions ensure that the index is composed of those creditors
of a speciﬁc credit rating grade whose single-name CDSs are most liquidly traded in the market.
Whenever there is a revision, a new index—or, more precisely, a new series of an index—is
launched.11 The most recently launched index is referred to as on-the-run and all previously
launched indices are referred to as off-the-run. Liquidity and trading activity concentrates in
on-the-run index CDSs and, in particular, those with a ﬁve-year maturity.
Index CDSs used to be traded in a relatively opaque OTC market. With the implementation of
Dodd-Frank Act provisions and, in particular, with the approval of a MAT determination for
5Y OTR and 5Y OFF contracts on the most popular credit indices, the index CDS market has
undergone signiﬁcant changes. Since the effective date of the trade execution requirement,
February 26, 2014, the majority of trades are executed on SEFs. Nevertheless, the structure of
the index CDS market has been largely unaffected and trades continue to be dealer intermedi-
ated due to almost exclusive use of RFQ methods for trade execution (see, e.g., Collin-Dufresne
et al. (2016)).
The two most popular credit indices of North American creditors with investment-grade and
high-yield ratings are the CDX North American Investment Grade (CDX.IG) and the CDX
North American High Yield (CDX.HY) index. The former comprises 125 creditors and the latter
comprises 100 creditors. Index CDS contracts on these indices have maturities between one
and ten years and are traded with ﬁxed spreads and points upfront. That is, the premium
payments of all contracts on a particular index accrue at the same ﬁxed rate (the ﬁxed spread
speciﬁed in the contract terms) and counterparties exchange an upfront payment (the points
upfront per dollar of notional amount) at trade initiation in order to compensate each other
for the potentially non-zero present value of the contract. Nevertheless, contracts are rarely
quoted in terms of points upfront. Instead, CDX.IG contracts are usually quoted in terms of par
spreads (i.e., in terms of the ﬁxed rates that give zero present values of contracts; henceforth
referred to as index CDS spreads) and CDX.HY contracts are usually quoted in terms of bond-
9For instance, a 60% default loss of a creditor in an equally-weighted index of 100 creditors corresponds to an
0.6% loss on the notional of the index CDS contract.
10Continuing with the example of one creditor’s default in an equally-weighted index of 100 creditors, following
the default, premium payments are made on 99% of the notional whereas they were made on the full notional of
the index CDS contract before the default.
11An index’s series number uniquely determines the creditors in the index.
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equivalent prices. Contracts on CDX.IG and CDX.HY are the focus of my analysis.
3.3.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
For the analysis, I use trade and quote data over the 611-trading-day period from January 2,
2013 to June 30, 2015. The trade data come from publicly disseminated trade reports by the
Bloomberg Swap Data Repository, the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation Data Reposi-
tory, and the Intercontinental Exchange Trade Vault (Appendix C contains details concerning
the sample construction). The trade reports comprise, amongst others, information to identify
the underlying of the index CDS contract, the contract term, the execution timestamp, the
transaction price, the (capped) trade size, and an on-SEF trade execution indicator. The quote
data come from Markit and comprise time-stamped dealer composite bid and ask quotes.
Composite quotes are updated on an intraday basis whenever a dealer sends out an electronic
pricing message with indicative quotes to one of the subscribers to Markit’s quote parsing
and streaming service. In order to preserve pricing message anonymity, Markit computes
composites using individual-dealer quotes from each dealer’s latest pricing message within
the past 15 minutes. Quote timestamps correspond to the time when the updating pricing
message was made.
As can be seen from Table 3.1, the data exhibit signiﬁcant differences in the trading and
quoting activity among contracts.12 Trading activity, both in terms of the notional amount
traded and in terms of the number of trades, concentrates in 5Y OTR index CDS contracts. For
instance, 5Y OTR CDX.IG accounts for 85% of total volume in CDX.IG contracts and for 87% of
total trades, and 5Y OTR CDX.HY accounts for 86% of total volume in CDX.HY contracts and
for 91% of total trades. Similarly, dealer quotes on 5Y OTR contracts alone account for around
60% of all quotes in case of both indices.
Daily trading volumes of 5Y OTR contracts are large. On an average trading day, the aggregate
notional amount of 5Y OTR CDX.IG contracts is USD 7.8 billion and that of 5Y OTR CDX.HY
contracts is USD 3.2 billion. Particulary noteworthy is the fact that daily trading volumes are
due to a relatively small number of trades, with only 138 5Y OTR CDX.IG and 169 5Y OTR
CDX.HY trades per day, on average. As a consequence of high daily trading volumes and
relatively few trades per day, it follows that trade sizes have to be large. It should also be noted
that actual trading volumes are even larger because reported volumes are downward biased
due to capped trade sizes and due to trading of non-U.S. institutions that are not subject to
the CFTC’s trade reporting requirement.
Although being low-high frequency in comparison to other markets (such as, the equity or
foreign exchange markets where trading and quoting takes place at a millisecond frequency),
12The number of contracts, N , in the Total row does not add up to those of the 5Y OTR, 5Y OFF, and Other rows
because ﬁve of the twelve contracts that are either 5Y OTR or 5Y OFF become further off-the-run during the sample
period (i.e., they become what I categorize as Other). Netting those out of the 83 and 67 Other CDX.IG and CDX.HY
contracts and adding the remaining seven 5Y OTR or 5Y OFF contracts gives the Total row value.
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quote revisions for 5Y OTR contracts occur relatively frequently. For instance, the average
numbers of 489 and 404 quotes per day on 5Y OTR CDX.IG and CDX.HY contracts, respectively,
suggest that during a ten-hour trading day quotes are updated every one to one and a half
minutes.
The 5Y OFF contract, i.e., the ﬁve-year contract referencing the previously launched index
series, also accounts for a signiﬁcant share of trading volume (7% for CDX.IG and 10% for
CDX.HY) and trades (7% in case of both indices). On an average trading day, there are ten 5Y
OFF CDX.IG and twelve 5Y OFF CDX.HY trades but around 10% of trading days see no trading
at all. Nevertheless, dealer quote activity remains relatively high with 200 to 300 quote updates
per day.
The residual trading volume is due to trading in non-ﬁve-year contracts on the on-the-run and
immediate off-the-run series and contracts on further off-the-run series (collectively referred
to as Other contracts in what follows).13 On an average trading day, there are around 57 such
CDX.IG contracts and 50 such CDX.HY contracts but less than a handful of those actually trade.
However, the few ones that trade seem to trade more than once which could, for instance,
be due to hedging activity by the dealer that facilitated the trade.14 Similarly, relatively few
contracts are quoted but those that are quoted have more than one quote per day, on average,
which is consistent with OTC market practice of getting quotes from a few dealers prior to
trade execution.
The differences in trading and quoting activity lead to disproportional large shares of trades
in Other contracts that are being dropped when combining the trade and quote data. The
combined data consists of all trades with an available intraday (i.e., from the same trading
day) quote prior to trade execution and another intraday quote from an update that follows
trade execution by at least 15 minutes. The 15-minute period is chosen for two reasons: ﬁrst,
it takes time for information to get incorporated into quotes; and second, block trades are
disseminated with a delay of 15 minutes and the 15-minute period ensures that the quotes
are updated when trade occurrence is public knowledge.15 Moreover, the 15-minute period
ensures that Markit composite quotes before and after trade execution are based on distinct
sets of dealer quotes.
The combined data set consists of 90,983 CDX.IG and 108,986 CDX.HY trades. The trades
comprise 83,550 5Y OTR, 6,002 5Y OFF, and 1,431 Other CDX.IG trades and 100,667 5Y OTR,
13Even within these inactively traded contracts, trading activity is relatively concentrated. For instance, in case
of CDX.IG two of the 83 other contracts, namely, seven- and ten-year CDX.IG series 9, account for 35% of trades
and 43% of trading volume of the remaining contracts. Series 9 is the last series that was launched before the
ﬁnancial crisis when tranche swaps were particulary popular and, anecdotally, trading activity is due to hedging of
the considerable amount of outstanding tranche swaps.
14On a per-contract basis, the sample means reported in Table 3.1 suggest that the average Other CDX.IG contract
trades 10/57.1= 0.2 times per day or once a week and the average Other CDX.HY contract trades 5/49.8= 0.1 times
per day or once every two weeks.
15This is only the case for somepart of the sample period because prior to July 30, 2013 all tradewere disseminated
with a delay of 30 minutes. Moreover, for the ﬁrst year following the compliance date of the CFTC’s real-time trade
reporting requirement (i.e., December 31, 2012) block trades were disseminated with a delay of 30 minutes.
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7,070 5Y OFF, and 1,249 Other CDX.HY trades. These correspond to 99%, 95%, and 24% of the
CDX.IG trades and 97%, 95%, and 43% of the CDX.HY trades, respectively, that are exhibited
in Table 3.1. Given prevailing quotes, I classify trades at index CDS spreads greater than
the prevailing mid-quote as protection buyer initiated and trades at spreads less than the
prevailing mid-quote as protection seller initiated. Following Lee and Ready (1991), trades
at the mid-quote are classiﬁed using the tick rule with trades on an up-tick being classiﬁed
as protection buyer initiated and trades on a down-tick being classiﬁed as protection seller
initiated.
3.4 Dodd-Frank Regime Trading Costs
Trading costs are measured by effective half-spreads with respect to the prevailing mid-quote.
Spreads reﬂect both the liquidity provider’s revenue and the trade’s information content and
can be decomposed accordingly:
qt (pt −mt )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Effective
Half-Spread
= qt (pt −mt+Δ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Realized
Half-Spread
+qt (mt+Δ−mt )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Price Im-
pact of Trade
, (3.1)
where pt is the transaction price, mt is the mid-quote prevailing at trade execution t , and
mt+Δ is the mid-quote of the ﬁrst quote update at least 15 minutes after trade execution. Both
transaction prices and quotes are in terms of index CDS spreads and expressed in basis points.
Trade direction, qt , equals +1 (−1) for protection-buyer-initiated (protection-seller-initiated)
trades.
The intuition for decomposing effective half-spreads according to Equation (3.1) is as follows:
the effective half-spread measures the liquidity provider’s revenue if he were able to immedi-
ately close his position at the prevailing mid-quote. If instead it takes the liquidity provider at
least 15 minutes to close his position (and again assuming that he is able to do so at the then
prevailing mid-quote), his revenue is the realized half-spread. The liquidity provider’s revenue
is less than the effective half-spread if the price moves against him while he is reversing the
trade over time. Such trade-induced price moves or adverse selection costs are captured by
the trade’s price impact.
Panels A and B of Figure 3.1 shows monthly averages of daily trade-size weighted effective and
realized half-spreads of 5Y OTR CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively, over the two-and-a-half-
year period following the effective date of the CFTC’s trade reporting requirement. Focusing
on the effective half-spread, the panels show a large and almost steady decline in the trading
costs of 5Y OTR CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively. Half-spreads of both indices compressed
by about 46% from 0.237 bps in January 2013 to 0.131 bps in June 2015 for 5Y OTR CDX.IG
and, similarly, from 1.210 bps to 0.647 bps for 5Y OTR CDX.HY. The spread compression is
consistent with the generally positive impact that various aspects of the Dodd-Frank reform
package (such as mandatory trade reporting, central clearing, and trade on SEFs) had on a
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Figure 3.1: Effective and Realized Half-Spreads and Fractions of On-SEF Volume.
Panels A and B show monthly averages of daily trade-size-weighted effective and realized half-spreads of transac-
tions in ﬁve-year on-the-run (5Y OTR) index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively. Panels C and D show
monthly averages of daily trading volumes (gray bars, left hand scales) of transactions in 5Y OTR index CDSs on
CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively, as well as monthly averages of the daily volume share of transactions executed
on SEFs (black squares, right hand scales). The sample period is January 2, 2013 to June 30, 2015. The dashed
vertical lines correspond to (from left to right) the effective date of the minimum trading functionality requirement,
October 2, 2013, and the effective date of the trade execution requirement, February 26, 2014.
variety of liquidity measures in the ﬁrst year of real-time trade reporting, as documented by
Loon and Zhong (2016). Relative to what has been documented by Loon and Zhong (2016),
Figure 3.1 provides evidence of a longer term trend of declining transaction costs in the Dodd-
Frank regulatory regime that seems primarily due to lower proﬁts from liquidity provision.
This is because realized half-spreads decline almost in lockstep with effective half-spreads
from 0.151 bps in January 2013 to 0.035 bps in June 2015 for 5Y OTR CDX.IG and, similarly,
from 0.799 bps to 0.283 bps for 5Y OTR CDX.HY.16 Apart from lower proﬁts from liquidity
provision, the correlated decline suggests that price impact, which is the difference between
effective and realized half-spreads, remains relatively constant over time.
It should be noted that, in the above, I do not measure half-spread declines from their peak
in June 2013 but from the ﬁrst month of the sample period, January 2013. The peak in June
16The time series correlation between daily trade-size weighted effective and realized half-spreads is 0.86.
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2013 coincides with a bond market sell-off that lasted from May 2013 to July 2013 and was
accompanied by widening credit spreads and sharply rising Treasury yields.17 The increase in
credit risk also led to wider index CDS spreads, with 5Y OTR CDX.IG (CDX.HY) rising from
74.3 bps (358.9 bps) on May 2, 2013 to 97.6 bps (477.9 bps) on June 24, 2013 before reverting
back to 74.8 bps (369.5 bps) on July 31, 2013.
Panels C and D of Figure 3.1 show monthly averages of daily trading volume for 5Y OTR CDX.IG
and CDX.HY, respectively. Trading volumes seem to be unaffected by the minimum trading
functionality and trade execution requirements. However, the decomposition of trading
volume changed due to the trade execution requirement. As can be read off the panels’ right
hand scales, the monthly average of the fraction of daily trading volume that is executed on
SEFs increased to about 90% in the month following the effective date of the trade execution
requirement. The latter was announced on January 28, 2014, about one month before it
came into effect. But even before the announcement, on-SEF volume shares among 5Y OTR
contracts were relatively high, averaging 47% and 40%, respectively, for CDX.IG and CDX.HY
during the third quarter of 2013. Abstracting from the unusually high half-spreads in between
May 2013 and July 2013, a comparison of upper and lower panels suggests that the spread
compression coincides with an increased use of on-SEF trade execution.
3.4.1 Difference-in-Differences Analysis
In order to quantify the impact of the minimum trading functionality and trade execution
requirements, I focus on the period from 60 calendar days before the effective date of the
minimum trading functionality requirement to 60 calendar days after the effective date of
the trade execution requirement, i.e., August 3, 2013 to April 26, 2014. The pre-event window
of 60 calendar days is chosen so as to not overlap with the effective date of the CFTC’s block
trade rules on July 30, 2013. Prior to that date all trades were disseminated with a delay of
30 minutes while after that date only block trades are disseminated with a delay.18 Because
August 3, 2013 is only three trading days after the effective date of block trade rules, I also
experimented with shorter 30-calendar-day pre- and post-event windows in order to rule out
confounding effects of block trade rules and found similar albeit weaker results.
As described above, block trades are exempt from the trade execution requirement and so
are end-user exempt trades and trades that are packaged with non-MAT index CDSs. In what
follows, I will abstract from the fact that the last two types of trades are not subject to the trade
execution requirement and consider all non-block trades in 5Y OTR and 5Y OFF index CDSs
on CDX.IG and CDX.HY (i.e., those CDX.IG and CDX.HY contracts that are MAT) as required
transactions, i.e., as transactions that are subject to the on-SEF trade execution requirement.19
17See “The Recent Bond Market Selloff in Historical Perspective,” Blog post, Liberty Street Economics, August 5,
2013.
18In addition, a uniform cap of USD 100 million was applied to the trade size of all trades in the period prior to
the effective date of block trade rules.
19In the period after the effective date of the trade execution requirement, 93.2% (5,535 out of 5,942) and 92.5%
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To the extent that the requirement did not have an impact on trades that are not subject
to the requirement, so-called permitted transactions, misclassifying the two types of trades
will make detection of the impact more difﬁcult (i.e., it will bias results against ﬁnding an
impact).20 In principle, end-user exempt trades could be taken into account because they are
ﬂagged in the transaction data. However, the ﬂag exhibits a behavior that cannot be reconciled
with primarily institutional participants in the index CDS market. Accordingly, the fraction of
end-user exempt trades increases from 36.9% of trades on August 5, 2013 to 73.0% of trades on
February 7, 2014. Then it drops to zero on February 10, 2014 and never exceeds 0.7% of trades
for the remainder of the sample period. Taken at face value, this suggests either a signiﬁcant
change in the composition of market participants or their trading behavior, neither one of
which appears plausible. Therefore, I do not account for the fact that end-user exempt trades
are not subject to the trade execution requirement. Because package transactions are not
ﬂagged in the transaction data, I cannot account for the fact that these trades are not subject to
the trade execution requirement. Block trades in MAT index CDSs and all trades in non-MAT
index CDSs form the control group of permitted transactions.
In order to address the question whether the minimum trading functionality and trade exe-
cution requirements had an impact on trading costs and proﬁts from liquidity provision, I
use a difference-in-differences approach that essentially assesses whether costs and proﬁts
of required transactions decline relatively more than those of permitted transactions over
the pre- and post-event windows associated with a given event. Speciﬁcally, I estimate the
following regression
y =β0+β1MAT+β2CMP+β3CMP×MAT+β4EXC+β5EXC×MAT+X ′β+ (3.2)
where y is either the effective or realized half-spread of the t-th trade in index CDS i on date
d (dependence on t , i , and d is suppressed for notational convenience), MAT is a dummy
variable taking the value one if the t-th trade is a non-block trade in an index CDS i that is
MAT (i.e., a required transaction according to the above deﬁnition), CMP is a dummy variable
taking the value one if the date d on which the t-th trade was executed is on or after the
compliance date of SEF rules (October 2, 2013) which include the requirement for a minimum
trading functionality, and EXC is a dummy variable taking the value one if the date d on
which the t-th trade was executed is on or after the effective date of the trade execution
requirement (February 26, 2014), X is a set of control variables, and  is an error term. The
coefﬁcient estimate of β5 is the difference-in-differences estimator of the causal effect of the
(6,049 out of 6,543) of the CDX.IG and CDX.HY trades that I classiﬁed as required transactions are actually executed
on a SEF.
20Spillover effects might lead to an impact on trading costs and proﬁts from liquidity provision of permitted
transactions. As long as this impact is less than the one on required transactions, the statement remains correct.
For an example of a regulatory intervention (the full repeal of the uptick rule for short sales by the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission) associated with signiﬁcant spillover effects, see Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2015).
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trade execution requirement on trading costs and proﬁts from liquidity provision in that
β5 = E[y |CMP= 1,EXC= 1,MAT= 1,X ]−E[y |CMP= 1,EXC= 0,MAT= 1,X ]
− (E[y |CMP= 1,EXC= 1,MAT= 0,X ]−E[y |CMP= 1,EXC= 0,MAT= 0,X ]).
(3.3)
That is, β5 is the difference of mean differences of effective or realized half-spreads of required
and permitted transactions, respectively, before and after the effective date of the trade execu-
tion requirement for MAT index CDSs, where before means before the effective date of the
trade execution requirement but after the SEF compliance date. Thus, a signiﬁcantly negative
β5 indicates a spread-compressing effect of the trade execution requirement. Similarly, β3
is the difference of mean differences of effective or realized half-spreads of required and
permitted transactions, respectively, before and after the compliance date of SEF rules, where
after means after the compliance date of SEF rules but before the effective date of the trade
execution requirement; that is,
β3 = E[y |CMP= 1,EXC= 0,MAT= 1,X ]−E[y |CMP= 0,EXC= 0,MAT= 1,X ]
− (E[y |CMP= 1,EXC= 0,MAT= 0,X ]−E[y |CMP= 0,EXC= 0,MAT= 0,X ]).
(3.4)
But β3 does not capture a causal effect because, in contrast to the trade execution requirement
that only applies to required transactions in MAT index CDSs, the minimum trading function-
ality requirement affects all trades in all index CDS contracts (provided that contracts are listed
on a SEF which is the case for all non-matured CDX.IG and CDX.HY contracts). Nevertheless,
β3 in itself is an insightful coefﬁcient because it captures potentially differential changes in
effective and realized half-spreads of required and permitted transactions over time.
I estimate Equation (3.2) with and without control variables. The control variables that I
consider can be grouped into variables that are trade speciﬁc and variables that control for
market conditions. The trade-speciﬁc control variables include a dummy variable for block
trades (BLCK) which accounts for the fact that there are no block trades that are subject to the
trade execution requirement, and dummy variables for trades in 5Y OFF and Other index CDS
contracts (5YOFF and OTHER, respectively). The variables that control for market conditions
are the bid-ask spread of the 5Y OTR contract prevailing at trade execution (BAS) and the
end-of-day at-the-money implied volatility of a three-month index option on the 5Y OTR
contract (VLTLTY).
As can be seen from speciﬁcations (1) and (4) of Table 3.2, trading costs of permitted transac-
tions in the 60-calendar-day period prior to the compliance date of SEF rules are statistically
indistinguishable from those of required transactions (β1 is insigniﬁcantly different from zero
and non-uniformly signed across indices). Trading cost of permitted transactions in the period
prior to the compliance date of SEF rules are higher than those in the period between effective
dates (β2 < 0 albeit insigniﬁcantly so for CDX.IG). In comparison to permitted transactions,
trading costs of required transactions decline signiﬁcantly more (β3 < 0) over the two peri-
ods. For CDX.IG, the magnitude of the decline is 0.080 bps or 28.0% of the level of trading
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CDX.IG CDX.HY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CNSTNT 0.295∗∗ 0.193∗ 0.130 1.532∗∗ 1.283∗∗ 0.906∗
(17.999) (2.188) (1.509) (20.183) (3.052) (2.202)
MAT -0.009 0.090 0.072 0.024 0.247 0.203
(-0.433) (1.022) (0.831) (0.244) (0.594) (0.495)
CMP -0.026 -0.036 0.029 -0.213∗ -0.297∗∗ 0.132
(-1.295) (-1.682) (1.614) (-2.208) (-3.192) (1.511)
CMP×MAT -0.080∗∗ -0.069∗∗ -0.048∗ -0.406∗∗ -0.319∗∗ -0.277∗∗
(-3.439) (-3.124) (-2.472) (-3.614) (-2.942) (-2.729)
EXC -0.055∗∗ -0.047∗ -0.011 -0.309∗∗ -0.249∗∗ -0.121
(-2.662) (-2.263) (-0.506) (-4.423) (-3.973) (-1.921)
EXC×MAT 0.030 0.021 0.022 0.094 0.020 0.008
(1.912) (1.349) (1.412) (1.408) (0.359) (0.142)
BLCK 0.081 0.083 0.075 0.060
(0.951) (0.975) (0.184) (0.149)
5YOFF 0.051∗∗ 0.068∗∗ 0.383∗∗ 0.454∗∗
(4.076) (5.111) (4.565) (6.676)
OTHER 0.406∗∗ 0.428∗∗ 2.282∗∗ 2.316∗∗
(5.504) (5.918) (5.825) (5.952)
BAS 0.967∗∗ 0.422∗∗
(7.119) (4.390)
VLTLTY 0.314∗ 1.118
(2.211) (1.040)
N 26,708 26,708 26,708 27,934 27,934 27,934
R2 0.027 0.042 0.069 0.041 0.071 0.086
Table 3.2: Difference-in-Differences Regression Speciﬁcations for Effective Half-Spreads.
The table shows OLS estimates of regression speciﬁcations for the difference-in-differences estimator of the causal
effect of the minimum trading functionality and trade execution requirements (t-statistics based on standard
errors clustered by date are shown in parenthesis). The dependent variable is the effective half-spread deﬁned
as qt × (pt −mt ), where pt is the transaction price and mt is the mid-quote prevailing at trade execution t . Both
transaction prices and quotes are in terms of index CDS spreads and expressed in basis points. Trade direction,
qt , equals +1 (−1) for protection-buyer-initiated (protection-seller-initiated) trades and is inferred by the Lee
and Ready (1991) algorithm. The explanatory variables include a dummy variable for non-block trades in made
available to trade index CDS contracts (MAT), a dummy variable for trades executed on or after the SEF compliance
date (CMP), a dummy variable for trades executed on or after the effective date of the trade execution requirement
(EXC), a dummy variable for block trades (BLCK), a dummy variable for trades in the ﬁve-year immediate off-
the-run contract (5YOFF), a dummy variable for trades in contracts other than the ﬁve-year on-the-run and
immediate off-the-run contract (OTHER), the bid-ask spread of the ﬁve-year on-the-run contract prevailing at
trade execution (BAS), and the end-of-day at-the-money implied volatility of a three-month index option on the
ﬁve-year on-the-run contract (VLTLTY). Continuous explanatory variables are demeaned. N is the number of
trades, R2 is the coefﬁcient of determination, and ∗∗ and ∗ denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% level,
respectively. Regression speciﬁcations are estimated from all trades between August 3, 2013 and April 26, 2014.
costs of required transactions prior to the compliance date of SEF rules. For CDX.HY, the
magnitude of the effect is more substantial in absolute terms, 0.406 bps, but of the same order
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of magnitude in relative terms, 26.1%. Moreover, trading costs of permitted transactions in
the period between effective dates are signiﬁcantly higher than those in the 60-calendar-day
period after the effective date of the trade execution requirement (β4 < 0). However, there is no
evidence of a causal effect of the trade execution requirement on trading costs as the declines
in trading costs of permitted and required transactions are statistically indistinguishable (β5 is
insigniﬁcantly different from zero and incorrectly signed).
Two aspects of the evidence in Table 3.2 deserve more attention. First, the large decline in the
cost of required transactions following the SEF compliance date which could, for instance,
be due to an increased use of SEFs in anticipation of the trade execution requirement.21
Second, the large decline in the cost of permitted transactions following the trade execution
requirement which is suggestive of a signiﬁcant spillover effect of the requirement. This
could, for instance, be due to the fact that traders who become SEF participants in order to
comply with the trade execution requirement for MAT index CDSs also execute their trades in
non-MAT index CDSs on SEFs. However, as observed by Boehmer et al. (2015), any changes in
market conditions will confound estimates of the spillover effect and controlling for market
conditions becomes important. In line with their observation, trade-speciﬁc control variables
do not affect spillover effect estimates (see speciﬁcations (2) and (5)), while controlling for
market conditions leaves spillover effects that are insigniﬁcantly different from zero (see
speciﬁcations (3) and (6)).
However, the decline in the cost of required transactions following the SEF compliance date
does not seem to occur in anticipation of the MAT determination because most of the decline
accrues prior to the date on which the determination was ﬁled (October 28, 2013). Estimating
a variant of regression (3.2) that focuses on the SEF compliance date only (i.e., EXC terms
in Equation (3.2) are omitted) gives β3 estimates of -0.076 bps (t-statistic -2.554), -0.068 bps
(t-statistic -2.382), and -0.063 bps (t-statistic -2.203) in case that speciﬁcations are estimated
from all CDX.IG trades between September 9, 2013 and October 25, 2013 and control variables
coincide with those of speciﬁcations (1), (2), and (3), respectively. Similarly, estimating this
variant of regression (3.2) from all CDX.HY trades during the above period givesβ3 estimates of
-0.412 bps (t-statistic -2.147), -0.410 bps (t-statistic -2.067), and -0.309 bps (t-statistic -1.873)
in case that control variables coincide with those of speciﬁcations (4), (5), and (6), respectively.
Moreover, placebo tests that use the date on which the MAT determination was ﬁled instead
of the SEF compliance date but that are otherwise identical to the aforementioned variant of
regression (3.2) (both in terms of the speciﬁcation and in terms of the number of trading days
in the pre- and post-event windows) give β3 estimates that are insigniﬁcantly different from
zero.
Table 3.3 shows the results of the difference-in-differences regression for realized half-spreads.
Consistent with the overall decline in proﬁts from liquidity provision in Figure 3.1, speciﬁ-
cations (1) and (4) show that realized half-spreads of permitted transactions decrease over
21The MAT determination that led to the trade execution requirement was ﬁled by Tradeweb SEF on October 28,
2013 and its certiﬁcation was announced on January 28, 2014.
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CDX.IG CDX.HY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CNSTNT 0.216∗∗ 0.074 0.037 1.260∗∗ 0.931 0.785
(12.327) (0.857) (0.431) (16.241) (1.715) (1.449)
MAT 0.012 0.147 0.136 -0.046 0.251 0.232
(0.550) (1.698) (1.586) (-0.430) (0.465) (0.431)
CMP -0.023 -0.029 0.009 -0.254∗ -0.322∗∗ -0.161
(-1.076) (-1.299) (0.423) (-2.553) (-3.174) (-1.429)
CMP×MAT -0.088∗∗ -0.079∗∗ -0.067∗∗ -0.304∗ -0.233 -0.216
(-3.587) (-3.323) (-3.073) (-2.485) (-1.823) (-1.723)
EXC -0.052∗∗ -0.049∗∗ -0.027 -0.387∗∗ -0.344∗∗ -0.280∗∗
(-2.934) (-2.866) (-1.556) (-4.946) (-4.848) (-3.894)
EXC×MAT 0.008 0.001 0.002 0.105 0.045 0.042
(0.477) (0.078) (0.110) (1.373) (0.659) (0.613)
BLCK 0.117 0.117 0.163 0.159
(1.360) (1.370) (0.308) (0.299)
5YOFF 0.077∗∗ 0.086∗∗ 0.464∗∗ 0.497∗∗
(5.981) (6.677) (5.682) (6.544)
OTHER 0.420∗∗ 0.433∗∗ 1.984∗∗ 1.997∗∗
(5.368) (5.575) (4.220) (4.252)
BAS 0.628∗∗ 0.223∗∗
(3.908) (3.139)
VLTLTY 0.094 -0.269
(0.595) (-0.300)
N 26,708 26,708 26,708 27,934 27,934 27,934
R2 0.021 0.031 0.038 0.027 0.043 0.045
Table 3.3: Difference-in-Differences Regression Speciﬁcations for Realized Half-Spreads.
The table shows OLS estimates of regression speciﬁcations for the difference-in-differences estimator of the causal
effect of the minimum trading functionality and trade execution requirements (t-statistics based on standard
errors clustered by date are shown in parenthesis). The dependent variable is the realized half-spread deﬁned as
qt × (pt −mt+Δ), where pt is the transaction price and mt+Δ is the ﬁrst mid-quote that follows trade execution t
by at least 15 minutes. Both transaction prices and quotes are in terms of index CDS spreads and expressed in
basis points. Trade direction, qt , equals +1 (−1) for protection-buyer-initiated (protection-seller-initiated) trades
and is inferred by the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. The explanatory variables include a dummy variable for
non-block trades in made available to trade index CDS contracts (MAT), a dummy variable for trades executed on
or after the SEF compliance date (CMP), a dummy variable for trades executed on or after the effective date of the
trade execution requirement (EXC), a dummy variable for block trades (BLCK), a dummy variable for trades in
the ﬁve-year immediate off-the-run contract (5YOFF), a dummy variable for trades in contracts other than the
ﬁve-year on-the-run and immediate off-the-run contract (OTHER), the bid-ask spread of the ﬁve-year on-the-run
contract prevailing at trade execution (BAS), and the end-of-day at-the-money implied volatility of a three-month
index option on the ﬁve-year on-the-run contract (VLTLTY). Continuous explanatory variables are demeaned. N
is the number of trades, R2 is the coefﬁcient of determination, and ∗∗ and ∗ denote statistical signiﬁcance at the
1% and 5% level, respectively. Regression speciﬁcations are estimated from all trades between August 3, 2013 and
April 26, 2014.
time (β2 < 0) and signiﬁcantly more so in case of required transactions (β3 < 0). Again, there is
evidence of a signiﬁcant spillover effect in that realized half-spreads of permitted transactions
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are signiﬁcantly lower in the period after the effective date of the trade execution requirement
(β4 < 0) but there is no evidence of a causal effect of the requirement itself (β5 insigniﬁcantly
different from zero and incorrectly signed). Adding control variables affects results of the two
indices in a different manner. For CDX.IG, the spillover effect becomes insigniﬁcant whereas it
remains signiﬁcant for CDX.HY. In case of both indices and regardless of the control variables
used, realized half-spreads of required transactions decline signiﬁcantly more upon the SEF
compliance date than those of permitted transactions although the evidence is relatively
weak in case of CDX.HY (one-sided t-tests of the null hypothesis H0 :β3 ≥ 0 are nevertheless
rejected at the 5% level).
The results for trading costs are consistent with pre-trade transparency having a positive effect
on trading costs and, more generally, liquidity. This is, e.g., a theoretical prediction of Pagano
and Röell (1996), who study the impact of transparency on liquidity by comparing trading
costs in auction and dealer markets under asymmetric information due to a single insider.
They ﬁnd that average (across trade sizes) expected trading costs for uninformed investors
in the more transparent auction market are lower than those in the less transparent dealer
market even if the insider optimally selects his trading strategy in each of the two markets.
However, in the setup of Pagano and Röell (1996) transparency refers to the liquidity provider’s
ability to infer whether or not order ﬂow is informed, while arguments for SEF rules and the
trade execution requirement typically refer to the liquidity demander’s access to a menu of
executable prices (either in response to a RFQ or available on an order book).
The results for proﬁts from liquidity provision seem to suggest that the decline in trading costs
is due to lower proﬁts from liquidity provision, for instance, because of increased competition
for liquidity provision on the order books that SEFs are required to operate because of the
minimum trading functionality requirement. In light of anecdotal evidence that the order
books of SEFs fail to attract liquidity this explanation seems implausible. However, trading
on SEFs differs from trading off SEFs along other dimensions of pre-trade transparency such
as comparison shopping that increase competition for liquidity provision on SEFs. The next
section investigates this hypothesis by comparing trading costs and proﬁts from liquidity
provision of on-SEF trades with those of off-SEF trades. Because prior to the SEF compliance
date there were no SEFs and because after the effective date of the trade execution requirement
on-SEF trade execution is mandatory for required transactions, I focus on the 95-trading-day
period between the two effective dates (October 2, 2013 to February 25, 2014) during which
on-SEF trade execution of both required and permitted transactions was voluntary.
3.4.2 On-SEF and Off-SEF Trading Cost Comparison
Table 3.4 shows trade-size-weighted average effective and realized half-spreads of trades
executed during the above-mentioned period separately for on-SEF and off-SEF trades. The
table shows that in case of both indices on-SEF trades have signiﬁcantly lower trading costs
than off-SEF trades. A breakdown into 5Y OTR, 5Y OFF, and Other contracts shows that this is
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Trades Effective Half-Spread Realized Half-Spread
Contract On-SEF Off-SEF On-SEF Off-SEF On-SEF Off-SEF
Panel A: CDX.IG
5Y OTR 7,906 5,287 0.153∗∗ 0.257 0.054∗∗ 0.221
5Y OFF 170 415 0.196∗ 0.309 0.085∗∗ 0.293
Other 33 163 0.722 0.603 0.541 0.571
Total 8,109 5,865 0.158∗∗ 0.276 0.058∗∗ 0.241
Panel B: CDX.HY
5Y OTR 7,386 5,659 0.666∗∗ 1.373 0.276∗∗ 1.222
5Y OFF 294 703 0.943∗∗ 1.493 0.713∗∗ 1.320
Other 29 160 2.953 3.027 2.765 2.324
Total 7,709 6,522 0.702∗∗ 1.453 0.324∗∗ 1.277
Table 3.4: Effective and Realized Half-Spreads.
Panels A and B show trade-size-weighted effective and realized half-spreads of on-SEF and off-SEF trades in
index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively. Averages are separately computed for transactions in ﬁve-year
on-the-run (5Y OTR) index CDSs, ﬁve-year immediate off-the-run (5Y OFF) index CDSs, and transaction in all
other (Other) index CDSs. The effective half-spread is deﬁned as qt × (pt −mt ), where pt is the transaction price
and mt is the mid-quote prevailing at trade execution t . The realized half-spread is deﬁned as qt × (pt −mt+Δ),
where mt+Δ is the ﬁrst mid-quote that follows trade execution by at least 15 minutes. Both transaction prices
and quotes are in terms of index CDS spreads and expressed in basis points. Trade direction, qt , equals +1 (−1)
for protection-buyer-initiated (protection-seller-initiated) trades and is inferred by the Lee and Ready (1991)
algorithm. Trades is the number of trades and ∗∗ and ∗ denote trade-size-weighted averages of on-SEF trades that
signiﬁcantly differ from those of off-SEF trades at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. The sample period is October
2, 2013 to February 25, 2014.
due to trades in those contracts that become MAT at the end of the period, namely, 5Y OTR
and 5Y OFF. For instance, effective half-spreads of 5Y OTR CDX.IG are 0.153 bps on-SEF and
0.257 bps off-SEF or, stated otherwise, on-SEF trading costs for 5Y OTR CDX.IG are 40% lower
than off-SEF trading costs. For 5Y OTR CDX.HY, on-SEF trading costs are even more than 50%
lower than off-SEF trading costs, with effective half-spreads being 0.666 bps on-SEF and 1.373
bps off-SEF.
Similarly, proﬁts from on-SEF liquidity provision are signiﬁcantly lower than those from off-
SEF liquidity provision in case of both indices and for both 5Y OTR and 5Y OFF contracts.
Differences in proﬁts from on-SEF and off-SEF liquidity provision are even more dramatic than
those in trading costs of on-SEF and off-SEF trades, with realized half-spreads of on-SEF trades
being less than 25% of those of off-SEF trades in case of 5Y OTR contracts on both CDX.IG
and CDX.HY. Moreover, proﬁts from on-SEF liquidity provision are lower than those from
off-SEF liquidity provision despite price impacts of on-SEF trades being larger than those of
off-SEF trades, as can be seen from the difference between effective and realized half-spreads
of on-SEF and off-SEF trades. This rules out that larger proﬁts from off-SEF liquidity provision
reﬂect remuneration for adverse selection.
An issue with the above comparison is the fact that trading costs are a likely determinant
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of the endogenous choice whether to trade on a SEF or not. Moreover, the above averages
may conceal differences in the characteristics of on-SEF and off-SEF trades. In order to
control for both, I estimate a latent variable binary choice model in spirit of Bessembinder
and Venkataraman (2004) and Hendershott and Madhavan (2015), in which transaction costs,
Y i , are given by
Y i = X ′βi +Ui , (3.5)
where X is a set of regressors affecting the cost of trade, Ui is a mean-zero error term with
variance σ2i , and the subscript i = 1 (i = 0) denotes on-SEF (off-SEF) trade execution. The
observed choice of trade execution, D(Z ), with D(Z )= 1 in case of on-SEF trade execution
and D(Z )= 0 in case of off-SEF trade execution, is due to a latent variable Z ′θ+UD (UD is
a mean-zero error term with variance 1) that is linked to the choice D(Z ) in that D(Z ) = 1
when Z ′θ+UD ≥ 0 and D(Z ) = 0 otherwise. Hendershott and Madhavan (2015) motivate
such a model for the choice between electronic and voice-based trade execution of corporate
bond transactions in terms of a trade-off between lower search cost (partly due to more ﬁerce
competition in case of simultaneously bidding dealers) and higher information leakage of
electronic relative to voice-based trade execution. It is the same trade-off that will determine
the choice of on-SEF (electronic) and off-SEF (voice-based) trade execution.
Accounting for the fact that Y 1 is only observed when D(Z )= 1 and that Y 0 is only observed
when D(Z )= 0, and assuming joint normality ofUs gives the following conditional means
E[Y 1|D(z)= 1,x,z]= x ′β1+E[U1|D(z)= 1,z]= x ′β1+ρ1σ1φ(z
′θ)
Φ(z ′θ)
, (3.6)
E[Y 0|D(z)= 0,x,z]= x ′β0+E[U0|D(z)= 0,z]= x ′β0−ρ0σ0 φ(z
′θ)
1−Φ(z ′θ) , (3.7)
where x and z are realizations of X and Z , respectively, ρi , i = 0,1, is the correlation be-
tween Ui and UD , Φ(x) denotes the cumulative density function of the standard normal
distribution, φ(x)=Φ′(x), and Φ(z ′θ)=P(D(z)= 1|z) is the probability of on-SEF trade exe-
cution conditional on the realization of Z and parameterized by the coefﬁcient vector θ. If
traders strategically select lower cost trade executions, then the conditional means in Equa-
tions (3.6) and (3.7) should be smaller than the unconditional means x ′β1 and x ′β0 in Equa-
tion (3.5) or, in other words, E[U1|D(z)= 1,z]= ρ1σ1φ(z ′θ)/Φ(z ′θ)< 0 and E[U0|D(z)= 0,z]=
−ρ0σ0φ(z ′θ)/(1−Φ(z ′θ))< 0.
The trade characteristics that I consider as explanatory variables of the ﬁrst-stage probit model
are dummy variables for trades with trade sizes in the second, third, and fourth quartile of the
trade size distribution (SMLL, MDM, and BLCK, respectively),22 dummy variables for trades in
5Y OFF and Other contracts (5YOFF and OTHER, respectively), a dummy variable for trades
22The 25%, 50%, and 75% quantiles of the trade size distribution for CDX.IG are USD 25MM, USD 50MM, and
USD 100MM, respectively, and those of the trade size distribution for CDX.HY are USD 5MM, USD 10MM, and
USD 25MM, respectively.
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CDX.IG CDX.HY
CNSTNT 0.744∗∗ 0.420∗∗
(20.458) (11.112)
SMLL 0.121∗∗ 0.423∗∗
(3.395) (10.744)
MDM -0.127∗∗ 0.056
(-3.204) (1.529)
BLCK -0.661∗∗ -0.598∗∗
(-13.819) (-12.493)
5YOFF -0.772∗∗ -0.621∗∗
(-7.632) (-9.841)
OTHER -0.960∗∗ -0.761∗∗
(-3.792) (-3.376)
RFRNC -0.247∗∗ -0.157∗∗
(-4.803) (-4.366)
UNCLRD -1.806∗∗ -1.639∗∗
(-29.219) (-23.366)
BAS -1.888∗∗ -0.077∗
(-4.911) (-1.972)
VLTLTY 2.798∗∗ 2.094∗∗
(5.325) (4.248)
N 13,974 14,231
Table 3.5: Probit Regressions for the Choice of On-SEF and Off-SEF Trade Execution.
The table shows coefﬁcient estimates of probit regression speciﬁcations for the binary choice between on-SEF and
off-SEF trade execution (t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by date are shown in parenthesis). The
dependent variable equals one for trades that are executed on a SEF. The explanatory variables include dummy
variables for small-sized trades (SMLL; USD 25–50MM trade size for CDX.IG and USD 5–10MM trade size for
CDX.HY), for medium-sized trades (MDM; USD 50–100MM trade size for CDX.IG and USD 10–25MM trade size
for CDX.HY), for block-sized trades (BLCK; trade size > USD 100MM for CDX.IG and trade size > USD 25MM for
CDX.HY), for trades in the ﬁve-year immediate off-the-run contract (5YOFF), for trades in contracts other than the
ﬁve-year on-the-run or immediate off-the-run contract (OTHER), for trades with reference-level transaction prices
(RFRNC), and for trades that are not centrally cleared (UNCLRD), the bid-ask spread of the ﬁve-year on-the-run
contract prevailing at trade execution (BAS), and the end-of-day at-the-money implied volatility of a three-month
index option on the ﬁve-year on-the-run contract (VLTLTY). Continuous explanatory variables are demeaned. N
is the number of trades and ∗∗ and ∗ denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. Probit
regression speciﬁcations are estimated from all trades between October 2, 2013 to February 25, 2014.
with transaction prices that coincide with a reference level of an index option or tranche swap
quote from the same trading day (RFRNC),23 and a dummy variable for trades that are not
centrally cleared (UNCLRD). 5YOFF and OTHER capture differences in the unconditional
likelihood of on-SEF trade execution between trades in the 5Y OTR contract and trades in 5Y
23Both index options and tranche swaps are conventionally traded “with delta.” That is, along with the index
option or tranche swap a delta neutralizing notional amount in the corresponding index CDS is traded in the
opposite direction. These trades are executed as packages and the index CDS leg is distinguished by the fact that it
is executed at a reference level that does not necessarily have to reﬂect the current index level because it tends to
be set at the beginning of the trading day.
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OFF and Other contracts (see Table 3.4). RFRNC and UNCLRD account for the fact that only
few SEFs facilitate index option and tranche swap packages and uncleared trades. In addition
to trade characteristics, I also consider the bid-ask spread of the 5Y OTR contract that prevails
at trade execution (BAS) and the end-of-day at-the-money implied volatility of three-month
index options written on the 5Y OTR contract (VLTLTY). The latter explanatory variables are
demeaned for the ease of interpretation and capture market liquidity and volatility at trade
execution.
Table 3.5 shows coefﬁcient estimates of ﬁrst-stage probit models. In case of both indices the
likelihood of on-SEF trade execution decreases with trade size.24 Trades in 5Y OFF and Other
contracts are less likely to be executed on SEFs than trades in the 5Y OTR contract. Similarly,
trades that are potentially part of index option or tranche swap packages and uncleared trades
are less likely to be executed on SEFs than non-packaged cleared trades. Surprisingly, market
liquidity and volatility have opposite effects on the likelihood of on-SEF trade execution. When
liquidity deteriorates the likelihood of on-SEF trade execution decreases, while the likelihood
of on-SEF trade execution increases when volatility is high. The latter is consistent with fast
trade execution being important when volatility is high, whereas the former seems to suggest
that there are beneﬁts (such as less information leakage) associated with bilateral negotiations
when liquidity is low.
Table 3.6 shows second-stage coefﬁcient estimates of the conditional mean speciﬁcations in
Equations (3.6) and (3.7), respectively. The explanatory variables of unconditional mean trad-
ing costs include trade size dummies (SMLL, MDM, and BLCK), contract dummies (5YOFF and
OTHER), the reference level dummy (RFRNC), and the bid-ask spread and implied volatility
of the 5Y OTR contract (BAS and VLTLTY). Trade size dummies capture sensitivity of trad-
ing costs to trade size (both asymmetric information and inventory considerations suggest
that transaction costs increase with trade size) and contract dummies account for the fact
the 5Y OFF and Other contracts tend to have higher trading costs than the 5Y OTR contract
(see Table 3.4). RFRNC accounts for reference levels that do not necessarily reﬂect current
index levels, potentially, giving rise to higher trading costs. Finally, BAS and VLTLTY capture
sensitivity of trading costs to market liquidity and volatility.25
Conditional means are estimated by separate regressions for on-SEF and off-SEF trades which
in addition to the above explanatory variables include the respective inverse Mill’s ratio
(MLLSRT), i.e., φ(z ′θ)/Φ(z ′θ) in Equation (3.6) and φ(z ′θ)/(1−Φ(z ′θ)) in Equation (3.7). Thus,
strategic selection of lower cost trade execution is reﬂected by negative coefﬁcient estimates on
MLLSRT. Inference is based on Heckman et al. (2003) and, by casting the two-step procedure
into a generalized method of moments (GMM) framework, takes into account that inverse
Mill’s ratios are generated regressors. Moreover, I allow for a general correlation structure
24The exception being trades in the ﬁrst quartile of the trade size distribution for which on-SEF trade execution
tends to be less likely than for trades in the second quartile of the trade size distribution.
25As before, BAS and VLTLTY are demeaned for the ease of interpretation. Because conditional means are
estimated in separate regressions for on-SEF and off-SEF trades (see next paragraph), BAS and VLTLTY are
separately demeaned for on-SEF and off-SEF trades.
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CDX.IG CDX.HY
On-SEF Off-SEF On-SEF Off-SEF
CNSTNT 0.100∗∗ 0.233∗∗ 0.623∗∗ 1.479∗∗
(8.515) (18.246) (9.944) (10.462)
SMLL 0.006 -0.020 -0.089∗ -0.147∗
(1.101) (-1.537) (-2.171) (-2.187)
MDM 0.026∗∗ -0.010 -0.049 -0.104
(3.255) (-0.604) (-1.449) (-1.211)
BLCK 0.054∗∗ 0.028 -0.001 -0.029
(4.977) (1.588) (-0.021) (-0.334)
5YOFF 0.018 0.068∗ 0.361∗∗ 0.265∗∗
(1.103) (2.258) (5.231) (2.674)
OTHER 0.649∗∗ 0.322∗∗ 2.037∗∗ 2.034∗∗
(3.908) (7.172) (5.469) (7.474)
RFRNC 0.084∗∗ 0.065∗∗ 0.096 -0.015
(5.162) (3.916) (1.799) (-0.184)
BAS 0.894∗∗ 0.785∗∗ 0.261∗∗ 0.419∗∗
(5.033) (4.190) (7.218) (3.596)
VLTLTY 0.411∗∗ 0.600∗∗ 1.635∗∗ 4.363∗∗
(3.518) (3.229) (3.818) (4.216)
MLLSRT 0.044∗ 0.009 0.090 -0.160
(2.013) (0.620) (1.037) (-1.633)
N 8,109 5,865 7,709 6,522
R2 0.127 0.044 0.068 0.055
Table 3.6: Effective Half-Spreads in Choice Model for On-SEF and Off-SEF Trade Execution.
The table shows OLS estimates of linear speciﬁcations in a latent variable binary choice model (t-statistics based
on standard errors clustered by date are shown in parenthesis; standard error computation follows Heckman,
Tobias, and Vytlacil (2003)). The dependent variable is the effective half-spread deﬁned as qt × (pt −mt ), where pt
is the transaction price and mt is the mid-quote prevailing at trade execution t . Both transaction prices and quotes
are in terms of index CDS spreads and expressed in basis points. Trade direction, qt , equals +1 (−1) for protection-
buyer-initiated (protection-seller-initiated) trades and is inferred by the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. The
explanatory variables include dummy variables for small-sized trades (SMLL; USD 25–50MM trade size for CDX.IG
and USD 5–10MM trade size for CDX.HY), for medium-sized trades (MDM; USD 50–100MM trade size for CDX.IG
and USD 10–25MM trade size for CDX.HY), for block-sized trades (BLCK; trade size > USD 100MM for CDX.IG
and trade size > USD 25MM for CDX.HY), for trades in the ﬁve-year immediate off-the-run contract (5YOFF), for
trades in contracts other than the ﬁve-year on-the-run or immediate off-the-run contract (OTHER), and for trades
with reference-level transaction prices (RFRNC), the bid-ask spread of the ﬁve-year on-the-run contract prevailing
at trade execution (BAS), the end-of-day at-the-money implied volatility of a three-month index option on the
ﬁve-year on-the-run contract (VLTLTY), and inverse Mill’s ratios based on the choice model estimated in Table 3.5
(MLLSRT; φ(z′θ)/Φ(z′θ) for on-SEF trades and φ(z′θ)/(1−Φ(z′θ)) for off-SEF trades). Continuous explanatory
variables other than MLLSRT are demeaned. N is the number of trades, R2 is the coefﬁcient of determination,
and ∗∗ and ∗ denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. Regression speciﬁcations are
estimated from the indicated number of on-SEF and off-SEF trades between October 2, 2013 to February 25, 2014.
among error terms of trades that are executed on the same trading day by using cluster-robust
inference for GMM estimators (see, e.g., Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011)).
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The results show no evidence for strategic selection. This most likely reﬂects factors that the
model is unable to capture such as costly onboarding and compliance processes associated
with joining a SEF. In fact, many market participants did not embrace the CFTC’s trade execu-
tion requirement because of the associated costs and up to date there seems to be a perception
among some market participants to avoid on-SEF trade execution whenever possible. On-SEF
trading costs of CDX.IG increase with trade size whereas off-SEF trading costs are insensitive
to trade size. For CDX.HY, trades in the second quartile of the trade size distribution have
signiﬁcantly lower trading costs than those in the other quartiles. Consistent with Table 3.4,
on-SEF and off-SEF trades in 5Y OFF and Other contracts tend to have higher trading costs
than those in the 5Y OTR contract. Moreover, trading costs are high when bid-ask spreads are
wide and when volatility is high.
As an illustration, Panels A and B of Figure 3.2 show unconditional mean trading costs implied
by the latent variable binary choice model, i.e., x ′βi , i = 0,1, for 5Y OTR CDX.IG and CDX.HY,
respectively, by quartiles of the trade size distribution.26 The panels show that trading costs
of on-SEF trades in 5Y OTR contracts are signiﬁcantly lower than those of off-SEF trades
regardless of the trade size and after controlling for the endogenous choice of whether to trade
on SEFs or not.
Because there is no evidence for strategic selection and because proﬁts from liquidity provision
are a less likely determinant of the liquidity demander’s choice whether to execute a trade
on a SEF or not, I resort to a simpler regression speciﬁcation when controlling for the fact
that average realized half-spreads reported in Table 3.4 may conceal differences in trade
characteristics. As before, the explanatory variables include trade size dummies (SMLL, MED,
and BLCK), contract dummies (5YOFF and OTHER), the reference level dummy (RFRNC), and
the bid-ask spread and implied volatility of the 5Y OTR contract (BAS and VLTLTY). In spirit of
the above, I estimate realized half-spread regression speciﬁcations separately for on-SEF and
off-SEF trades and I use cluster-robust inference.27
Table 3.7 shows the results. Realized half-spreads of on-SEF and off-SEF trades are not system-
atically related to trade size. Proﬁts from liquidity provision on trades in 5Y OFF and Other
contracts seem to be signiﬁcantly higher than those on trades in 5Y OTR contracts. For CDX.IG,
realized half-spreads tend to be high when market liquidity is low and realized half-spreads
of off-SEF trades in both indices are sensitive to market volatility. As an illustration, Panels C
and D of Figure 3.2 show regression-speciﬁcation-implied proﬁts from on-SEF and off-SEF
liquidity provision in 5Y OTR contracts (as a function of trade size), conﬁrming that even after
accounting for trade characteristics, proﬁts from off-SEF liquidity provision are signiﬁcantly
higher than those from on-SEF liquidity provision irrespective of trade size. Similar results
are obtained if the regression in addition includes inverse Mill’s ratios based on the above
ﬁrst-stage probit model.
26More precisely, the panels show the unconditional mean trading costs of 5Y OTR trades with non-reference
level transaction prices and BAS and VLTLTY evaluated at their unconditional means of 0.
27As before, BAS and VLTLTY are separately demeaned for on-SEF and off-SEF trades for ease of interpretation.
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Figure 3.2: Effective and Realized Half-Spreads by Quartiles of the Trade Size Distribution.
Panels A and B show effective half-spreads by quartiles of the trade size distribution for on-SEF (black lines) and
off-SEF (gray lines) trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run (5Y OTR) CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively. Effective half-spread
estimates are based on the linear speciﬁcations in the latent variable binary choice model estimated in Tables 3.5
and 3.6. Panels C and D show realized half-spreads by quartiles of the trade size distribution for on-SEF (black
lines) and off-SEF (gray lines) trades in 5Y OTR CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively. Realized half-spread estimates
are based on the regression speciﬁcations estimated in Table 3.7. Dashed lines mark 95% conﬁdence intervals. The
sample period is October 2, 2013 to February 25, 2014.
The evidence thus far shows that trades executed on SEFs have lower transaction costs and are
less proﬁtable from a liquidity provider’s perspective. The CFTC’s trade execution requirement
that came into effect on February 26, 2014 mandates on-SEF trade execution for a signiﬁcant
share of trades. Thus, one reason for the decline in trading costs and proﬁts from liquidity
provision exhibited in Figure 3.1 is the higher share of trades executed on SEFs. As argued
above, pre-trade price competition on SEFs is higher than in bilateral negotiations which is a
likely explanation for the lower proﬁts from on-SEF liquidity provision. In order to provide
some evidence in support of stronger price competition on SEFs, I next compare the fractions
of on-SEF and off-SEF trades with transaction prices outside the quoted bid-ask spread that
prevails at trade execution. For comparability with the results of this section, I again focus on
the period between the effective dates of the minimum trading functionality requirement and
the trade execution requirement.
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CDX.IG CDX.HY
On-SEF Off-SEF On-SEF Off-SEF
CNSTNT 0.042∗∗ 0.218∗∗ 0.277∗∗ 1.215∗∗
(6.205) (14.822) (6.785) (12.065)
SMLL -0.010 -0.041∗∗ -0.083 -0.202∗
(-1.330) (-2.697) (-1.869) (-2.208)
MDM 0.007 -0.023 -0.079 -0.132
(0.713) (-1.386) (-1.646) (-1.299)
BLCK 0.019 0.004 0.015 -0.068
(1.469) (0.224) (0.252) (-0.687)
5YOFF 0.046∗ 0.079∗ 0.479∗∗ 0.272∗
(2.115) (2.277) (4.254) (2.479)
OTHER 0.510∗∗ 0.278∗∗ 1.906 1.532∗∗
(7.080) (4.204) (1.850) (3.910)
RFRNC 0.112∗∗ 0.096∗∗ 0.230∗∗ 0.115
(5.970) (4.213) (3.259) (1.125)
BAS 0.556∗∗ 0.586∗∗ 0.058 0.193
(3.275) (2.581) (0.949) (1.552)
VLTLTY -0.001 0.557∗ 0.109 3.575∗∗
(-0.007) (2.453) (0.189) (3.145)
N 8,109 5,865 7,709 6,522
R2 0.039 0.029 0.019 0.021
Table 3.7: Regression Speciﬁcations for Realized Half-Spreads of On-SEF and Off-SEF Trades.
The table shows OLS estimates of regression speciﬁcations for realized half-spreads of on-SEF and off-SEF trades
(t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by date are shown in parenthesis). The dependent variable is the
realized half-spread deﬁned as qt × (pt −mt+Δ), where pt is the transaction price and mt+Δ is the ﬁrst mid-quote
that follows trade execution t by at least 15 minutes. Both transaction prices and quotes are in terms of index
CDS spreads and expressed in basis points. Trade direction, qt , equals +1 (−1) for protection-buyer-initiated
(protection-seller-initiated) trades and is inferred by the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. The explanatory variables
include dummy variables for small-sized trades (SMLL; USD 25–50MM trade size for CDX.IG and USD 5–10MM
trade size for CDX.HY), for medium-sized trades (MDM; USD 50–100MM trade size for CDX.IG and USD 10–25MM
trade size for CDX.HY), for block-sized trades (BLCK; trade size > USD 100MM for CDX.IG and trade size > USD
25MM for CDX.HY), for trades in the ﬁve-year immediate off-the-run contract (5YOFF), for trades in contracts
other than the ﬁve-year on-the-run or immediate off-the-run contract (OTHER), and for trades with reference-level
transaction prices (RFRNC), the bid-ask spread of the ﬁve-year on-the-run contract prevailing at trade execution
(BAS), and the end-of-day at-the-money implied volatility of a three-month index option on the ﬁve-year on-
the-run contract (VLTLTY) Continuous explanatory variables are demeaned. N is the number of trades, R2 is
the coefﬁcient of determination, and ∗∗ and ∗ denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
Regression speciﬁcations are estimated from the indicated number of on-SEF and off-SEF trades between October
2, 2013 to February 25, 2014.
3.4.3 Trades at Prices Outside the Quoted Bid-Ask Spread
Markit bid and ask quotes are dealer composites and, therefore, a transaction price outside the
quoted bid-ask spread does not necessarily reﬂect trade execution outside what was quoted
by the dealer that facilitated the trade. However, a transaction price outside Markit’s quoted
96
3.4. Dodd-Frank Regime Trading Costs
Trades Outside Quoted Spread Outside Quoted Spread (%)
Contract On-SEF Off-SEF On-SEF Off-SEF On-SEF Off-SEF
Panel A: CDX.IG
5Y OTR 7,906 5,287 941 1,514 11.9∗∗ 28.6
5Y OFF 170 415 31 132 18.2∗∗ 31.8
Other 33 163 18 52 54.5 31.9
Total 8,109 5,865 990 1,698 12.2∗∗ 29.0
Panel B: CDX.HY
5Y OTR 7,386 5,659 594 1,635 8.0∗∗ 28.9
5Y OFF 294 703 33 199 11.2∗∗ 28.3
Other 29 160 7 57 24.1 35.6
Total 7,709 6,522 634 1,891 8.2∗∗ 29.0
Table 3.8: Trades at Prices Outside the Quoted Bid-Ask Spread.
Panels A and B show the number and percentage of on-SEF and off-SEF trades with transaction prices outside the
quoted bid-ask spread for CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively. Trades is the number of trades and ∗∗ and ∗ denote
fractions of on-SEF trades with transaction prices outside the quoted bid-ask spread that signiﬁcantly differ from
those of off-SEF trades at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. The sample period is October 2, 2013 to February 25,
2014.
composite bid-ask spread constitutes a valid metric for a comparison of the competitiveness
of on-SEF and off-SEF liquidity provision: if order ﬂow with the same characteristics would be
executed on and off SEFs and pre-trade price competition would be identical on SEFs and in
bilateral negotiations, then one would not expect to see differences in the fractions of on-SEF
and off-SEF trades with transaction prices outside the quoted bid-ask spread. At this point, it
should also be noted that looking at trades with transaction prices strictly inside the quoted
spread (i.e., at trades that look as if they have received price improvement from the quoted bid
or ask spread) gives opposite but otherwise almost identical results because only few trades
are executed at the quoted composite bid or ask spread.28,29
Table 3.8 shows the number and fraction of trades with transaction prices outside the quoted
bid-ask spread. The fraction of trades with transaction prices outside the quoted bid-ask
spread is signiﬁcantly higher for off-SEF trades in case of both CDX.IG and CDX.HY. But there
are some differences among contracts. For the contracts that are relatively actively quoted,
5Y OTR and 5Y OFF, the fraction of trades with transaction prices outside the quoted bid-
ask spread is signiﬁcantly lower for on-SEF trades, while there is no statistically discernable
difference for Other contracts. For instance, 11.9% of on-SEF trades in 5Y OTR CDX.IG have
transaction prices outside the quoted bid-ask spread and so do 8.0% of on-SEF trades in 5Y
OTR CDX.HY. In comparison, 28.6% and 28.9% of off-SEF trades in these two contracts have
28Again, due to the fact that quotes are dealer composites, a trade strictly inside the quoted spread does not
necessarily reﬂect trade execution inside what was quoted by the dealer that facilitated the trade.
29For CDX.IG, 82 trades are executed at either the quoted bid spread or the quoted ask spread. For CDX.HY, 170
trades are executed at either the quoted bid price or the quoted ask price (the comparison for CDX.HY is based
on prices instead of spreads because the index is quoted in terms of a price and converted spreads mechanically
mismatch quoted composite spreads because the latter are rounded).
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transaction prices outside the quoted bid-ask spread. As discussed above, on-SEF and off-SEF
trades differ in the degree of pre-trade price competition for liquidity provision. Quotes on
SEFs are executable and usually come from multiple liquidity providers that simultaneously
compete for a trade. In contrast, when bilaterally negotiating trades, quotes are executable
only “as long as the breath is warm” and, as a consequence, quotes collected from multiple
liquidity providers are subject to strategic price deterioration upon a repeat contact for trade
execution. Thus, SEFs allow for better comparison shopping which should ultimately lead
to increased competition among liquidity providers. For 5Y OTR and 5Y OFF contracts, the
observed differences in the fractions of on-SEF and off-SEF trades with transaction prices
outside the quoted bid-ask spread are consistent with stronger competition for liquidity
provision of trades that are executed on SEFs in comparison to trades that are bilaterally
negotiated off SEFs.
Off-SEF, around 30% of trades have transaction prices outside the quoted bid-ask spread
irrespective of the contract.30 In contrast, on-SEF, the fractions of actively quoted contracts
(5Y OTR and 5Y OFF) are lower than those of other contracts (Other). One reason that cross-
contract differences prevail for on-SEF trades but not for off-SEF trades may be the number of
dealers queried for on-SEF trade execution via RFQ.31 Because the cost of information leakage
is higher for less actively traded contracts, it is plausible that traders query less dealers when
they want to trade an Other contract in comparison to the case when they want to trade 5Y OTR
or 5Y OFF contracts. But querying more dealers increases pre-trade price competition which
leads to better transaction prices and, consequently, less instances where the transaction
price is outside the quote bid-ask spread. For on-SEF trades, the cross-contract pattern of
the fraction of trades with transaction prices outside the quoted bid-ask spread is consistent
with this explanation. Moreover, the absence of a cross-contract pattern for off-SEF trades
is consistent with the explanation as well because there is no simultaneous pre-trade price
competition when trades are bilaterally negotiated off SEFs.
In order to control for differences in the characteristics of on-SEF and off-SEF trades and
the market conditions during which the trades are executed, I estimate trade-by-trade probit
regressions where the dependent variable equals one for trades with transaction prices outside
the quoted bid-ask spread. The explanatory variables include a dummy variable for trades
that are executed on SEFs (SEF) and some of the above control variables. Speciﬁcally, I include
trade size dummies (SMLL, MDM, and BLCK) in order to control for the fact that quotes reﬂect
prices near which only an instrument’s standard notional amount can be expected to get
executed without additional bargaining. I include contract dummies (5YOFF and OTHER)
in order to control for differences in the unconditional likelihood with which trades in 5Y
OTR, 5Y OFF, and Other contracts are executed at prices outside the quoted bid-ask spread
30t-tests for the null hypothesis that the fraction of off-SEF trades with transaction prices outside the quoted
bid-ask spread is the same for 5Y OTR (5Y OFF) and Other contracts fail to reject the null hypothesis at conventional
signiﬁcance levels in case of both indices.
31As mentioned in Sections 3.3, on-SEF trades tend to be executed via RFQ. Also note that during the period
under consideration there was no requirement to transmit requests to a minimum number of dealers.
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(see Table 3.8). I also include the reference level dummy (RFRNC) in order to control for the
fact that reference levels do not necessarily reﬂect current index levels which increases the
likelihood of trade execution at a price outside the quoted bid-ask spread. Finally, I include
the bid-ask spread and the implied volatility of the 5Y OTR contract (BAS and VLTLTY) in order
to control for liquidity and volatility that prevails in the market at trade execution.32
Table 3.9 shows coefﬁcient estimates of the probit regressions. The most important result is the
strongly signiﬁcant and negative estimate of the coefﬁcient on the SEF dummy which shows
that on-SEF trades are signiﬁcantly less likely to be executed at prices outside the quoted bid-
ask spread. This is strong evidence in support of relatively more pre-trade price competition
on SEFs. Moreover, regression results reveal that larger-sized trades are signiﬁcantly more
likely to be executed at prices outside the quoted bid-ask spread than smaller-sized trades.33
Consistent with quotes being for an instrument’s standard notional amount, at- or below-
median-sized trades in the second quartile of the trade size distribution are most likely to be
executed within the quoted bid-ask spread. In line with Table 3.8, 5Y OFF and Other contracts
are more likely to be executed at prices outside the quoted bid-ask spread but in terms of
statistical signiﬁcance results are non-uniform across indices. Finally, trades are more likely to
get executed at prices outside the quoted bid-ask spread when liquidity is low and volatility is
high.
For 5Y OTR CDX.IG, probit regression estimates imply that 90.7% of on-SEF trades with trade
size in the second quartile of the trade size distribution get executed at or within Markit’s
quoted composite bid-ask spread. In comparison, the estimates imply that 77.8% of off-SEF
trades in this contract get executed at or within the quoted spread. This suggests that for
bilaterally negotiated off-SEF trades the probability of trade execution at a price outside the
quoted bid-ask spread is more than twice that of trades executed on SEFs. For 5Y OTR CDX.HY,
the discrepancy is even larger because regression estimates imply that 93.5% of on-SEF trades
with trade size in the second quartile of the trade size distribution get executed at or within
Markit’s quoted composite bid-ask spread while only 76.1% of off-SEF trades do. Overall,
this section provides strong evidence in support of higher pre-trade price competition for
trades that are executed on SEFs in comparison to bilaterally negotiated trades off SEFs. This
supports increased pre-trade price competition as an explanation for the lower trading costs
of on-SEF trades and the smaller proﬁts from on-SEF liquidity provision.
3.4.4 Robustness
While allowing for the endogenous choice of whether to trade on a SEF or not, the above
comparison of on-SEF and off-SEF trading costs ignores market-structure- and regulation-
32As before, BAS and VLTLTY are demeaned for ease of interpretation and cluster-robust inference allows for a
general correlation structure among error terms of trades that are executed on the same trading day.
33The probability of trade execution at prices outside the quoted bid-ask spread is an increasing function of
trade size only in the region beyond the 25% quantile of the trade size distribution. In contrast, the probability
decreases when trade size increases from the ﬁrst to the second quartile of the trade size distribution.
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CDX.IG CDX.HY
CNSTNT -0.744∗∗ -0.521∗∗
(-17.643) (-12.569)
SMLL -0.023 -0.190∗∗
(-0.672) (-3.963)
MDM 0.091∗ -0.106∗
(2.273) (-2.472)
BLCK 0.283∗∗ 0.037
(6.167) (0.778)
5YOFF 0.203∗∗ 0.013
(3.067) (0.239)
OTHER 0.158 0.224∗
(0.675) (1.980)
RFRNC 0.456∗∗ 0.085
(7.834) (1.574)
SEF -0.555∗∗ -0.805∗∗
(-13.369) (-20.905)
BAS 2.247∗∗ 0.058
(4.628) (1.033)
VLTLTY 3.005∗∗ 2.977∗∗
(5.512) (4.389)
N 13,974 14,231
Table 3.9: Probit Regressions for Trades at Prices Outside the Quoted Bid-Ask Spread.
The table shows coefﬁcient estimates of probit regression speciﬁcations for trades with transaction prices outside
the quoted bid-ask spread (t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by date are shown in parenthesis). The
dependent variable equals one for trades that are executed at a prices outside the quoted bid-ask spread that
prevails at trade execution. The explanatory variables include dummy variables for small-sized trades (SMLL; USD
25–50MM trade size for CDX.IG and USD 5–10MM trade size for CDX.HY), for medium-sized trades (MDM; USD
50–100MM trade size for CDX.IG and USD 10–25MM trade size for CDX.HY), for block-sized trades (BLCK; trade
size > USD 100MM for CDX.IG and trade size > USD 25MM for CDX.HY), for trades in the ﬁve-year immediate
off-the-run contract (5YOFF), for trades in contracts other than the ﬁve-year on-the-run or immediate off-the-run
contract (OTHER), for trades with reference-level transaction prices (RFRNC), and for trades that are executed on a
SEF (SEF), the bid-ask spread of the ﬁve-year on-the-run contract prevailing at trade execution (BAS), and the
end-of-day at-the-money implied volatility of a three-month index option on the ﬁve-year on-the-run contract
(VLTLTY). Continuous explanatory variables are demeaned. N is the number of trades and ∗∗ and ∗ denote
statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. Probit regression speciﬁcations are estimated from all
trades between October 2, 2013 to February 25, 2014.
implied speciﬁcs of on-SEF trading. These arise from the bifurcated structure of the index
CDS market into dealer-operated client markets and broker-operated interdealer markets.
Credit derivatives dealers trade with their institutional clients in the former and manage their
inventories in the latter. Because interdealer brokerage falls under the activities speciﬁed in
the deﬁnition of a SEF, interdealer brokers (IDBs) have to comply with SEF rules and, as a
consequence, the interdealer market migrated on IDB SEFs when SEF rules became effective
on October 2, 2013. On SEFs, client (dealer-to-customer) trades have higher trading costs
than interdealer (dealer-to-dealer) trades because the latter serve to manage inventories
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Trades Effective Half-Spread Realized Half-Spread
Contract On-SEF Off-SEF On-SEF Off-SEF On-SEF Off-SEF
Panel A: CDX.IG
5Y OTR 4,943 5,287 0.156∗∗ 0.257 0.043∗∗ 0.221
5Y OFF 90 415 0.225 0.309 0.090∗∗ 0.293
Total 5,033 5,702 0.158∗∗ 0.261 0.044∗∗ 0.226
Panel B: CDX.HY
5Y OTR 4,808 5,659 0.676∗∗ 1.373 0.179∗∗ 1.222
5Y OFF 165 703 1.221 1.493 0.702∗∗ 1.320
Total 4,973 6,362 0.698∗∗ 1.387 0.201∗∗ 1.233
Table 3.10: Effective and Realized Half-Spreads when Excluding Interdealer Trades.
Panels A and B show trade-size-weighted effective and realized half-spreads of on-SEF and off-SEF trades in index
CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively. On-SEF trades are limited to dealer-to-customer trades occurring
on non-interdealer-broker SEFs. Averages are separately computed for transactions in ﬁve-year on-the-run (5Y
OTR) index CDSs and ﬁve-year immediate off-the-run (5Y OFF) index CDSs. The effective half-spread is deﬁned
as qt × (pt −mt ), where pt is the transaction price and mt is the mid-quote prevailing at trade execution t . The
realized half-spread is deﬁned as qt × (pt −mt+Δ), where mt+Δ is the ﬁrst mid-quote that follows trade execution
by at least 15 minutes. Both transaction prices and quotes are in terms of index CDS spreads and expressed
in basis points. Trade direction, qt , equals +1 (−1) for protection-buyer-initiated (protection-seller-initiated)
trades and is inferred by the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. Trades is the number of trades and ∗∗ and ∗ denote
trade-size-weighted averages of on-SEF trades that signiﬁcantly differ from those of off-SEF trades at the 1% and
5% level, respectively. The sample period is October 2, 2013 to February 25, 2014.
(see, e.g., Collin-Dufresne et al. (2016)). Thus, in order to rule out that the on-SEF and off-
SEF trading cost comparison only reﬂects differences in trading costs of client (off-SEF) and
interdealer (on-SEF) trades, I remove all on-SEF interdealer trades from the sample.34 As
in Collin-Dufresne et al. (2016), on-SEF interdealer trades are identiﬁed as trades that are
executed on an IDB SEF.
Table 3.10 shows trade-size-weighted average effective and realized half-spreads of the re-
maining trades. In fact, the table shows trade-size-weighted averages for 5Y OTR and 5Y OFF
contracts only. This is because, after removing on-SEF interdealer trades, so few (a total of
ten in both indices) on-SEF trades in Other contracts remain that trading costs cannot be
estimated accurately. The small number of on-SEF client trades in Other contracts likely
reﬂects both high leakage costs associated with requesting quotes on an inactively traded
contract and low response rates. Moreover, it suggests that IDB intermediation mitigates such
obstacles in the interdealer market. Removing on-SEF interdealer trades has a minimal effect
on on-SEF trading costs of 5Y OTR contracts but, in comparison to Table 3.4, increases on-SEF
trading costs of 5Y OFF contracts to a degree that they become statistically indistinguishable
from off-SEF trading costs. Proﬁts from on-SEF liquidity provision tend to decrease further,
34This assumes that all off-SEF trades are client trades. The assumption is not implausible because interdealer
trade typically involves some sort of IDB service (either an IDB-operated order book or voice-brokerage). Moreover,
low trading costs of non-removed off-SEF interdealer trades bias the comparison against ﬁnding larger off-SEF
trading costs.
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Figure 3.3: Effective and Realized Half-Spreads by Quartiles of the Trade Size Distribution
when Excluding Interdealer Trades.
Panels A and B show effective half-spreads by quartiles of the trade size distribution for on-SEF (black lines) and
off-SEF (gray lines) trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run (5Y OTR) CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively. Effective half-spread
estimates are based on linear speciﬁcations in a latent variable binary choice model that excludes the dummy
variable for trades in contracts other than the ﬁve-year on-the-run and immediate off-the-run contract (OTHER)
but is otherwise identical to the latent variable binary choice model estimated in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. Panels C and D
show realized half-spreads by quartiles of the trade size distribution for on-SEF (black lines) and off-SEF (gray
lines) trades in 5Y OTR CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively. Realized half-spread estimates are based on regression
speciﬁcations that exclude the dummy variable for trades in contracts other than the ﬁve-year on-the-run and
immediate off-the-run contract (OTHER) but are otherwise identical to the regression speciﬁcations estimated
in Table 3.7. The samples from which the latent variable binary choice models and regression speciﬁcations are
estimated exclude on-SEF dealer-to-dealer trades occurring on interdealer-broker SEFs and all trades in contracts
other than the ﬁve-year on-the-run and immediate off-the-run contract. Dashed lines mark 95% conﬁdence
intervals. The sample period is October 2, 2013 to February 25, 2014.
reinforcing earlier results of signiﬁcantly lower proﬁts from on-SEF liquidity provision.
Estimating choice models from the samples that exclude on-SEF interdealer trades and all
trades in Other contracts gives results that are consistent with those reported in Tables 3.5
and 3.6. Panels A and B of Figure 3.3 show unconditional mean trading costs implied by
the latent variable binary choice models estimated from these samples. The panels show
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that differences in trading costs of on-SEF and off-SEF trades in 5Y OTR contracts are not
due to lower trading costs of on-SEF interdealer trades. Moreover, estimating regression
speciﬁcations alike the ones in Table 3.7 gives estimates of proﬁts from off-SEF liquidity
provision that are signiﬁcantly higher than those from on-SEF liquidity provision as can be
seen from Panels C and D of Figure 3.3. Thus, potentially low proﬁts on on-SEF interdealer
trades are not the reason for the difference in proﬁts from on-SEF and off-SEF liquidity
provision.
3.5 Conclusion
I document a reduction of trading costs in the index CDS market over the course of a two-and-
a-half-year period during which the CFTC implemented Dodd-Frank Act provisions. I provide
evidence in support of lower proﬁts from liquidity provision driving the decline in the cost
of trading. I ﬁnd that trading costs and proﬁts from liquidity provision are lower for trades
that are executed on SEFs than for bilaterally negotiated off-SEF trades. Trading on SEFs is
regulated so as to ensure a minimum degree of pre-trade transparency in OTC markets and,
in comparison to bilaterally negotiated trades, facilitates comparison shopping and creates
direct price competition among liquidity providers. Consistently, I ﬁnd that on-SEF trades are
signiﬁcantly more likely to get executed within the quoted bid-ask spread than off-SEF trades.
The results suggest that CFTC rules introducing SEFs had a compressing effect on trading
costs and proﬁts from liquidity provision.
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A Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Explanatory Variables of CDSMarket Illiquidity
Bid-Ask. Bid and ask quotes for EUR or USD denominated senior ﬁve-year CDS contracts
come from Bloomberg. Contract-speciﬁc bid-ask spreads are monthly averages of daily bid-
ask spreads, which are calculated whenever more than ﬁve nonnegative daily bid-ask spread
observations are available within the month. For each month, Bid-Ask is the average of
contract-speciﬁc bid-ask spreads.
ILLIQCDS. Single-name CDS data for the construction of ILLIQCDS come from Markit. For
each reference name i , the ILLIQCDS measure is the monthly average of absolute spread
changes divided by the number of contributors to the spread quotation on date t , Depthi ,t .
That is,
ILLIQCDSi ,m =
1
ni ,m
ni ,m∑
t=1
|Ci ,t −Ci ,t−1|
Depthi ,t
, (A.1)
where ni ,m is the number of consecutive spread changes in month m andCi ,t is the ﬁve-year
par spread. For each month, ILLIQCDS is the average of ILLIQCDSi ,m across those reference
names with ni ,m > 5.
ILLIQIDX. Data for the construction of ILLIQIDX are those described in Section 1.2.3. For each
credit index i , the ILLIQIDX measure is the monthly average of absolute changes in the level of
the ﬁve-year on-the-run series divided by the number of contributors to the quotation of the
index level on date t , DepthIDXi ,t . That is,
ILLIQIDXi ,m =
1
ni ,m
ni ,m∑
t=1
|CIDXi ,t −CIDXi ,t−1|
DepthIDXi ,t
, (A.2)
where ni ,m is the number of consecutive index level changes in month m andCIDXi ,t is deﬁned
as in Section 1.2.2. For each month, ILLIQIDX is the average of ILLIQIDXi ,m across credit indices.
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LIB-OIS. USD LIBOR and OIS rates come from Bloomberg. LIB-OIS is the monthly av-
erage of daily observations of the spread between three-month LIBOR and OIS rates.
Repo. Repo rates come from Bloomberg. Repo is the monthly average of daily observa-
tions of the spread between three-month Agency MBS and Treasury general collateral repo
rates.
Capital. Data for the construction of Capital come from Bloomberg. The market capitaliza-
tion of each ﬁnancial intermediary that belongs to the G14 group of major credit derivatives
dealers is given by the product of the intermediary’s share price (shares denominated in cur-
rencies other than USD are converted to USD using spot exchange rates) and the number of
shares outstanding.1 Capital is the monthly average of the daily aggregate market capitaliza-
tion of G14 members.
VIX. VIX index levels come from Bloomberg. VIX is the monthly average of daily index
levels.
Noise. The Hu, Pan, and Wang (2013) “Noise” measure comes from Jun Pan’s website http:
//www.mit.edu/~junpan. Noise is the monthly average of daily observations.
CDS-Bond. The average CDS-bond basis across U.S. investment-grade bonds comes from J.P.
Morgan. CDS-Bond is the monthly average of daily observations.
A.2 Excess Return Computation
This Appendix describes the computation of expected and realized excess returns on a CDS
trading at par as well as a portfolio composed of such CDSs. It also describes the computation
of realized excess returns on a credit index and its replicating portfolio.
1In 2005, the G14 included Bank of America, Barclays, Bear Stearns, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank,
Goldman Sachs, HSBC, J.P. Morgan, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, UBS, and Wachovia (see
“Statement regarding developments in the credit derivatives markets,” Press release, Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, October 5, 2005). When Nomura was added as a 15th member at the end of August 2011 (see “G14 dealer
group adds two members,” Risk.net, December 1, 2011) the group consisted of Bank of America Merrill Lynch,
Barclays, BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, J.P. Morgan, Morgan
Stanley, Royal Bank of Scotland, Société Générale, UBS, and Wells Fargo. Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch left
the group when they were acquired by J.P. Morgan and Bank of America on June 2, 2008 and January 2, 2009,
respectively. Lehman Brothers dropped out on September 15, 2008 when it defaulted and Wells Fargo replaced
Wachovia upon acquisition on January 2, 2009. Because we are unable to determine in which order BNP Paribas,
Royal Bank of Scotland, and Société Générale joined the group of G14 dealers, we treat them as group members
throughout the entire sample period.
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A.2.1 Realized CDS Excess Return
When computing realized excess returns, we assume that contracts are marked to market using
the ISDA CDS Standard Model, which is the market standard for determining mark-to-market
payments in credit derivatives transactions.2 Consider a CDS contract referencing entity i
with a notional amount of one dollar and ﬁxed spreadC .3 On date t , the present value of the
contract from the perspective of the protection seller is
PVt (C ;Ci ,t ,R
∗
i )= Premt (C ;Ci ,t ,R∗i )−Prott (Ci ,t ,R∗i ), (A.3)
whereCi ,t denotes the date-t par spread and R∗i denotes the expected recovery rate on (senior
unsecured) debt issued by entity i .4 The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of Equation (A.3) is
the date-t present value of the premium leg
Premt (C ;Ci ,t ,R
∗
i )=C ×PVBPt (Ci ,t ,R∗i ), (A.4)
where
PVBPt (Ci ,t ,R
∗
i )=
J∑
j=1
(
(t j − t j−1)
360
D(t , t j )Si (t , t j )−
∫t j
t∨t j−1
(u− t j−1)
360
D(t ,u)dSi (t ,u)
)
(A.5)
is the date-t present value of a risky annuity with payment dates t < t1 < ·· · < tJ (t0 ≤ t being
the start date of the CDS contract and tJ being its maturity), D(t , t j ) is the date-t discount
factor applicable to a risk free cash ﬂow on date t j , and Si (t , t j ) is the date-t risk neutral
survival probability of entity i up to date t j .5 The second term of Equation (A.3) is the date-t
present value of the protection leg6
Prott (Ci ,t ,R
∗
i )=−
∫tJ
t
(1−R∗i )D(t ,u)dSi (t ,u). (A.6)
The present value of the contract can be decomposed into an accrual amount,C × (t − t0)/360,
and a residual upfront amount. The par spread is deﬁned such that the upfront amount is
2 The ISDA CDS Standard Model is a reduced form model which assumes that (i) credit events occur randomly
and independently across reference names at the ﬁrst jump times of homogeneous Poisson processeswith constant
intensities; (ii) interest rates evolve independent of the occurrence of credit events; and (iii) in case that a credit
event occurs, creditors recover a constant fraction of the reference obligation’s par value.
3 We follow market standard in assuming that CDS contracts are standardized with respect to their spread
payment dates and maturities. Payment dates of standardized contracts fall on the 20th of March, June, September,
and December of each year, and the maturity date is the ﬁrst payment date that follows the trade date by the
term of the contract. CDS contracts trade with standardized payment dates and maturities since 2003, see O’Kane
(2008).
4Note that the pricing formulas below are identical in case of a constant recovery rate and in case of a random
recovery rate that is independently drawn upon the occurrence of a credit event. But only the latter case is
consistent with the interpretation of R∗i as an expected (risk neutral) recovery rate.
5The integral term in Equation (A.5) is the present value of the accrual amount on default.
6 Note that bothPremt (C ;Ci ,t ,R
∗
i ) andPrott (Ci ,t ,R
∗
i ) depend on the par spread,Ci ,t , and the expected recovery
rate, R∗i , via the survival probabilities, Si (t , t j ).
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zero, which means that (A.3) can be equivalently expressed as
PVt (C ;Ci ,t ,R
∗
i )=
(
C −Ci ,t
)(
PVBPt (Ci ,t ,R
∗
i )−
t − t0
360
)
+C t − t0
360
. (A.7)
We compute the excess return from t to t ′ from the protection seller’s perspective. At date t , we
assume that the protection seller posts initial collateral equal to the notional of the contract.
This collateral earns the risk-free rate. In addition, the protection seller pays the protection
buyer the present value of the contract, but under standard margining rules, this amount is
immediately refunded to the protection seller as variation margin.7 Moreover, to simplify
matters, we assume that the contract is initiated at the par spread.8
If there is no credit event between dates t and t ′, the contract is marked to market on date t ′
and the protection seller receives an amount equal to the change in the present value of the
contract from t to t ′. In this case, the excess return is
r ei ,t ,t ′ = −(Ci ,t ′ −Ci ,t )
(
PVBPt ′(Ci ,t ′ ,R
∗
i )−
t ′ − t
360
)
+Ci ,t t
′ − t
360
(A.8)
on the notional amount of the contract.
If there is a credit event between dates t and t ′, the excess return is
r ei ,t ,t ′ = −(1−Ri )+Ci ,t
τi − t
360
, (A.9)
where Ri is the actual recovery rate and the second term of Equation (A.9) is the accrual
amount on default (where τi is the credit event date).
We use Markit ﬁve-year mid spreads and the corresponding expected recovery rates to con-
struct one-week realized excess returns (we denote by r ei ,t the realized excess return over a
one-week period ending on date t ). Risk free discount factors are bootstrapped from the term
structure of LIBOR/swap rates. For each reference name that triggered a credit event, we
compute the realized excess return over the one-week period that contains the credit event
date, using the actual recovery rate determined in the credit event auction. In case of failure
to pay and restructuring credit events, we resume return computations from the ﬁrst week
following the credit event auctions and delete all intermediate data. Our sample includes a
total of 22 credit events and losses per dollar of notional range from 23.38% for the Governor
and Company of the Bank of Ireland to 98.75% for Landsbanki.
7 The interest that is paid on variation margin varies with contract terms. For simplicity, we assume that it is
zero.
8 Alternatively, we could assume that contracts are traded with upfront amounts and ﬁxed spreads (as we do
below when computing realized excess returns on credit indices), which is the convention for trading standardized
single-name CDS contracts since the implementation of the ISDA’s “Big Bang” Protocol. Assuming that contracts
are traded at their par spreads has the advantage that those quotations are available throughout the sample period.
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A.2.2 Expected CDS Excess Return
We follow Bongaerts et al. (2011) in deﬁning the date-t conditional expected excess return
over the life of a ﬁve-year CDS contract as
Êt [r
e
i ,t ,tJ
]=Ci ,t PVBPPi ,t −ELPi ,t , (A.10)
where
PVBPPi ,t =
J∑
j=1
(
(t j − t j−1)
360
D(t , t j )Pi (t , t j )−
∫t j
t∨t j−1
(u− t j−1)
360
D(t ,u)dPi (t ,u)
)
− t − t0
360
, (A.11)
and
ELPi ,t =−
∫tJ
t
(1−R∗i )D(t ,u)dPi (t ,u), (A.12)
in which the physical survival probability of entity i , Pi (t ,u), integrates payoffs instead of the
risk neutral survival probability.9 Physical survival probabilities are extracted from Moody’s
KMV one-year and ﬁve-year EDFs through
Pi (t , t +1Y )= 1−EDF1Yi ,t and Pi (t , t +5Y )= (1−EDF5Yi ,t )5 (A.13)
and intermediate values are obtained by interpolation based on the assumption of piecewise
constant instantaneous physical default intensities. Conditional expected excess returns
for a holding period shorter than ﬁve years are obtained by assuming that returns scale
proportionally with time-to-maturity. In particular,
Êt [r
e
i ,t+1]=
7
tJ − t
Êt [r
e
i ,t ,tJ
]. (A.14)
A.2.3 Portfolio Excess Returns
Because we consider equally weighted portfolios of reference names, the realized excess return
on a portfolio p of ﬁve-year CDS contracts over the one-week period from t −1 to t is the
average realized excess return on the np,t−1 CDS contracts that constitute portfolio p on date
t −1; that is,
r ep,t =
1
np,t−1
∑
i∈Ip,t−1
r ei ,t , (A.15)
whereIp,t−1 denotes the set of reference names. Similarly, the date-t conditional expected
excess return on the portfolio is the average conditional expected excess return on the CDS
9By using the same expected recovery rate under the risk neutral and physical probability measure, we implicitly
assume that there is no recovery risk premium.
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contracts that constitute the portfolio; that is,
Êt [r
e
p,t ,tJ ]=
1
np,t
∑
i∈Ip,t
Êt [r
e
i ,t ,tJ
]=Cp,t PVBPPp,t −ELPp,t , (A.16)
where the portfolio level quantities in Equation (A.16) are deﬁned as
Cp,t = 1
np,t
∑
i∈Ip,t
Ci ,t , (A.17)
ELPp,t =
1
np,t
∑
i∈Ip,t
ELPi ,t , (A.18)
PVBPPp,t =
1
np,t
∑
i∈Ip,t
Ci ,t
Cp,t
PV BPPi ,t . (A.19)
A.2.4 Realized Credit Index Excess Return
Finally, consider a ﬁve-year credit index contract with one dollar notional amount. The
contract trades with ﬁxed spread C and date-t upfront amount, UFIDXi ,t (C ), that is received
by the seller of credit protection. As in the case of single-name CDS contracts, we compute
“unlevered” realized excess returns on credit index contracts, r IDXi ,t ,t ′ , assuming that contracts
are covered by collateral agreements and standard margining rules apply; that is,
r IDXi ,t ,t ′ = −
(
UFIDXi ,t ′ (C )−UFIDXi ,t (C )
)
+ It
I
C
t ′ − t
360
− 1
I
(
Li ,t ′ −Li ,t
)
, (A.20)
where Li ,t is the cumulative loss due to credit events among index constituents on date t .10
Replacing the upfront amounts in Equation (A.20) with those on the replicating basket of
single-name CDSs gives the “unlevered” realized excess return on the replicating basket, r CDSi ,t ,t ′ .
Hence, realized credit index excess returns can be readily computed from Markit’s credit index
data described in Section 1.2.3 (as before we denote by r IDXi ,t and r
CDS
i ,t , respectively, the realized
excess returns over a one-week period ending on date t ). Whenever an index roll date, trol l ,
falls between dates t and t ′, the realized excess return is obtained by ﬁrst computing the
realized excess return on series Si of index i between t and trol l and then adding to it the
realized excess return on series Si +1 over trol l to t ′.
10As in case of CDS excess returns, losses accumulated in Li ,t are given as one minus the recovery value
determined in a credit event auction. The expression in Equation (A.20) presumes that all defaults between dates
t and t ′ occur exactly on date t ′. In our implementation, we account for the fact that defaults may happen in
between t and t ′ and adjust the accrual term in Equation (A.20) accordingly.
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A.3 CDS Spread Decomposition
From Equation (A.10), the ﬁve-year CDS spreads can be expressed in terms of conditional
expected excess returns and expected default losses; that is,
Ci ,t =
ELPi ,t + Êt [r ei ,t ,tJ ]
PVBPPi ,t
. (A.21)
Conditional expected one-week excess returns are decomposed according to Equation (1.8)
and are converted to a ﬁve-year holding period by multiplication with (tJ − t)/7, see Equa-
tion (A.14). Replacing Êt [r ei ,t ,tJ ] in Equation (A.21) with the resulting expression gives the
following decomposition of reference entity i ’s ﬁve-year CDS spread on date t :
Ci ,t =
ELPi ,t
PVBPPi ,t
+ (tJ − t )β̂
DEF
i λDEF,t
7×PVBPPi ,t
+ (tJ − t )β̂
LIQ
i λLIQ,t
7×PVBPPi ,t
+ (tJ − t )ui ,t
7×PVBPPi ,t
. (A.22)
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of Equation (A.22) is the expected default loss, while the
second and third terms are the default and liquidity risk premia, respectively, and the last term
is the pricing error. The components of our CDS spread decomposition are the sample means
of the terms in Equation (A.22). Note that the same decomposition holds for portfolio level
CDS spreads using the respective expressions in Appendix A.2.
A.4 Robustness Checks: Factor Constructions
Conditional volatility weighting. The construction of our tradable liquidity factor is similar
to that of Moskowitz et al.’s (2012) time series momentum factor in that it aggregates signed
returns. To account for the considerable cross-sectional variation in volatilities across assets,
Moskowitz et al. (2012) scale returns by their conditional volatilities. We construct a tradable
liquidity factor in a similar way with weights inversely proportional to conditional volatilities;
that is,
LIQCVWt =
nt∑
i=1
wCVWi ,t−1 sgn
(
Bi ,t−1
)(
r IDXi ,t − r CDSi ,t
)
, (A.23)
where wCVWi ,t = (1/σi ,t )/(
∑nt
j=1 1/σ j ,t ) and σ
2
i ,t is an estimate of annualized conditional vari-
ance of r IDXi ,t − r CDSi ,t that is obtained from daily returns as in Equation (1) of Moskowitz et al.
(2012). Because we use the ﬁrst six-month period to estimate the conditional volatilities for
the computation of the alternative liquidity factor’s ﬁrst observation, its time series consists of
252 weekly observations from March 28, 2007 to February 1, 2012. The alternative liquidity
factor has a correlation of 0.97 with the benchmark liquidity factor indicating that our index-
level-based weighting scheme is effectively a weighting by conditional volatilities.
Corporate bond market illiquidity factor. We use transaction data from the Financial In-
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dustry Regulatory Authority’s Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) to construct
the corporate bond market illiquidity factor. In particular, we obtain transaction data for
plain-vanilla ﬁxed-rate bullet bonds issued by U.S. corporations. The data are ﬁltered for
erroneous transactions using Dick-Nielsen’s (2009) methodology and, as in Dick-Nielsen et al.
(2012), transactions with par volume below 100,000 USD are discarded. Bond-speciﬁc Amihud
(2002) illiquidity measures are obtained each day by averaging absolute returns of consec-
utive transactions per million dollar of par volume traded. These are converted to a weekly
frequency by taking the within-week median of daily measures. Each week the market-wide
measure is obtained as the weighted average (by amount issued) of bond-speciﬁc measures.
The corporate bond market illiquidity factor is then given as the residual of an AR(2) speciﬁca-
tion of the market-wide illiquidity measure. When converting bond-speciﬁc Amihud (2002)
illiquidity measures to a monthly rather than a weekly frequency, the resulting corporate
bond illiquidity measure has a correlation of 0.93 in levels and 0.79 in ﬁrst differences with
Dick-Nielsen et al.’s (2012) λ.
Stock market illiquidity factor. To construct the stock market illiquidity factor, we obtain
price, return, and volume data for NYSE- and AMEX-traded ordinary common shares of U.S.
companies from the CRSP daily stock ﬁle. Individual-stock Amihud (2002) illiquidity mea-
sures are given as weekly averages of absolute one-day returns per million dollar of daily
trading volume. By construction the individual-stock measures are very noisy and outliers
may have a nonnegligible impact when aggregating them into a market-wide illiquidity mea-
sure. We, therefore, follow Korajczyk and Sadka (2008) and “Winsorize" the individual-stock
measures for a given week at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their distribution. Each week
the market-wide illiquidity measure is obtained as the cross-sectional mean of “Winsorized”
individual-stock measures, and the stock market illiquidity factor is the residual of an AR(2)
speciﬁcation of the market-wide measure.
A.5 Standard Error Computation
A.5.1 Standard Errors of Factor Price of Risk Estimates
We describe the standard error computation for a general K -dimensional vector of factors,
ft = [ f1,t , . . . , fK ,t ]′, and the most general case that we consider in the paper, namely the case
of a cross-sectional regression with an intercept, a characteristic, and an additional univariate
beta. In this case, the counterparts of Equations (1.4) and (1.5) in vector notation are
rt =α+β ft +t , (A.24)
and
μξ = 1Nλ0+μcλc +βλ+β∗kλk = Xγ, (A.25)
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where rt = [r e1,t , . . . , r eN ,t ]′ is the N-dimensional vector of realized excess returns, α denotes
the N-dimensional vector of regression intercepts, β denotes the N ×K matrix of factor betas,
t = [1,t , . . . , N ,t ]′ is the N-dimensional vector of mean zero error terms, μξ denotes the
mean of the N-dimensional vector of conditional expected excess returns, ξt = [ξ1,t , . . . , ξN ,t ]′
with ξi ,t = Êt [r ei ,t+1], μc denotes the mean of the N-dimensional vector of characteristics,
ct = [c1,t , . . . , cN ,t ]′, β∗k denotes the N-dimensional vector of univariate betas of y¯t with
respect to the k-th factor, fk,t with 1 ≤ k ≤ K , yt is an N-dimensional vector of exogenous
variables, yt = [y1,t , . . . , yN ,t ]′, y¯t = yt −β∗yg gt is the N-dimensional vector of exogenous
variables orthogonalized with respect to an additional factor gt , the N × (K +3) matrix X and
the (K +3)-dimensional vector γ are deﬁned by X = [1N , μc , β, β∗k ] and γ= [λ0, λc , λ′, λk ]′,
respectively, and 1N denotes an N-dimensional vector of ones. Note that in contrast to the
standard two-pass cross-sectional regression method, there is a distinction between expected
excess returns, μξ, and the mean of realized excess returns, μr .
Moreover, we deﬁne the d = (K +1+4N )-dimensional vector Yt = [ f ′t , gt , r ′t , c ′t , y ′t , ξ′t ]′ and
denote its mean and covariance matrix by μ= [μ′f , μg , μ′r , μ′c , μ′y , μ′ξ]′ and V , respectively. In
what follows, we will use the following convenient partition of V ,
V =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Vf V
′
g f V
′
r f V
′
c f V
′
y f V
′
ξ f
Vg f Vg V
′
r g V
′
cg V
′
yg V
′
ξg
Vr f Vr g Vr V
′
cr V
′
yr V
′
ξr
Vc f Vcg Vcr Vc V
′
yc V
′
ξc
Vy f Vyg Vyr Vyc Vy V
′
ξy
Vξ f Vξg Vξr Vξc Vξy Vξ
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, (A.26)
and express factor betas and univariate betas in terms of the elements of V . The matrix of
factor betas is given by β=Vr f V −1f and the vector of univariate betas of y¯t with respect to the
k-th factor is given by
β∗k =β∗y¯ f ιk = (β∗y f −β∗ygβ∗g f )ιk =Vy f D−1ιk −VygV −1g Vg f D−1ιk , (A.27)
where D = diag(Vf ), β∗y f = Vy f D−1 denotes the N ×K matrix of univariate betas of yt with
respect to ft , β∗yg =VygV −1g denotes the N-dimensional vector of univariate betas of yt with
respect to gt , β∗g f =Vg f D−1 denotes the 1×K matrix of univariate betas of gt with respect to
ft , and ιk denotes the K -dimensional unit vector whose k-th element is nonzero. As in Kan
et al. (2013), we assume that Yt is stationary and ergodic with ﬁnite fourth moment.
Under a potentially misspeciﬁed model, there is no γ such that Equation (A.25) is satisﬁed and
γ is chosen to minimize the sum of squared population pricing errors, e =μξ−Xγ; that is,
γ= argmin
δ
(μξ−Xδ)′(μξ−Xδ)= (X ′X )−1X ′μξ. (A.28)
113
Appendix A. Appendix to Chapter 1
Note that with e deﬁned as above, γ satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order conditions
X ′e = 0K+3 ⇔ 1′Ne = 0, μ′ce = 0, β′e = 0K , and β∗k ′e = 0, (A.29)
where 0m denotes an m-dimensional vector of zeros. From the ﬁnal expression in Equa-
tion (A.28) an estimate of γ can be obtained by replacing population moments with their
sample counterparts; that is,
γ̂= (X̂ ′X̂ )−1X̂ ′μ̂ξ, (A.30)
where X̂ = [1N , μ̂c , β̂, β̂∗k ], β̂ and β̂∗k are given by V̂r f V̂ −1f and V̂y f D̂−1ιk − V̂yg V̂ −1g V̂g f D̂−1ιk ,
respectively, and μ̂·s and V̂·s are the corresponding elements of
μ̂= 1
T
T∑
t=1
Yt , (A.31)
and
V̂ = 1
T
T∑
t=1
(Yt − μ̂)(Yt − μ̂)′, (A.32)
respectively.
Note that θ̂ = [μ̂′, vec(V̂ )′]′ is the method of moments estimator of θ = [μ′, vec(V )′]′. Under
the above assumptions,11

T (θ̂−θ) d−→
T→∞
N (0d(1+d),S0), (A.33)
where S0 =∑∞j=−∞E [ψ(Yt ;θ)ψ(Yt+ j ;θ)′] andψ(Yt ;θ) is the moment function,
ψ(Yt ;θ)= [(Yt −μ)′, vec((Yt −μ)(Yt −μ)′ −V )′]′. (A.34)
Since γ is a smooth function of θ, an application of the delta method yields

T (γ̂−γ) d−→
T→∞
N (0K+3, (∂γ/∂θ′)S0(∂γ/∂θ′)′). (A.35)
Using the expression for S0 from above, the asymptotic covariance matrix of γ̂, i.e., (∂γ/∂θ′)
S0(∂γ/∂θ′)′, becomes
∑∞
j=−∞E [hth
′
t+ j ], with ht = (∂γ/∂θ′)ψ(Yt ;θ).
In order to ﬁnd an explicit expression for ht it remains to compute ∂γ/∂θ′. Using the above
11As noted by Kan et al. (2013), S0 is a singular matrix. This is due to the fact that V̂ is symmetric, i.e., it contains
linearly dependent elements. One could alternatively consider the parameter vector θ˜ = [μ′, vech(V )′]′, in which
case the covariance matrix of the limiting normal distribution would be nonsingular.
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partition of θ, we have ∂γ/∂θ′ = [∂γ/∂μ′, ∂γ/∂vec(V )′] and
ht = ∂γ
∂θ′
ψ(Yt ;θ)= ∂γ
∂μ′
(Yt −μ)+ ∂γ
∂vec(V )′
vec((Yt −μ)(Yt −μ)′ −V ). (A.36)
With H = (X ′X )−1 and A =HX ′, the Jacobian matrices ∂γ/∂μ′ and ∂γ/∂vec(V )′ are given by
∂γ
∂μ′
=
[
0(K+3)×(K+1+N ),
∂γ
∂vec(X )′
∂vec(X )
∂μ′c
,0(K+3)×N ,A
]
, (A.37)
and
∂γ
∂vec(V )′
= ∂γ
∂vec(X )′
∂vec(X )
∂vec(V )′
, (A.38)
respectively, where 0m×n denotes an m×n matrix of zeros and
∂γ
∂vec(X )′
= (H ⊗e ′)− (γ′ ⊗ A). (A.39)
Now, note that vec(X )= [1′N , μ′c , vec(β)′, β∗k ′]′. Thus,
∂vec(X )
∂μ′c
= [0N×N , IN , 0N×N ·(K+1)]′ = ([0, 1, 0′K+1]′ ⊗ IN ), (A.40)
where IN denotes the N-dimensional identity matrix, and, consequently,
∂γ
∂μ′
(Yt −μ)= A(ξt −μξ)− A(ct −μc )λc +H [0, c ′t e, 0′K+1]′. (A.41)
Similarly,
∂vec(X )
∂vec(V )′
=
[
0d2×2N ,
(
∂vec(β)
∂vec(V )′
)′
,
(
∂β∗k
∂vec(V )′
)′]′
. (A.42)
For the remaining expressions, we get
∂vec(β)
∂vec(V )′
= (V −1f ⊗ IN )
∂vec(Vr f )
∂vec(V )′
− (V −1f ⊗β)
∂vec(Vf )
∂vec(V )′
, (A.43)
and
∂β∗k
∂vec(V )′
=(ι′kD−1⊗ IN )
∂vec(Vy f )
∂vec(V )′
− (ι′kβ∗g f ′V −1g ⊗ IN )
∂Vyg
∂vec(V )′
+ (ι′kβ∗g f ′V −1g ⊗β∗yg )
∂Vg
∂vec(V )′
− (ι′kD−1⊗β∗yg )
∂vec(Vg f )
∂vec(V )′
− (ι′kD−1⊗β∗y¯ f )Θ
∂vec(Vf )
∂vec(V )′
,
(A.44)
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where Θ is a K 2 × K 2 matrix such that vec(D) = Θvec(Vf ). Thus, the Jacobian matrix
∂vec(X )/∂vec(V )′ can be expressed as the following sum of Kronecker products
∂vec(X )
∂vec(V )′
= ([0K×2, V −1f , 0K ]′ ⊗ IN )
∂vec(Vr f )
∂vec(V )′
− ([0K×2, V −1f , 0K ]′ ⊗β)
∂vec(Vf )
∂vec(V )′
+ ([0K×(K+2), D−1ιk ]′ ⊗ IN )
∂vec(Vy f )
∂vec(V )′
− ([0′K+2, V −1g β∗g f ιk ]′ ⊗ IN )
∂Vyg
∂vec(V )′
+ ([0′K+2, V −1g β∗g f ιk ]′ ⊗β∗yg )
∂Vg
∂vec(V )′
− ([0K×(K+2), D−1ιk ]′ ⊗β∗yg )
∂vec(Vg f )
∂vec(V )′
− ([0K×(K+2), D−1ιk ]′ ⊗β∗y¯ f )Θ
∂vec(Vf )
∂vec(V )′
.
(A.45)
Moreover,
∂vec(Vr f )
∂vec(V )′
=([IK , 0K×(4N+1)]⊗ [0N×(K+1), IN , 0N×3N ]), (A.46)
∂vec(Vf )
∂vec(V )′
=([IK , 0K×(4N+1)]⊗ [IK , 0K×(4N+1)]), (A.47)
∂vec(Vy f )
∂vec(V )′
=([IK , 0K×(4N+1)]⊗ [0N×(K+1+2N ), IN , 0N×N ]), (A.48)
∂Vyg
∂vec(V )′
=([0′K , 1, 0′4N ]⊗ [0N×(K+1+2N ), IN , 0N×N ]), (A.49)
∂Vg
∂vec(V )′
=([0′K , 1, 0′4N ]⊗ [0′K , 1, 0′4N ]), (A.50)
∂vec(Vg f )
∂vec(V )′
=([IK , 0K×(4N+1)]⊗ [0′K , 1, 0′4N ]). (A.51)
Substituting the expressions in Equations (A.39) and (A.45) into Equation (A.38), and using
Equations (A.46)–(A.51) as well as the ﬁrst-order conditions yields
∂γ
∂vec(V )′
vec((Yt −μ)(Yt −μ)′ −V )=Hz˜t
+ A {β( ft −μ f )( ft −μ f )′ − (rt −μr )( ft −μ f )′}V −1f λ
+ A
{
β∗y¯ f Dt − (yt −μy )( ft −μ f )′ +β∗yg (gt −μg )( ft −μ f )′
}
D−1ιkλk
− A
{
β∗yg (gt −μg )2− (yt −μy )(gt −μg )
}
V −1g β
∗
g f ιkλk ,
(A.52)
where
z˜t =
[
0′2, ut ( ft −μ f )′V −1f , vt ( ft −μ f )′D−1ιk −e ′β∗yg (gt −μg )( ft −μ f )′D−1ιk . . .
+e ′{β∗yg (gt −μg )2− (yt −μy )(gt −μg )}V −1g β∗g f ιk −e ′β∗y¯ f DtD−1ιk
]′, (A.53)
ut = e ′(rt −μr ), vt = e ′(yt −μy ), and Dt = diag(( ft −μ f )( ft −μ f )′).
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Finally, adding up the terms in Equations (A.41) and (A.52), ht can be explicitly expressed as
ht =(γt −γ)− A(ct −μc )λc + A
{
β( ft −μ f )( ft −μ f )′ − (rt −μr )( ft −μ f )′
}
V −1f λ
+ A
{
β∗y f Dt − (yt −μy )( ft −μ f )′
}
D−1ιkλk
− A
{
β∗yg (gt −μg )2− (yt −μy )(gt −μg )
}
V −1g β
∗
g f ιkλk
− Aβ∗yg
{
β∗g f Dt − (gt −μg )( ft −μ f )′
}
D−1ιkλk +Hzt ,
(A.54)
where γt = Aξt and
zt =
[
0, c ′t e, ut ( ft −μ f )′V −1f , vt ( ft −μ f )′D−1ιk −e ′β∗yg (gt −μg )( ft −μ f )′D−1ιk . . .
+e ′{β∗yg (gt −μg )2− (yt −μy )(gt −μg )}V −1g β∗g f ιk −e ′β∗y¯ f DtD−1ιk
]′. (A.55)
Applying the Newey and West (1987) method, a heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consis-
tent estimator for the asymptotic covariance matrix of γ̂ is given by
1
T
T∑
t=1
ĥt ĥ
′
t +
1
T
m∑
l=1
T∑
t=l+1
(
1− l
m+1
)(
ĥt ĥ
′
t−l + ĥt−l ĥ′t
)
, (A.56)
where ĥt is given by Equation (A.54) with population parameters replaced by their sample
estimates. In particular, ê = μ̂ξ− X̂ γ̂. The ﬁnite sample approximation of γ̂’s covariance matrix
is then obtained as 1/T times the estimate of the asymptotic covariance matrix.
Based on Equation (A.54) it is straightforward to break down asymptotic variation of γ̂ into
three components. The ﬁrst one, γt −γ, is variation of γ̂ in case that the model is correctly
speciﬁed and estimated using population values, i.e., there is no error associated with the
estimation of the characteristic, μc , and betas, β and β∗k . The second source of variation
are errors-in-variables (EIV). The second term of Equation (A.54) captures variation associ-
ated with the estimation of the characteristic, μc , the third term of Equation (A.54) captures
variation associated with the estimation of factor betas, β, the fourth, ﬁfth, and sixth terms
of Equation (A.54) capture variation associated with the estimation of the univariate betas,
β∗y f , β
∗
yg , and β
∗
g f , respectively. Variation from the ﬁrst two sources is, e.g., accounted for by
generalized-method-of-moments-based inference. The third source of variation is due to
potential model misspeciﬁcation and captured by Hzt . Note that this term vanishes when
the model is correctly speciﬁed, i.e., when e = μξ− Xγ = 0N . Thus, setting e = 0N gives the
asymptotic variance of γ̂ in a generalized method of moments estimation of μc , β, β∗y¯ f , and γ.
As mentioned above, this asymptotic variance takes into account EIV but ignores potential
model misspeciﬁcation.
In case that the intercept is restricted to zero, γ= [λc , λ′, λk ]′, X = [μc , β, β∗k ], and ht is given
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by Equation (A.54), where
zt =
[
c ′t e, ut ( ft −μ f )′V −1f , vt ( ft −μ f )′D−1ιk −e ′β∗yg (gt −μg )( ft −μ f )′D−1ιk . . .
+e ′{β∗yg (gt −μg )2− (yt −μy )(gt −μg )}V −1g β∗g f ιk −e ′β∗y¯ f DtD−1ιk
]′, (A.57)
and A, H , and e are deﬁned as above. In case that the model speciﬁcation does not include
the characteristic, γ= [λ0, λ′, λk ]′, X = [1N , β, β∗k ], and ht is given by
ht =(γt −γ)+ A
{
β( ft −μ f )( ft −μ f )′ − (rt −μr )( ft −μ f )′
}
V −1f λ
+ A
{
β∗y f Dt − (yt −μy )( ft −μ f )′
}
D−1ιkλk
− A
{
β∗yg (gt −μg )2− (yt −μy )(gt −μg )
}
V −1g β
∗
g f ιkλk
− Aβ∗yg
{
β∗g f Dt − (gt −μg )( ft −μ f )′
}
D−1ιkλk +Hzt ,
(A.58)
where
zt =
[
0, ut ( ft −μ f )′V −1f , vt ( ft −μ f )′D−1ιk −e ′β∗yg (gt −μg )( ft −μ f )′D−1ιk . . .
+e ′{β∗yg (gt −μg )2− (yt −μy )(gt −μg )}V −1g β∗g f ιk −e ′β∗y¯ f DtD−1ιk
]′, (A.59)
and A, H , and e are deﬁned as above. Finally, in case that the model speciﬁcation does not
include the univariate beta, γ= [λ0, λc , λ′]′, X = [1N , μc , β], and ht is given by
ht =(γt −γ)− A(ct −μc )λc + A
{
β( ft −μ f )( ft −μ f )′ − (rt −μr )( ft −μ f )′
}
V −1f λ
+Hzt ,
(A.60)
where zt = [0, e ′ct , ut ( ft −μ f )′V −1f ]′, and A, H , and e are deﬁned as above.
A.5.2 Standard Error of the Cross-Sectional R2
The standard error computation of the cross-sectional R2 is based on the same principle as
that of the factor price of risk estimates. Again, we derive standard errors for the most general
case that we consider in the paper and we discuss less general cases at the end of this section.
Let ρ2 denote the population value of the R2; that is,
ρ2 = 1− Q
Q0
= 1− e
′e
e ′0e0
, (A.61)
where e0 = (IN − (1/N )1N1′N )μξ are population deviations of expected excess returns from
their cross-sectional average. Replacing population values in Equation (A.61) by their sample
estimates, obviously, gives the R2.
Assume
unable to explain any cross-sectional variation in expected excess returns. As in the previous
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section, ρ2 is a smooth function of θ and an application of the delta method yields

T (R2−ρ2) d−→
T→∞
N (0, (∂ρ2/∂θ′)S0(∂ρ2/∂θ′)′), (A.62)
where S0 is deﬁned as in the previous section, (∂ρ2/∂θ′)S0(∂ρ2/∂θ′)′ =∑∞j=−∞ E [ηtηt+ j ], and
ηt = (∂ρ2/∂θ′)ψ(Yt ;θ). Thus, it remains to compute ∂ρ2/∂θ′ in order to obtain an explicit
expression for ηt . Using the above partition of θ, we have ∂ρ2/∂θ′ = [∂ρ2/∂μ′, ∂ρ2/∂vec(V )′]
and
ηt = ∂ρ
2
∂θ′
ψ(Yt ;θ)= ∂ρ
2
∂μ′
(Yt −μ)+ ∂ρ
2
∂vec(V )′
vec((Yt −μ)(Yt −μ)′ −V ). (A.63)
The Jacobian matrices ∂ρ2/∂μ′ and ∂ρ2/∂vec(V )′ are given by
∂ρ2
∂μ′
=
[
0′K+1+N ,
∂ρ2
∂vec(X )′
∂vec(X )
∂μ′c
, 0′N ,
2
Q0
{(1−ρ2)e ′0−e ′}
]
, (A.64)
and
∂ρ2
∂vec(V )′
= ∂ρ
2
∂vec(X )′
∂vec(X )
∂vec(V )′
, (A.65)
respectively, with
∂ρ2
∂vec(X )′
= − 2
Q0
(γ′ ⊗e ′). (A.66)
Replacing ∂vec(X )/∂μ′c and ∂vec(X )/∂vec(V )′ by the expressions derived in the previous
section and making use of the ﬁrst-order conditions yields
ηt = 2
Q0
{
{(1−ρ2)e ′0−e ′}(ξt −μξ)+e ′ctλc +ut ( ft −μ f )′V −1f λ
−e ′
{
β∗y f Dt − (yt −μy )( ft −μ f )′
}
D−1ιkλk
+e ′
{
β∗yg (gt −μg )2− (yt −μy )(gt −μg )
}
V −1g β
∗
g f ιkλk
+e ′β∗yg
{
β∗g f Dt − (gt −μg )( ft −μ f )′
}
D−1ιkλk
}
,
(A.67)
where, as before, ut = e ′(rt −μr ) and Dt = diag(( ft −μ f )( ft −μ f )′). As in the previous section,
the Newey and West (1987) method applied to ηt ’s sample analog, η̂t , gives a heteroscedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent estimate of the asymptotic variance of the R2.
In case that the intercept is restricted to zero, the expression of ηt for the standard error
computation does not change.12 The expressions for ηt in case that the model speciﬁcation
does not include the characteristic or the univariate beta can be obtained from Equation (A.67)
12Note that we do not redeﬁne ρ2 in case that the intercept is restricted to zero. Therefore, ρ2 is not necessarily
nonnegative. Nevertheless, ρ2 ≤ 1 and ρ2 = 1 if and only if e = 0N .
119
Appendix A. Appendix to Chapter 1
Expected Excess Returns Realized Excess Returns
Price Impact Price Impact
Credit Rating Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
AAA–AA 0.36 0.39 0.44 0.61 -0.50 -0.36 -0.86 0.65
[6.28] [6.23] [6.71] [6.98] [-0.70] [-0.42] [-0.85] [0.42]
A 0.37 0.45 0.58 0.95 -0.44 -0.34 0.31 -0.25
[7.82] [6.91] [4.91] [4.43] [-0.62] [-0.33] [0.19] [-0.08]
BBB 0.50 0.70 1.01 1.58 -0.72 -0.12 0.96 1.71
[8.92] [6.80] [6.23] [5.26] [-0.75] [-0.08] [0.39] [0.39]
BB 1.26 1.84 2.31 3.07 -0.87 1.19 2.80 5.23
[9.72] [10.41] [8.30] [8.81] [-0.46] [0.34] [0.58] [0.79]
B–CCC 2.58 3.11 4.34 5.74 -1.33 1.04 12.13 23.82
[11.24] [10.73] [6.48] [6.00] [-0.29] [0.14] [0.96] [1.41]
CDS Spreads Standard Deviations
Price Impact Price Impact
Credit Rating Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
AAA–AA 0.42 0.54 0.75 1.17 1.16 1.79 2.72 4.83
A 0.51 0.65 0.90 2.08 1.23 1.80 2.65 6.20
BBB 0.70 0.98 1.44 2.79 1.57 2.36 3.65 6.09
BB 1.82 2.85 3.67 5.97 3.30 6.02 7.75 11.02
B–CCC 4.52 6.29 9.31 17.01 8.58 12.40 19.95 27.94
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics of Price-Impact-Sorted Portfolios.
The table displays descriptive statistics for the 20 portfolios formed by ﬁrst sorting CDS contracts according to
credit ratings and then according to price impact. The upper part of the table reports sample means of conditional
expected excess returns (in % per year) and realized excess returns (in % per year). In brackets are t-statistics
based on Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors with 24 lags.
The lower part of the table reports sample means of average ﬁve-year CDS spreads across portfolio constituents (in
% per year) and standard deviations of realized excess returns (in % per year). Portfolio time series consist of 276
weekly observations from October 11, 2006 to February 1, 2012.
by setting the respective parameters, i.e., λc or λk , equal to zero.
A.6 Additional Figures and Tables
Figure A.1 depicts monthly time series of the explanatory variables of CDS market illiquidity
(thin black lines) and the CDS market illiquidity measure (thick gray lines).
Figure A.2 displays the CDS spread decomposition for the 20 price-impact-sorted portfolios.
Table A.1 displays descriptive statistics for the 20 price-impact-sorted portfolios.
Table A.2 summarizes index rules for the main indices of the CDX North American and iTraxx
Europe credit index families as well as their sub-indices.
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Figure A.1: Explanatory Variables of CDS Market Illiquidity.
The ﬁgure displays monthly observations of the explanatory variables of CDS market illiquidity (thin black lines,
left hand scales) and the CDS market illiquidity measure (thick gray lines, right hand scales). The explanatory
variables are: the average bid-ask spread of single-name CDSs (Bid-Ask), the average absolute spread change per
quote contributed across single-name CDSs (ILLIQCDS), the average absolute change in the index level per quote
contributed across on-the-run credit indices (ILLIQIDX), the spread between three-month LIBOR and OIS rates
(LIB-OIS), the spread between three-month Agency MBS and Treasury general collateral repo rates (Repo), the
aggregate market capitalization of ﬁnancial institutions that make up the G14 group of major credit derivatives
dealers (Capital), the VIX index (VIX), the Hu, Pan, and Wang (2013) “Noise” measure (Noise), and the average
CDS-bond basis across U.S. investment-grade bonds (CDS-Bond). CDS-Bond, LIB-OIS, Repo, and VIX are in %.
Bid-Ask, CDSILLIQ, and Noise are in basis points. ILLIQCDS and ILLIQIDX are in basis points per contributed quote.
Capital is in 100 billion USD. The time series consist of 64 monthly observations from October 2006 to January
2012.
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Figure A.2: CDS Spread Decomposition of Price-Impact-Sorted Portfolios.
The ﬁgure displays ﬁve-year CDS spreads (in % per year) of the price-impact-sorted portfolios. CDS spreads are
decomposed into expected default losses, factor risk premia, and pricing errors implied by the benchmark model
speciﬁcation. The horizontal axis displays portfolio identiﬁers.
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B Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Dodd-Frank Act Implementation Timeline
Jul 21, 2010 President Obama signs the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”) into law.
Jan 9, 2012 The CFTC publishes the ﬁnal rules for real-time public reporting of swap
transaction data.
Nov 28, 2012 The CFTC announces mandatory central clearing of certain index CDSs in
three implementation phases. In the ﬁrst phase, index CDS dealers and
private funds active in the index CDS market (so-called Category 1 Entities)
are required to clear their index CDS transactions. In the second phase,
ﬁnancial entities other than Category 3 Entities (so-called Category 2 Enti-
ties) are required to clear their index CDS transactions. In the third phase,
investment managers and pension plans (so-called Category 3 Entities) are
required to clear their index CDS transactions. End-users, i.e., non-ﬁnancial
entities hedging business risk, are exempt from mandatory central clearing.
Dec 31, 2012 Real-time public reporting of index CDS transactions becomes mandatory
for index CDS dealers.
Feb 28, 2014 Real-time public reporting of index CDS transactions becomes mandatory
for major index CDS market participants.
Mar 11, 2013 Central clearing becomes mandatory for Category 1 Entities trading CDX.IG
or CDX.HY (for transactions in the ﬁve-year tenor, mandatory central clear-
ing applies to series 11 and all subsequent series).
Apr 10, 2013 Real-time public reporting of index CDS transactions becomes mandatory
for any index CDS market participant.
May 31, 2013 The CFTC publishes the ﬁnal block-trade rules.1
1Block trades are exempt from the trade execution requirement and may be publicly disseminated with delay.
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Jun 4, 2013 The CFTC publishes the ﬁnal rules for SEF compliance and mandatory trade
execution on SEFs. These specify: (i.) the (electronic) trading platforms
that are required to be registered as SEFs and the methods of execution for
swaps that are subject to mandatory trade execution on SEFs (either against
orders resting on a SEF’s order book or against a response to a RFQ facilitated
by the SEF); and (ii.) the process that SEFs can initiate (via so-called made
available to trade determinations) to get CFTC approval for mandatory trade
execution of certain swaps on SEFs.2
Jun 10, 2013 Central clearing becomes mandatory for Category 2 Entities trading CDX.IG
or CDX.HY.
Jul 30, 2013 Block trade rules become effective, with index CDS transactions of notional
amounts exceeding certain spread- and tenor-dependent minimum block
sizes being deﬁned as block trades (note that minimum block sizes deﬁning
block trades do not necessarily coincide with the sizes at which publicly
disseminated notional amounts are being capped).3
Aug 5, 2013 Closing date for applications to become a CFTC-registered SEF according
to (i.) from above. Temporarily registered SEFs are free to initiate made
available to trade determinations that are subject to CFTC approval as set
forth in (ii.) from above.
Sep 9, 2013 Central clearing becomes mandatory for Category 3 Entities trading CDX.IG
or CDX.HY.
Oct 2, 2013 The ﬁrst temporarily registered SEFs start operating.
Jan 28, 2014 The CFTC approves a made available to trade determination for on-the-
run and immediate off-the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY with
ﬁve-year tenors.
Feb 26, 2014 The approved made available to trade determination becomes effective and
all transactions in the above-mentioned index CDSs (not qualifying as block
trades or being end-user exempt) must be executed on SEFs.
B.2 Data Processing
This section gives a detailed account of the data that we use in our empirical analysis, the
procedures that we use to account for outliers in the data, and the algorithms that we apply to
identify swap execution facilities (SEFs) and package transactions.
2Swaps eligible for “made available to trade” determinations have to be subject to mandatory central clearing.
3Prior to July 30, 2013, all index CDS transaction were publicly disseminated with delay and for transactions
with notional amount exceeding USD 100 million, the disseminated notional amounts were capped at USD 100
million.
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B.2.1 On-SEF Trade Report History
We collect all trade reports of credit asset class swaps executed on or before October 16, 2015
from three of the four operating swap data repositories (SDRs): the Bloomberg Swap Data
Repository (BSDR), the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation Data Repository (DDR),
and the Intercontinental Exchange Trade Vault (ICETV).4 The DDR started operating on the
effective date of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s (CFTC’s) real-time public
reporting requirement for swap dealers, December 31, 2012, and the ICETV and BSDR started
operating on February 9, 2013 and May 12, 2014, respectively. Nevertheless, there are trade
reports of transaction executed prior to December 31, 2012 because the DDR trade report
history contains some historical swap transactions that fall under the CFTC’s recordkeeping
requirement.5
There are three types of trade reports that can be submitted to SDRs: new trade reports, cance-
lations, and corrections. New trade reports are used to submit transaction data, cancelations
are used to cancel a previously submitted trade report that contains erroneous transactions
data, and corrections are used to submit the correct transaction data of a previously canceled
trade report. The CFTC’s real-time public reporting requirement speciﬁes that cancelations
and corrections should be submitted in the above order by the party that submitted the
erroneous trade report (the so-called reporting party).6
From each SDR’s trade report history, we remove canceled trade reports and the corresponding
cancelations. We also remove duplicate corrections (in case that a correction was not only
submitted by the reporting party) and corrections that cannot be traced back to the trade
reports that they are supposed to correct. In case of corrections of non-canceled trade reports,
we remove both the corrections and the non-canceled trade reports.
We then remove all trade reports of transactions that were not executed on SEFs and all trade
reports of on-SEF transactions that were executed prior to the CFTC’s SEF compliance date,
October 2, 2013, on which temporarily registered SEFs started operating. We also remove trade
reports of non-price-forming transactions, such as amendments, novations, and terminations,
and trade reports of transactions in contracts other than index CDSs, index swaptions, and
index tranche swaps.
Next, we remove all trade reports for which we cannot identify the underlying. These include
trade reports of transaction in which the underlying is not a standardized credit index of
corporate, municipal, or sovereign creditors, and trade reports with missing or incomplete
data items (or ﬁelds) that we use to identify the underlying.7 For BSDR trade reports this
4The trade report history of the fourth SDR, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange Swap Data Repository, consists of
a total of 65 trade reports. None of the trade reports would be included in our sample because the transactions
were not executed on SEFs.
5See Part 43 and Part 46 of Chapter I of Title 17 of the Code of Federal Regulations (17 CFR).
6See §43.3(e) of Chapter I of 17 CFR.
7Standardized credit indices are uniquely identiﬁed by the index’s name, the index’s series number (which
uniquely identiﬁes the creditors in the index), and the index’s version number (which keeps track of the creditors
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concerns the index’s Bloomberg ticker (BSDR ﬁeld name “ticker”) and its version number
(BSDR ﬁeld name “cds version”),8 for DDR trade reports this concerns the index’s Reference
Entity Database (RED) code (DDR ﬁeld name “UNDERLYING_ASSET_1”; speciﬁcally, the last
nine-digits of the item),9 and for ICETV trade reports this concerns the index’s ICETV product
mnemonic (ICETV ﬁeld name “TVProductMnemonic”; the latter can be mapped via ICETV
product deﬁnitions to the “TvProductName” ﬁeld from which the index can be identiﬁed).
Finally, we remove trade reports with incomplete transaction data (such as, execution times-
tamps, transaction prices, and trade sizes), and trade reports of transactions in which the
underlying is neither a CDX.IG nor a CDX.HY index. We then merge the trade reports of
the three SDRs which amounts to mapping ﬁeld names used by each of the three SDRs in-
dividually to those commonly deﬁned by the CFTC.10 Where applicable, we augment trade
reports that do not provide data for certain ﬁelds with the respective standardized contract
terms. For example, ICETV trade reports do not specify the day-count convention (ICETV ﬁeld
name “DayCountConvention”) which we populate by ACT/360, the day-count convention of
standardized index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY indices.
B.2.2 Identiﬁcation of SEFs
Each of the transactions that remain in the trade report history must have been executed
on one of the eleven SEFs that are registered with the CFTC and offer trading in index CDSs.
These are BGC Derivative Markets, Bloomberg SEF, DW SEF, GFI Swaps Exchange, ICAP SEF,
ICE Swap Trade, MarketAxess SEF, TeraExchange, tpSEF, Tradition SEF, and TW SEF. However,
according to volume data that SEFs have to make publicly available (usually on their websites)
on a daily basis,11 no transactions in index CDSs, index swaptions, or index tranche swaps on
CDX.IG or CDX.HY indices have been executed on TeraExchange during the sample period.12
that have been removed from the index due to credit events).
8During the ﬁrst two weeks of operation, the BSDR disseminated trade reports with missing Bloomberg tickers
and version numbers. Nevertheless, the underlying of transactions in indices of the CDX North American family
can be identiﬁed under the assumption that (i.) the underlying credit index is not a sub-index of the index whose
name is contained in the trade report (BSDR ﬁeld name “underlying asset 1”; this may not be an unreasonable
assumption given that Bloomberg SEF—the only SEF that reports transaction data to the BSDR—does not list
sub-indices of the CDX North American family, and given that in the period following the ﬁrst two weeks of
operation, there are no trade reports in the BSDR history in which the underlying is such a sub-index); and (ii.)
the version number of the underlying credit index series is that of the version with the maximum number of
contributors to Markit’s end-of-day composite computation on the trade date (the number of contributors is a
reliable indicator of trading activity because it usually shifts from one version to the next after the respective credit
event auctions have taken place which is consistent with anecdotal evidence that activity shifts on these days
because dealers prefer to continue trading in versions that include the defaulted names until recovery values are
determined; this is because attachment and detachment points of new versions of a tranche swap can only be set
once recovery rates are known).
9RED codes uniquely identify the index’s name, the index’s series number, and the index’s version number.
10See Appendix A to Part 43 of Chapter I of 17 CFR for the deﬁnition of data ﬁelds for public dissemination.
11See Part 16 of Chapter I of 17 CFR.
12Clarus FT, the standard data source for SEF market shares and volumes, collects these data and makes them
available historically (see Section B.3 for details).
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As explained in §43.3(a)(2) of Chapter I of 17 CFR, SEFs are responsible for reporting trans-
action data of trades executed on their platforms to SDRs. This in particular means that
the choice to which SDR the transaction data are reported is with the SEF and, in general,
not with the counterparties to the transaction (see 77 Federal Register 1198 (Jan. 9, 2012)
for a clarifying discussion). Bloomberg SEF reports cleared transactions to the BSDR while
non-cleared transactions are reported to the DDR, the SDR to which Bloomberg SEF reported
all transaction data before the BSDR started operating.13 ICE Swap Trade states in its rulebook
that it generally reports cleared transactions to the ICETV and non-cleared transactions to the
DDR.14 All other SEFs seem to report transaction data to the DDR.15 Therefore, we identify
the transactions of on-SEF trade reports disseminated by the BSDR as being executed on
Bloomberg SEF, and we identify the transactions of on-SEF trade reports disseminated by
the ICETV as being executed on ICE Swap Trade. For transactions of on-SEF trade reports
disseminated by the DDR it is possible to identify the SEF on which trade execution took place
based on the format the SEF used for trade reporting.
Speciﬁcally, the SEF that submitted a trade report to the DDR can be identiﬁed based on the
format inwhich the underlying and the price notation type is reported (the correspondingDDR
ﬁeld names are “UNDERLYING_ASSET_1” and “PRICE_NOTATION_TYPE”).16 The different
formats that SEFs use for reporting transactions in index CDSs on CDX.IG or CDX.HY indices
are exhibited in Table B.1. The table’s entries are based on an identiﬁcation strategy that is
illustrated by means of the following example:
1. For a given index CDS contract (characterized in terms of the underlying index and the
contract’s tenor) and date, search for the unique underlying and (case-sensitive) price
notation type formats among DDR trade reports that are executed on SEFs. For each
such pair of formats, sum up the notional amount of non-block trades. The result of
such a search for ﬁve-year CDX.IG.21 on February 19, 2014 is, for instance:
Price Nota- Non-Block No-
Underlying tion Type tional (USD MM)
2I65BY:2I65BYCX1 Percentage 100.1
CDX.NA.IG.21:2I65BYCX1 Basis points 200
CDX.NA.IG.21:2I65BYCX1 BasisPoints 250
Dow Jones CDX Investment Grade21 V1:2I65BYCX1 Basispoints 850
13See rulebook of Bloomberg SEF and “Change in SDR Reporting,” Notice to Bloomberg SEF Participants, June 23,
2014.
14See rulebook of ICE Swap Trade.
15For instance, BGC Derivative Markets, GFI Swaps Exchange, ICAP SEF, MarketAxess SEF, and tpSEF state in
their rulebooks that they are reporting credit asset class transaction data to the DDR. Tradition SEF leaves the
choice to the counterparties of the transaction, and DW SEF and TW SEF do not further specify the SDR to which
they report transaction data.
16In some cases, the “CLEARED” ﬁeld, the “INDICATION_OF_COLLATERALIZATION” ﬁeld, or the
“DAY_COUNT_CONVENTION” ﬁeld has to be taken into account as well when identifying the SEF. SEF identiﬁca-
tion based on collateralization seems economically insensible because collateralization should be transaction-
speciﬁc rather than SEF-speciﬁc but could be consistent with SEFs failing to report collateralization details to
SDRs or choosing not to do so in case of trades that are centrally cleared.
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IG.21:2I65BYCX1 Percentage 136
MARKIT CDX.NA.IG.21 12/18 CME:2I65BYCX1 Basis points 0.2
MARKIT CDX.NA.IG.21 12/18 ICE:2I65BYCX1 Basis points 2,924.1
2. Identify the underlying and (case-sensitive) price notation type format with the SEF that
has reported approximately the same non-block notional amount for the index CDS
contract (characterized in terms of the security name and tenor) on that date.17 The
following excerpt is a screenshot of Clarus FT’s SEF View for the above example.
In this example, “MARKIT CDX.NA.IG.21 12/18 CME:2I65BYCX1” and “MARKIT
CDX.NA.IG.21 12/18 ICE:2I65BYCX1” share a common underlying format of the form
“MARKIT CDX.NA.IG.[Series] [Term as mm/yy] [CCP]:[Nine-digit RED code]” (where
CCP denotes the central clearing party) and the non-block notional amounts of trans-
actions with these formats sum up to USD 2,924.3 million, which is approximately the
value of USD 2,925 million reported for BBG (i.e., Bloomberg SEF) on Clarus FT’s SEF
View. In similar vein, “Dow Jones CDX Investment Grade21 V1:2I65BYCX1” corresponds
to GFI (i.e., GFI Swaps Exchange), “2I65BY:2I65BYCX1” corresponds to MarketAxess
(i.e., MarketAxess SEF), and “IG.21:2I65BYCX1” corresponds to TW (i.e., TW SEF). Trade
reports whose underlying asset ﬁeld is populated with “CDX.NA.IG.21:2I65BYCX1” have
to be further differentiated by their price notation type ﬁeld values; “Basis points” and
“BasisPoints”. The former corresponds to TP (i.e., tpSEF) and the latter corresponds to
ICAP (i.e., ICAP SEF). Note that among DDR trade reports on February 19, 2014 there
are no further trade reports of on-SEF transactions in ﬁve-year CDX.IG.21 that have a
non-block notional amount of USD 50 million and that could be identiﬁed with ICE
(i.e., ICE Swap Trade). This is because CDS index transactions executed on ICE Swap
Trade are reported to the ICETV. Indeed, the non-block notional amount of on-SEF
transactions in ﬁve-year CDX.IG.21 in the ICETV trade report history is USD 50 million
on February 19, 2014.
The identiﬁcation strategy focuses on non-block trades because these tend to have non-
capped notional amounts in the transaction data. This is because minimum applicable block
sizes are by deﬁnition less than or equal to cap sizes.18 However, apart from having a notional
17Because trade reports contain rounded notional amounts (see §43.4(g) of Chapter I of 17 CFR), non-block
notional amounts cannot be expected to be identical.
18See §43.4(h) of Chapter I of 17 CFR.
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amount above the minimum applicable block size, the CFTC’s block trade deﬁnition includes
additional conditions that a trade has to meet in order to qualify as a block. Thus, there might
be non-block trades with notional amounts beyond cap sizes and these trades will complicate
identiﬁcation due to cap-induced mismatches of transaction-data-based non-block notional
amounts and SEF-reported non-block notional amounts. However, the incidence of mis-
matches is lower among non-block trades than among all trades and, therefore, we focus on
non-block trades. The issue is discussed in more detail in Section B.2.3.
Table B.1 does not contain an entry for BGC Derivative Markets because the SEF only reported
index swaption trades (according to Clarus FT data). Index swaptions (as well as index tranche
swaps) are typically traded “with delta,” i.e., two counterparties that enter into an index
swaption simultaneously enter into the underlying index CDS with a notional amount that
makes the overall position approximately neutral to changes of the index CDS spread. The
index CDS transaction is typically referred to as a “delta exchange” because it is non-price-
forming in that the index swaption is already quoted relative to a reference level at which
the index CDS will be traded. BGC Derivative Markets does not seem to report the notional
amount of delta exchanges as index CDS trading volume and, therefore, we lack data to verify
the trade report format which we would associate with the SEF. Given that all of the trades that
we would associate with the SEF are delta exchanges, they would not be part of the sample on
which most of our analyses are based.
Table B.1 does not contain an entry for Tradition SEF because the SEF does not seem to use
a consistent reporting format for its transaction data. Therefore, we hand match index CDS
trades on dates on which the SEF reported index CDS, index swaption, or index tranche
swap trading (according to Clarus FT data). Speciﬁcally, we look for trades in the respective
index CDS contract with transaction prices in the high-low range reported by the SEF, whose
aggregate notional amount is consistent with the non-block ﬁgure reported by the SEF, and
that have previously not been assigned to another SEF.19 We also hand match ICE Swap
Trade transaction that have been reported to the DDR by looking for trades in the respective
index CDS contract with transaction prices in the high-low range reported by the SEF, whose
aggregate notional amount is consistent with the non-block ﬁgure reported by the SEF on
dates for which the SEF reports trading of uncleared index CDSs (when reporting SEF volumes,
ICE Swap Trade differentiates between clearing houses and missing values indicate uncleared
trades).
Despite being able to identify trades executed on DW SEF (the interdealer broker SEF operated
by Tradeweb), we will not consider them in our analyses. This is because, we are confronted
with contradicting information regarding index CDS trading on DW SEF. On the one hand, we
were told by Tradeweb personnel that the SEF never offered index CDS trading. On the other
hand, the SEF seems to have ﬁled for listing index CDSs in a class certiﬁcation submitted to
19A “notional amount ... consistent with the non-block ﬁgure” may be below the SEF-reported ﬁgure due to
capping.
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the CFTC on September 30, 2013,20 and it seems to have reported some volume data in the
ﬁrst ﬁve weeks following the SEF compliance date (according to Clarus FT data). Given that
only very few trades (26 in total) have been executed on DW SEF during this period, omitting
them has no material impact on our results.
B.2.3 Assessing the Identiﬁcation Algorithm’s Performance
Assessing the performance of the SEF identiﬁcation algorithm is rather difﬁcult because,
on the one hand, notional amounts in the transaction data are rounded and capped while
aggregate volumes reported by SEFs are not, and, on the other hand, most SEFs do not report
the number of transactions executed on their platforms. The exception are tpSEF and Tradition
SEF. Because Tradition SEF trades are hand-matched, tpSEF is the only SEF for which the
performance of the SEF identiﬁcation algorithm can be assessed in terms of the number of
executed transactions. During the sample period tpSEF reported 2,899 transactions in CDX.IG
index CDSs and 4,283 transactions in CDX.HY index CDSs. This compares to 2,897 and 4,285
transactions, respectively, that the algorithm identiﬁed as being executed on tpSEF.
Figure B.1 compares the aggregate non-block notional amount reported by SEFs (using Clarus
FT data) with the one constructed from the transaction data separately for each SEF. Because
minimum block sizes are by deﬁnition less than or equal to cap sizes, focusing on the non-
block notional amount seems sensible at ﬁrst sight; these transactions should have non-
capped notional amounts below minimum block sizes and, therefore, allow for a meaningful
comparison with (uncapped) SEF-reported volumes. The caveat is that block status depends
not only on trade size but also on the means of trade execution. By deﬁnition a block trade
has to occur “away from the registered [SEF]’s ... trading system or platform” and be “executed
pursuant to the registered [SEF]’s ... rules and procedures.”21 This part of the deﬁnition
was temporarily overruled on September 19, 2014 by a no-action relief of the CFTC which
further speciﬁes that “SEFs are permitted to use [request for quote (RFQ)] functionalities to
facilitate the execution of a block trade” but “block trades may not be facilitated through a
SEF’s Order Book functionality.”22 To further clarify matters, the CFTC notes that “trades above
the minimum block size may occur on the SEF’s Order Book however they will not receive
treatment as block trades and will not be afforded a reporting time delay.” Thus, for SEFs on
which a signiﬁcant portion of trades is executed on the order book (anecdotally, these are
the SEFs operated by interdealer brokers; that is, GFI Swaps Exchange, ICAP SEF, tpSEF, and
Tradition SEF) even the comparison of non-block notional amounts may not be meaningful
because block-sized (and eventually capped) transactions do not qualify as block trades and,
therefore, render the comparison of non-block notional amounts vulnerably to cap-induced
mismatches.
20See “DW SEF LLC Certiﬁcation to CFTC for listing IRS and CDS” on Tradeweb’s website.
21See §43.2 of Chapter I of 17 CFR.
22See CFTC Letter No. 14–118 (Sep. 19, 2014) and its extension CFTC Letter No. 15–60 (Nov. 2, 2015). For instance,
block trades can be executed by a RFQ to one other participant on the SEF (because block trades are exempt from
the CFTC’s trade execution requirement, this also applies to made available to trade index CDSs).
133
Appendix B. Appendix to Chapter 2
← 88%
← 101%
← 99%
← 97%
← 78%
← 80%
← 67%
↑
99%
SEF-Reported
Transaction Data
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
Tradition SEF
tpSEF
ICAP SEF
GFI Swaps Exchange
TW SEF
MarketAxess SEF
ICE Swap Trade
Bloomberg SEF
Figure B.1: Non-Block Notional Amount Identiﬁed (in USD Billion).
The ﬁgure shows the aggregate non-block notional amount traded on different swap execution facilities (SEFs)
between October 2, 2013 and October 16, 2015. For each SEF, the dark gray bar is the SEF-reported non-block
notional amount traded (from Clarus FT) aggregated over all index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY, and the light
gray bar is the aggregate notional amount of non-block trades in index CDS contracts referencing CDX.IG and
CDX.HY identiﬁed as being executed on the respective SEF. The percentages of the SEF-reported notional amounts
that are identiﬁed in the transaction data are indicated to the right of the arrows at the end of each light gray bar.
This limits the true information content of Figure B.1 to the four SEFs where the majority of
trades are dealer-to-customer (D2C) and executed via RFQs (i.e., Bloomberg SEF, ICE Swap
Trade, MarketAxess SEF, and TW SEF) because non-block trades on these SEFs tend to be
disseminated with uncapped notional amounts. For all of these SEFs but ICE Swap Trade the
aggregate non-block notional amount in the transaction data is close to 100% of the amount
reported by the SEF, indicating very good performance of the SEF identiﬁcation algorithm.
Moreover, ICE Swap Trade generally reports its cleared index CDS trades to the ICETV and,
therefore, the comparably low fraction of the aggregate non-block notional amount in the
transaction data is most likely not due to the identiﬁcation algorithm. Instead it could be due
to a non-negligible fraction of block-sized trades executed on the SEF’s order book.
B.2.4 Identiﬁcation of Package Transactions
We impose additional structure on the data by accounting for the fact that some index CDS
transactions may be part of packages, i.e., trades that involve more than one index CDS or an
index CDS and a related instrument, such as, an index swaption or an index tranche swap.
Speciﬁcally, we account for four popular packages: index rolls, curve trades, index swaptions
with delta exchange, and index tranche swaps with delta exchange. Packages are typically
quoted in relative terms. For instance, quotes of index rolls and curve trades are understood
to be the difference between quotes on the individual legs of the package and quotes of index
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swaptions and index tranche swaps are relative to the reference level of the delta exchange.
Therefore, when a package is executed, the transaction prices on the individual legs of the
package or the delta exchange may be different from those of non-package transactions
(hereafter referred to as outright trades) in the respective index CDSs that are executed at
about that time.
Delta Exchanges of Index Tranche Swaps
In order to identify delta exchanges of index tranche swaps, we ﬁrst apply a reporting-format-
based SEF identiﬁcation algorithm to on-SEF index tranche swap transactions disseminated
by the DDR.23 There are a total of 575 on-SEF index tranche swap transactions and for 571 of
those we are able to identify the SEF on which the transaction was executed. About half of
the index tranche swap transactions (273) are executed on ICAP SEF. The other half of index
tranche swap transactions is executed on ICE Swap Trade (139), GFI Swaps Exchange (86), and
Tradition SEF (73).
For each of the index tranche swap transactions, we ﬁrst look for a simultaneously executed
index CDS transaction on the same SEF which references the same index as the tranche
swap and which has the same maturity as the latter. This results in only 243 matching delta
exchanges, none of which takes place on ICAP SEF, i.e., the SEF that accounts for almost
half of the index tranche swap transactions. This suggests that not all SEFs have the ability
to simultaneously execute, conﬁrm, and/or report index tranche swaps and the respective
delta exchanges. Therefore, we hand match to most of the remaining index tranche swap
transactions an index CDS transaction executed on the same trading day and SEF which
references the same index as the tranche swap and which has the same maturity as the latter.
Frequently, the match is unique because the index tranche swap references a far off-the-run
index series that trades infrequently. However, in order to deal with non-unique matches, we
resort to Credit Market Analysis (CMA) intraday tranche swap quotes from the same trading
day on which the index tranche swap was executed, and, in addition, require that index CDS
and tranche swap notional amounts are consistent with some delta that was quoted on the
trading day (i.e., the index CDS’s notional amount is approximately equal to delta times the
tranche swap’s notional amount) and that the transaction price of the index CDS equals the
quote’s reference level. This results in an additional 297 delta exchanges. The remaining index
tranche swaps are assumed to be traded without delta. Since tranche swaps without delta
usually trade at less favourable prices, investors may ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to trade index tranche
swaps with delta and unwind the delta exchange themselves. We identify such delta offsets as
23DDR trade reports of index tranche swaps executed on GFI Swaps Exchange have “UNDERLYING_ASSET_1”
ﬁeld values “Dow Jones CDX Investment Grade[Series]...” or “Dow Jones CDX HY([Series])...” or “DJ CDX
IG[Series]...” ([Series] denotes the index’s series number). Those of index tranche swaps executed on ICAP
SEF have “PRICE_NOTATION_TYPE” ﬁeld value “Percentage” and those of index tranche swaps executed on ICE
Swap Trade have “PRICE_NOTATION_TYPE” ﬁeld values “Price” or “UpfrontPoints”. Trade reports of index tranche
swaps executed on Tradition SEF are hand-matched on dates on which the SEF reported index tranche swap
trading (according to Clarus FT data). The four SEFs are the only SEFs with index tranche swap trading activity
during our sample period according to Clarus FT data.
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transactions with the same transaction price and notional amount as a delta exchange of an
index tranche swap which occur on the same trading day and SEF.
We assign to each of the identiﬁed transactions a index tranche swap delta exchange trade
type and a more detailed trade type specifying the tranche swap’s attachment and detachment
points, the reference level, and the delta.24
Delta Exchanges of Index Swaptions
In order to identify delta exchanges of index swaptions, we ﬁrst apply a reporting-format-
based SEF identiﬁcation algorithm to on-SEF index swaption transactions disseminated by the
DDR.25 On-SEF index swaption transactions disseminated by the ICETV are identiﬁed as being
executed on ICE Swap Trade. There are a total of 1,250 on-SEF index swaption transactions
and for 1,169 of those we are able to identify the SEF on which the transaction was executed.26
24Attachment and detachment points are usually not part of the trade report but they can be inferred from the
tranche swap quote used to identify the delta hedge.
25DDR trade reports of index swaptions executed on Bloomberg SEF have “UNDERLYING_ASSET_1” ﬁeld val-
ues “MARKIT CDX.NA.IG.[Series] mm/yy:...” or “MARKIT CDX.NA.HY.[Series] mm/yy:...” and (case-sensitive)
“PRICE_NOTATION_TYPE” ﬁeld value “Basis points”. Bloomberg SEF index swaptions are cleared (see the
respective contract speciﬁcations on Bloomberg SEF’s website). Trade reports of index swaptions executed
on GFI Swaps Exchange either have “UNDERLYING_ASSET_1” ﬁeld values “CDX.NA.IG.[Series]v[Version]...”,
“CDX.NA.IG.[Series]:...”, “CDX.NA.HY.[Series]v[Version]...”, or “CDX.NA.HY.[Series]:...” and (case-sensitive)
“PRICE_NOTATION_TYPE” ﬁeld values “Basis points” or “Price” and effective dates after trade execution dates, or
“UNDERLYING_ASSET_1” ﬁeld values “IG...” or “HY...”, or “UNDERLYING_ASSET_1” ﬁeld values that contain the
word “Swaption”, or “EMBEDED_OPTION” ﬁeld value “EMBED1”. Trade reports of index swaptions executed on
ICAP SEF have “UNDERLYING_ASSET_1” ﬁeld value “...:Bespoke Basket”, or “UNDERLYING_ASSET_1” ﬁeld values
“CDX.NA.IG.[Series]:...” or “CDX.NA.HY.[Series]:...” and (case-sensitive) “PRICE_NOTATION_TYPE” ﬁeld value “Per-
centage” and “DAY_COUNT_CONVENTION” ﬁeld value “30/360” and effective dates after trade execution dates.
Trade reports of index swaptions executed on ICE Swap Trade have “UNDERLYING_ASSET_1” ﬁeld values that con-
tain the words “Call”, “Payer”, “Put”, or “Receiver”, or “UNDERLYING_ASSET_1” ﬁeld values “CDX.NA.IG.[Series]:...”
or “CDX.NA.HY.[Series]:...” and (case-sensitive) “PRICE_NOTATION_TYPE” ﬁeld value “BasisPoints”, or “UNDER-
LYING_ASSET_1” ﬁeld values “MARKIT CDX.NA.IG.[Series] mm/yy:...” or “MARKIT CDX.NA.HY.[Series] mm/yy:...”
and (case-sensitive) “PRICE_NOTATION_TYPE” ﬁeld value “Price”, or “UNDERLYING_ASSET_1” ﬁeld values
“CDX.NA.IG.[Series]:...” or “CDX.NA.HY.[Series]:...” and (case-sensitive) “PRICE_NOTATION_TYPE” ﬁeld value
“Percentage” and “DAY_COUNT_CONVENTION” ﬁeld value “ACT/360” and effective dates at or before trade execu-
tion dates. Trade reports of index swaptions executed on MarketAxess SEF have “UNDERLYING_ASSET_1” ﬁeld
value “[Six-digit RED code]:...”. Trade reports of index swaptions executed on tpSEF have “UNDERLYING_ASSET_1”
ﬁeld values “CDX.NA.IG.[Series]:...” or “CDX.NA.HY.[Series]:...” and (case-sensitive) “PRICE_NOTATION_TYPE”
ﬁeld value “Percentage” and “DAY_COUNT_CONVENTION” ﬁeld value “30/360” and effective dates at or before
trade execution dates. Trade reports of index swaptions executed on Tradition SEF have “UNDERLYING_ASSET_1”
ﬁeld values “CDX.NA.IG.[Series]:...” or “CDX.NA.HY.[Series]:...” and (case-sensitive) “PRICE_NOTATION_TYPE”
ﬁeld value “Percentage” and “DAY_COUNT_CONVENTION” ﬁeld value “ACT/360” and effective dates after trade
execution dates. According to Clarus FT data all of the above SEFs but ICAP SEF have index swaption trading
activity during our sample period. The reason for ICAP SEF not showing up in the Clarus FT data is the fact that, in
many cases, the SEF does not seem to declare index swaption (as well as index tranche swap) trading activity in an
explicit manner (see Section B.3 for details). In addition, the Clarus FT data shows index swaption trading activity
by BGC Derivative Markets which we neglect because the SEF does not seem to report the notional amount of
delta exchanges as index CDS trading activity.
26Among the remaining 81 on-SEF index swaption transactions are 65 transactions that we would identify as
being executed on BGC Derivative Market and nine transactions that we would identify as being executed on
Tradition SEF but for which Clarus FT data does not show trading activity.
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Most of the index swaption transactions are executed on GFI Swaps Exchange (383), ICE Swap
Trade (368), and Tradition SEF (208). Index swaptions are relatively rarely executed on the
remaining four SEFs; Bloomberg SEF (14), ICAP SEF (81), MarketAxess SEF (45), and tpSEF
(70).
For each of the index swaption transactions, we ﬁrst look for a simultaneously executed trans-
action in the underlying index CDS on the same SEF. This results in only 321 matching delta
exchanges. Therefore, we hand match to many of the remaining index swaption transactions a
transaction in the underlying index CDS that is executed on the same trading day and SEF. The
matches have transaction prices at which reference levels tend to be set and non-round-lot
notional amounts. This results in an additional 640 delta exhanges. The remaining index
swaptions are assumed to be traded without delta. As in case of delta exchanges of index
tranche swaps, we identify delta offsets as transactions with the same transaction price and
notional amount as a delta exchange of an index swaption which occur on the same trading
day and SEF.
We assign to each of identiﬁed transactions an index swaption delta exchange trade type
and a more detailed trade type specifying the swaption’s underlying, type (payer or receiver
swaption), expiry, and strike price.
Index Rolls
We identify index rolls as simultaneously executed index CDS transactions on the same SEF
that reference two different series of the same index and that have the same contract tenor. In
addition, we require that the ratio of notional amounts on the two legs of an index roll (i.e., the
notional amount of the index CDS referencing the older index series divided by the notional
amount of the index CDS referencing the newer index series) is within certain bounds.27 In
case of non-unique matches, we hand match trades such that disparity between the notional
amounts on both legs of the trade is minimal.
The bounds serve to prevent index roll identiﬁcation from transactions that have been simul-
taneously executed by chance. Broadly speaking, an index roll may serve one of two purposes:
either maintaining an exposure of a given notional amount in a more current index series or
getting exposure to a more current index series at a minimal outlay. In the former case, the
notional amount of the index CDS referencing the newer index series will be equal to that of
the index CDS referencing the older index series. In the latter case, the notional amount of the
index CDS referencing the newer index series will typically be smaller than that of the index
CDS referencing the older index series because the risky duration (or risky present value of
27The bounds are 1 and 1.2 for index rolls from the immediate off-the-run series to the on-the-run series, and 1
and 4.1667 for all other index rolls. The latter bound is calibrated to volume data reported by GFI Swaps Exchange
(from Clarus FT). For some part of our sample period, the SEF reported index roll volumes separately. During this
period, the index roll with most displaced index series is a “HY14/HY22 Roll” on April 30, 2014. In the transaction
data, a USD 50 million notional amount in ﬁve-year CDX.HY.14 is rolled into a USD 12 million notional amount in
ﬁve-year CDX.HY.22. This determines the bound in that 4.1667 = 50/12.
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a basis point) of the former index CDS is larger than that of latter index CDS. Therefore, we
set the lower bound for index roll identiﬁcation to unity. For index rolls from the immediate
off-the-run series to the on-the-run series the upper bound for index roll identiﬁcation is set
to 1.2 because simpliﬁed risky duration considerations suggest that the notional amount ratio
of zero-outlay index rolls is of the order 1.18 (≈ 3.25/2.75) or below for contract tenors of three
or more years.28
We assign to each of these transactions an index roll trade type and a more detailed trade type
specifying the index CDSs involved in these trades.
Curve Trades
We identify curve trades as simultaneously executed index CDS transactions on the same SEF
that have different contract tenors and that reference the same index (but not necessarily the
same series of an index). In case of non-unique matches, we hand match trades such that
disparity between the notional amounts on both legs of the trade is minimal.
We assign to each of these transactions a curve trade trade type and a more detailed trade type
specifying the index CDSs involved in these trades.
B.2.5 Trade Size Aggregation
Given the detailed trade types, we aggregate trade sizes of simultaneously executed non-block
transactions in the same index CDS contract and on the same SEF that have the same detailed
trade type and the same transaction price. Simultaneously executed transactions may occur in
case that a trade aggressor hits or lifts limit orders that different market participants placed on
the order book.29 For instance, the best bid on the order book may show USD 50 million depth
and, in fact, be composed of two limit buy orders for USD 25 million. When the full depth is
hit, two simultaneous transactions for USD 25 million occur although the aggressor traded
USD 50 million. Alternatively, simultaneously executed transactions may be duplicates (in
case that they have equal trade size as in the previous example) or they may occur in case that
two RFQ initiators execute an identical response at the same time. Both scenarios seems less
likely to us than the aforementioned order book execution that justiﬁes trade size aggregation.
Of course, trade size aggregation fails to account for the fact that an aggressor’s order may
“walk the book” because we require transaction price to be the same. This is likely to be a
minor issue because SEF personnel told us that order books are usually shallow with depth
concentrating at the best bid and offer.
28Note that index CDSs have a maturity that is one quarter longer than the contract tenor on the index launch
date (i.e., the three-year tenor has approximately 3.25 years to maturity on the launch date) and that indices are
launched every six months (i.e., the three-year tenor of an index CDS referencing the immediate off-the-run index
has approximately 2.75 years to maturity on the launch date).
29As described in Section B.2.3, an otherwise block-eligible transaction that is executed on an order book does
not receive block treatment. Therefore, the situation described here may not explain simultaneous execution of
two or more block trades, and this is why we require transactions to be non-block when aggregating trade sizes.
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B.2.6 Cleaning Transaction Prices
The last stage of data processing assesses whether index CDS contract terms are sufﬁciently
standardized and whether the transaction data and, in particular, the contained pricing
information, are accurate. Because we only use transaction prices of trades in ﬁve-year on-
the-run and immediate off-the-run index CDSs, this stage is only applied to trades in the latter
contracts.
To this end, we remove all trade reports with zero transaction prices, all trade reports with
00:00:00 DST (New York daylight saving time) timestamps, and all trade reports with non-
standard maturity dates.30 We also remove all trade reports of outright transactions and delta
exchanges with ﬁxed-spread transaction prices because of likely reporting errors (index CDS
spreads tend to be different from ﬁxed spreads).31
Conventionally, the prices of index CDSs referencing CDX.IG indices are expressed in terms of
index CDS spreads (in basis points), while those of index CDSs referencing CDX.HY indices are
expressed in terms of prices (in percent). SDR trade reports indicatewhether transaction prices
are expressed in terms of a price or in terms of an index CDS spread,32 but the indications
are frequently erroneous or systematically wrong. For instance, almost all DDR trade reports
of transactions in CDX.HY index CDSs that were executed on Bloomberg SEF indicate that
transaction prices are expressed in terms of spreads (the reported price notation type is “Basis
points”) although the reported transaction prices are expressed in terms of prices. In order
to account for erroneous indications, we overwrite indications with SEF-speciﬁc price types
based on our experience with the trade report history. In our experience, all trade trade reports
of CDX.IG transactions other than those executed on MarketAxess SEF prior to March 6, 2014
contain transaction prices that are expressed in terms of spreads.33 Similarly, all trade reports
of CDX.HY transactions other than those executed on ICE Swap Trade between February
21, 2014 and August 1, 2014 contain transaction prices that are expressed in terms of prices.
Transaction prices contained in the MarketAxess SEF trade reports seem to be expressed in
terms of prices, while transaction prices contained in the ICE Swap Trade trade reports seem
to be expressed in terms of index CDS spreads.
Moreover, we divide transaction prices contained in all trade reports of transactions executed
on MarketAxess SEF prior to March 6, 2014 by 100. This is because they seem to be expressed
in basis points rather than in percent of the notional amount. For the same reason, we divide
transaction prices contained in trade reports of transactions executed on MarketAxess SEF on
or after March 6, 2014 by 100 if they indicate “Percentage” price notation type.
In order to ensure that overwriting indications does not introduce further errors, we compare
30Standardized index CDSs that were launched in March (September) mature on the 20th of June (December) of
the year that follows the index launch by the number of years speciﬁed through the contract tenor.
31We exclude index rolls and curve trades because they are priced in relative terms.
32The corresponding ﬁeld names of BSDR, DDR, and ICETV trade reports are “price notation type”,
“PRICE_NOTATION_TYPE”, and “PriceType”, respectively.
33Here and in what follows, dates refer to DST calendar dates.
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transaction prices with Markit’s end-of-day composites. To this end, we remove all trade
reports of transactions without available Markit end-of-day composite prices and spreads on
the date of trade execution (this, amongst others, removes transactions that were executed on
weekends) and process the remaining trade reports through the following ﬁlter:
1. In case that a transaction price which is expressed in terms of a spread deviates by more
than 5% from Markit’s end-of-day composite spread, we ﬁrst check whether there is a
scaling factor such that the scaled transaction price does not deviate by more than 5%
from the end-of-day composite.34 If this is the case, we replace the transaction price by
the scaled transaction price with minimum percentage deviation from the end-of-day
composite spread.
2. In case that a transaction price which is expressed in terms of a price deviates by more
than 1% from Markit’s end-of-day composite price, we ﬁrst check whether there is a
scaling factor such that the scaled transaction price does not deviate by more than 1%
from the end-of-day composite. If this is the case, we replace the transaction price by
the scaled transaction price with minimum percentage deviation from the end-of-day
composite price.
3. In case that a transaction price which is expressed in terms of a spread continues to
deviate by more than 5% from Markit’s end-of-day composite spread, we next check
whether there is a scaling factor such that the scaled transaction price does not deviate
by more than 1% from Markit’s end-of-day composite price.35 If this is the case, we
overwrite the indication such that it indicates a transaction price which is expressed in
terms of a price and replace the transaction price by the eventually scaled transaction
price with minimum percentage deviation from the end-of-day composite price.
4. In case that a transaction price which is expressed in terms of a price continues to
deviate by more than 1% from Markit’s end-of-day composite price, we next check
whether there is a scaling factor such that the scaled transaction price does not deviate
by more than 5% from Markit’s end-of-day composite spread. If this is the case, we
overwrite the indication such that it indicates a transaction price which is expressed in
terms of a spread and replace the transaction price by the eventually scaled transaction
price with minimum percentage deviation from the end-of-day composite spread.
Then, we convert transaction prices which are expressed in terms of a price into equivalent
expressions in terms of index CDS spreads, and vice versa.36 Once this is done, we detect
outliers by transaction prices that deviate by more than 3% from the intraday mid-quote that
prevails at trade execution. Both transaction prices and quotes are in terms of index CDS
34The scaling factor may take one of the four values that would be used when converting transaction prices into
decimals, percentages, or basis points: 1/1000, 1/100, 100, and 10000.
35In addition to the four above mention values, the scaling factor may be 1 (no scaling).
36When converting between expressions, we use the ISDA CDS Standard Model which is the industry standard.
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spreads and, apart from the robustness check in Section B.7, the intraday mid-quote comes
from Markit. We remove all trade reports of transactions with outlier transaction prices and, in
case of package transactions with outlier transaction prices, we also remove the trade report
of the other leg of the package. Finally, we remove all trade reports of transactions executed
on Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) recommended close and
recommended early close days, and all all trade reports indicating bespoke terms.
B.2.7 Inference of Capped Trade Sizes in case of ICETV Trade Reports
ICETV trade reports do not indicate whether the contained notional amounts are capped or
not but the rules-based approach of CFTC regulations allows to infer capped notional amounts.
It should, however, be noted that exact inference is not possible because trade reports contain
rounded notional amounts.
CFTC rules deﬁne the cap size of an index CDS transaction as the maximum of the appro-
priate minimum block size and USD 100 million.37 The appropriate minimum block size is
transaction-speciﬁc in that it depends on the swap category to which the index CDS transac-
tion belongs. The latter is uniquely determined by the transaction’s index CDS spread and the
contract tenor.38 There are three index CDS spread categories with cutoffs at 175 bps and 350
bps and six tenor categories with cutoffs at two, four, six, eight and a half, and twelve and a half
years. Appendix F to Part 43 of Chapter I of 17 CFR contains the initial appropriate minimum
block sizes of the resulting 18 swap categories. Given the above deﬁnition, cap sizes of all swap
categories can be easily deduced from the appendix by the maximum of USD 100 million and
the applicable minimum block size contained in the appendix.
Determining swap categories requires transaction price in terms of index CDS spreads. There-
fore, the transaction prices of all ICETV trade reports are processed in the same way as
transactions in ﬁve-year on-the-run and immediate off-the-run index CDSs (the previous
section contains the details) but only up to the point where transaction prices are converted.
Then capped notional amounts are inferred by a notional amount at or above the cap size
applicable to the swap category that is implied by the index CDS spread and the contract tenor
of the transaction. There are a few transaction with zero and ﬁxed-spread transaction prices
for which inference in based on the previous end-of-day composite spread from Markit rather
than the transaction price. This approach appears to be plausible in light of cap sizes that
depend on minimum applicable block sizes and industry practice to use previous end-of-day
spreads in order to determine block treatment.39
37See §43.4(h) of Chapter I of 17 CFR.
38Unfortunately, the term tenor is not deﬁned in CFTC rules but the following footnote of a Federal Register
publication by the CFTC (see 77 Federal Register 15468 (March 15, 2012) at note 101) suggests that tenor refers to
days to maturity: “the tenor of a swap refers to the amount of time from the effective or start date of a swap to the
end date of such swap. In circumstances where the effective or start date of the swap was different from the trade
date of the swap, the Commission used the later occurring of the two dates to determine tenor.” Analogously, we
deﬁne tenor as the date difference between the date on which the transaction was executed and the maturity date.
39SEFs use previous end-of-day spreads in order to determine block treatment because different methods of
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B.3 Additional Data Sources
This section brieﬂy describes other data sources that our analyses rely upon and eventual data
processing.
B.3.1 Clarus FT SEF Volumes
We obtain data for USD-denominated index CDS contracts referencing CDX.IG and CDX.HY
indices from Clarus FT’s SEF View. The view compiles data from trading activity reports that
SEFs ﬁle on a daily basis on their websites.
Data Description
The Clarus FT data contains 26 ﬁelds including the SEF, the reporting date, an credit index
identiﬁer, the contract tenor, the notional amount traded, and the block and non-block
notional amounts traded. In addition, the data contains three “Markup” ﬁelds whose content
seems to differ for each SEF. The “Markup1” ﬁeld seems to contain the index CDS contract
description that the respective SEF used when ﬁling the report and is populated for all SEFs.
Formost SEFs this is the only “Markup” ﬁeld populated. However, for some SEFs the “Markup2”
and “Markup3” ﬁelds are populated as well. Those include ICE (i.e., ICE Swap Trade), TP
(i.e., tpSEF), and Tradition (i.e., Tradition SEF). For ICE the “Markup3” ﬁeld contains the
derivatives clearing organization (the ﬁeld is populated with “ICE CLEAR CREDIT”, “ICE
CLEAR EUROPE”, or “None”). This allows us to determine the dates on which ICE Swap Trade
data is disseminated by the DDR (remember that ICE Swap Trade reports uncleared index
CDSs transactions, i.e., those that make up SEF-reported entries with “Markup3” ﬁeld values
“None”, to the DDR). For TP (Tradition) the “Markup3” (“Markup2”) ﬁeld contains the trade
count.
Data Cleaning
The “Markup1” ﬁeld enables us to detect erroneous entries. Speciﬁcally, the Clarus FT data are
cleaned by removing (i.) duplicate entries; (ii.) entries for swaption and tranche swap contracts
(i.e., entries for which the “Markup1” ﬁeld contains “Call”, “Payer”, “Put”, “Receiver”, “Tranche”,
or “%”); (iii.) ICAP (i.e., ICAP SEF) entries with “Markup1” ﬁeld values that contain six-digit
RED codes instead of nine-digit RED codes (these entries seem to be for index swaptions and
index tranche swaps because their prices are very different from the ones of the index CDSs
on the credit indices displayed in the “Security” ﬁeld); (iv.) ICAP (i.e., ICAP SEF) entries with
“Markup1” ﬁeld value “5” (these entries seem to be for swaptions because their prices are very
different from the ones of the index CDSs on the credit indices displayed in the “Security”
ﬁeld); (v.) ICE (i.e., ICE SwapTrade) entries with “Markup1” ﬁelds values that start with “Markit”
trade execution are available for block and non-block trades and applicability of the method of trade execution
has to be veriﬁed before trade.
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and “Markup3” ﬁelds values that are “None” (these entries seem to be for non-cleared index
tranche swaps); (vi.) entries with “Markup1” ﬁeld values that contain “2I65BZ” (these entries
seem to be for index CDSs on CDX.EM); (vii.) entries with reporting dates prior to the launch
date of the index series; and (viii.) three ICAP (i.e., ICAP SEF) entries that have reporting dates
after the maturity of the index CDS contract.
B.3.2 Credit Market Analysis Intraday Quotes
We obtain a custom data set of intraday index CDS quotes from CMA. Alike Markit, CMA
provides dealer-run-based intraday composite quotes for index and single-name CDSs but
there are important methodological differences between the two data sources. The most
important of which is knowledge of the quote setter’s identity: when forming a composite
quote, Markit is aware of the dealer that initiated the run while CMA is not.40
When forming a composite quote, CMA only has excess to contributions from a data-sharing
consortium of non-dealer market participants. Consortium members use CMA’s quote parsing
software (CMA Quotevision) in order to manage the large number of quotes that is communi-
cated to them via dealer runs.41 Speciﬁcally, the software provides each consortium member
with a real-time structured overview of the quotes she has received by mail. The overview
is speciﬁc to each consortium member and only available to her, but for a given index CDS
contract summary statistics (such as, the median mid-quote and the median bid-ask spread)
of the quotes contained in the overview are contributed to CMA whenever the overview for
the particular contract is updated by receipt of a new run.42 CMA’s composite mid-quote
is a robust (median-like) statistic of the summary statistics contributed by the consortium
members.43 Instead of CMA’s composite mid-quote, our custom data set comprises bid and
ask quotes based on the average mid-quote and the average bid-ask spread across all contri-
butions received by CMA within a given second. In addition, the data include the number of
contributions underlying the computation of averages. We only use averages with at least two
underlying contributions.
B.3.3 GFIMarket Data
We obtain GFI Market Data from Fenics. GFI is a leading interdealer broker in both cash and
40Quotes are the intellectual property of the quote setter and cannot be shared with third persons without the
quote setter’s agreement.
41According to CMA, some of the consortium members receive up to 20,000 quotes via dealer runs per day.
42For a contribution to be made, the overview has to contain quotes of at least two different dealers and satisfy
additional proprietary criteria.
43For inactively quoted CDSs, the procedure can give rise to composites that actually coincide with an individual
dealer’s quotes. In order to preserve quote anonymity, CMA adds a small random quantity to composite mid-
quotes. Unfortunately, the random quantities added to CDX.IG composites turned out to be too large to allow for
meaningful inference of trade direction or precise estimation of transaction costs. For CDX.IG and CDX.HY, quote
randomization started on January 1, 2014 and was suspended on November 19, 2014 because of sufﬁciently active
quoting by dealers. The custom data are not randomized.
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derivative ﬁxed income markets and the operator of the GFI Swaps Exchange SEF. The data
come from GFI’s CreditMatch trading platform which is also used by its SEF. The data comprise
the best bids and offers resting on GFI order books as well as prices at which quantity can
be exchanged during designated matching sessions. Matching sessions are either periodic
and time-limited or continuous and open-ended. In case of periodic matching sessions,
prices can be determined in a variety of ways including price ﬁxing sessions that turn into
matching sessions once prices are ﬁxed. In case of continuous matching sessions, prices are
broker-determined mid-points.
We remove a few obvious outliers from the data for ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs on
CDX.IG and CDX.HY. In order to determine the beginning and end of continuous mid-point
matching sessions in these contracts, we remove mid-point repetitions in case that there are
consecutive mid-points at the same level. According to GFI representatives, the repetitions
are due to the data collection procedure which records all non-trade events happening during
existing matching sessions (such as, the bids and offers made) in the same way as matching
session prices. In order to compute proﬁts from liquidity provision, we convert quotes that
are expressed in terms of index CDS spreads into quotes that are expressed in terms of prices.
B.3.4 Markit Index Swaptions
The index swaption data come from Markit and comprise end-of-day composite bid and
ask prices and implied volatilities. The composites are formed at 6:30 p.m. New York time
and based on a collection of individual dealer quotes. Markit parses quotes from dealer runs
throughout the trading day, and the collection on which composite computation is based
contains the quotes from each dealer’s latest run. In addition to composites, the data also
comprise the number of dealers whose quotes are used in the composite computation and
the number of quotes parsed over the previous 24 hours. Because dealers may use non-
identical reference levels when quoting swaption contracts (cross-sectionally and throughout
the trading day), composites are formed per swaption contract and reference level.
We use three-month at-the-money implied index swaption volatility as a control variable
for market conditions in trade-by-trade regressions that estimate selection-bias-corrected
average effective half-spreads, realized half-spreads, and price impacts. The at-the-money
swaption has a strike closest to the index’s end-of-day composite. To select among swaptions
with the same strike and different reference levels, we choose the swaption that is most actively
quoted, and that has the largest number of quoting dealers and the tightest average bid-ask
spread across payer and receiver swaptions. In case that these criteria do not result in a unique
match, we select the swaption with reference level closest to the end-of-day composite.
B.3.5 Markit Intraday Quotes
Markit intraday data comprise bid and ask quotes in terms of both prices and indexCDS spreads.
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We ﬁrst remove duplicate entries from the data. Then, we remove quotes for already-matured
index CDS and quotes that give rise to negative bid-ask spreads.44 Finally, we compress the
information of quotes which are made in the same second (quotes are time stamped with
second precision) as some other quote on the same index CDS into single quotes such that
in each second there is at most one quote on a particular index CDS.45 Occasionally, there
are short periods of time in which mid-quotes are more volatile than transaction prices. We
ignore quotes from these periods when detecting outliers and in all our analyses.
B.4 Trading Protocol Identiﬁcation for GFI Swaps Exchange Trades
We use GFI Market Data to identify the trading protocols that were used to execute trades
on the GFI Swaps Exchange. First, we identify order-book trades by transaction prices that
coincide with either the best bid or offer that prevails on the order book of the GFI Swaps
Exchange at trade execution.
Then, we identify workup sessions and workups. In identifying workup sessions, we closely
follow the description of the workup protocol that is contained in the rulebook of the GFI
Swaps Exchange, in particular, with respect to the 40-second duration of workup sessions and
the fact that only trades that occur on the order book trigger workup sessions.46 Speciﬁcally,
we sequence all transactions in a given index CDS contract that are of the same detailed trade
type.47 Whenever two consecutive transactions in such a sequence occur within 40 seconds
and at the same price, we infer that the second transaction is part of a workup session that
was triggered by the execution of the ﬁrst one, the so-called workup trigger, provided that
the workup trigger is an order-book trade. We assume that the workup session times out 40
seconds after it was triggered and that any transaction in the sequence which occurs before
the timeout at a price other than the workup trigger’s transaction price terminates the session
prematurely. All transactions that occur at the workup trigger’s transaction price before the
session terminates are identiﬁed as workups (for transactions that were previously identiﬁed
as order-book trades the identiﬁed trading protocol is overwritten).
44Note that only the quotes in terms of the primary price type, i.e., the price type used in dealer runs, can be
expected to be non-negative. This is because, when converting primary price type quotes into secondary price
types, Markit does not take into account the inverse relation between prices and index CDS spreads. For instance,
the primary price type for CDX.IG index CDSs is the index CDS spread. In this case, bid (ask) quotes in terms of
price (i.e., the secondary price type) correspond to converted bid (ask) quotes in terms of the index CDS spread.
When the bid quote in terms of the index CDS spread is below the ask quote, then the price that is obtained by
conversion of the bid quote is above the price that is obtained by conversion of the ask quote due to the inverse
relation between prices and index CDS spreads.
45This compression is achieved by taking the quote pair at the 50th percentile of the mid-quote distribution. In
case that there is more than one pair of quotes with mid-quote equal to the 50th percentile, the pair at the 50th
percentile of the bid-ask spread distribution is taken.
46The rulebook leaves open whether or not operation of the order book is suspended during the workup session.
Our identiﬁcation assumes that the order book continues operating while the session is in progress and that the
session will be immediately terminated by any transaction at a price other than the one at which trade size is
worked up.
47We sequence transactions ﬁrst by their execution timestamps, then by the disseminating SDR, and ﬁnally by
the numeric part of the SDR’s dissemination identiﬁer.
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Finally, we identify mid-market matches as trades with previously unidentiﬁed trading pro-
tocols whose transaction prices coincide with the mid-market level that prevails at trade
execution on the GFI Swaps Exchange.
B.5 Trade SizeWeighting
In the paper, we choose to focus on sample means because capped trade sizes may render
trade-size-weighted averages subject to biases. However, trade-size-weighted average effective
half-spreads may be more representative of the actual cost of trading, for instance, because
the weighting scheme already accounts for the fact that transaction costs increase with trade
size. Therefore, Table B.2 displays trade-size-weighted effective half-spreads, realized half-
spreads, and price impacts of outright trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs and, for
comparison, recapitulates the estimates reported in Table 2.3 of the paper in the ﬁrst row
of each panel. Consistent with effective half-spreads that increase with trade size, trade-
size-weighted averages are larger than sample means and so are differences of trade-size-
weighted average effective half-spreads of D2C and dealer-to-dealer (D2D) trades. Therefore,
the differences between D2C and D2D transaction costs that we report in the paper are
conservative. Similarly, the differences between D2C and D2D price impacts that we report in
the paper are conservative as well.
In order to mitigate eventual biases of trade-size-weighted averages, we proceed as in Sec-
tion 2.3.4 of the paper and determine the average size by which trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run
index CDSs exceed cap sizes using SEF-reported volumes from Clarus FT. We then add these
averages on top of the disseminated cap sizes in order to obtain cap-adjusted weights for
computing trade-size-weighted averages. Similar to the average trade sizes in excess of caps
that we report in the paper (which are based on the broader sample of all on-SEF index CDS
transactions in CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively), we ﬁnd that D2C trades in ﬁve-year on-
the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG exceed caps on average by USD 123.21 million USD. The size
by which D2D trades in these index CDSs exceed caps is slightly larger than the one reported
in the paper, USD 132.53 million. The corresponding averages for D2C and D2D trades in
ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs on CDX.HY are USD 107.33 million and USD 142.28 million,
respectively.
The resulting cap-adjusted trade-size-weighted averages are shown in the last row of each
panel. Cap-adjusted trade-size-weighted average effective half-spreads tend to be slightly
larger than unadjusted averages while the opposite seems to be the case for trade-size-
weighted price impacts. This indicates that capped trade sizes induce a small downward bias
in trade-size-weighted effective half-spreads and a small upward bias in trade-size-weighted
price impacts. Inference regarding differential effective half-spreads and price impacts of D2C
and D2D trades seems to be unaffected by the bias.
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Dealer-To-Customer Dealer-To-Dealer D2C-D2D
Effc Rlzd Prc Effc Rlzd Prc Effc Rlzd Prc
Sprd Sprd Imp Sprd Sprd Imp Sprd Sprd Imp
Panel A: CDX.IG
Sample mean 0.137 0.031 0.106 0.088 0.025 0.063 0.049∗∗ 0.006 0.043∗∗
Weighted Avg. 0.149 0.033 0.116 0.092 0.034 0.058 0.057∗∗ -0.001 0.058∗∗
Weighted (adj.) 0.156 0.039 0.117 0.094 0.040 0.053 0.062∗∗ -0.002 0.064∗∗
Panel B: CDX.HY
Sample mean 0.674 0.166 0.508 0.402 0.155 0.246 0.273∗∗ 0.011 0.262∗∗
Weighted Avg. 0.763 0.250 0.513 0.410 0.187 0.223 0.353∗∗ 0.062∗∗ 0.290∗∗
Weighted (adj.) 0.795 0.302 0.493 0.414 0.199 0.215 0.380∗∗ 0.102∗∗ 0.278∗∗
Table B.2: Effective Half-Spreads, Realized Half-Spreads, and Price Impacts.
Panels A and B show mean and trade-size-weighted averages of effective half-spreads (EffcSprd), realized half-
spreads (RlzdSprd), and price impacts (PrcImp) of outright dealer-to-customer (D2C) and dealer-to-dealer (D2D)
trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively. In the computation of the adjusted
trade-size-weighted average, the size of trades that are disseminated with capped notional amounts is adjusted
by an index- and D2C-(D2D)-speciﬁc mean excess-beyond-cap estimate based on SEF-reported actual trading
volumes from Clarus FT. EffcSprd is deﬁned as qt × (pt −mt ), where pt is the transaction price and mt is the
latest mid-quote in the 15-minute period prior to trade execution. RlzdSprd is deﬁned as qt × (pt −mt+Δ), where
mt+Δ is the ﬁrst mid-quote in the 15-minute period that follows trade execution by 15 minutes. PrcImp is deﬁned
as qt × (mt+Δ −mt ). Both transaction prices and quotes are in terms of index CDS spreads and expressed in
basis points. Trade direction, qt , is inferred by the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. ∗∗ and ∗ denote rejection
of a regression-based t test for the null hypothesis that D2C and D2D sample means are identical at the 1% and
5% level, respectively, with inference based on the Newey and West (1987) estimate of the covariance matrix of
coefﬁcient estimates. The sample period is October 2, 2013 to October 16, 2015 and comprises 50,126 (8,881) and
71,697 (10,219) outright D2C (D2D) trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively.
B.6 Outright Immediate Off-The-Run Index CDS Trades
Table B.3 displays average effective half-spreads, realized half-spreads, and price impacts of
outright trades in ﬁve-year immediate off-the-run index CDSs. Transaction costs of trades in
immediate off-the-run index CDSs are larger than those of trades in on-the-run index CDSs
which is consistent with off-the-run index CDSs being less liquidly traded than on-the-run
index CDSs. In contrast, the price impact of trades in immediate off-the-run index CDSs is
smaller than the one of trades in on-the-run index CDSs. This most likely reﬂects the fact that
many of the trades in off-the-run index CDSs are liquidity motivated in that they close existing
positions. Consistent with our results for outright trades in on-the-run index CDSs, we ﬁnd
larger transaction costs and higher price impacts of D2C trades.
Table B.4 displays regression results for outright trades in ﬁve-year immediate off-the-run
index CDSs.48 Results are broadly consistent with those for outright trades in on-the-run
48The mismatch in the number of trades between Table B.3 and Table B.4 is due to unavailable quotes on the
ﬁve-year on-the-run index (i.e., trades for which the BAS and SPRD explanatory variables cannot be computed).
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Dealer-To-Customer Dealer-To-Dealer D2C-D2D
Effc Rlzd Prc Effc Rlzd Prc Effc Rlzd Prc
Type Sprd Sprd Imp Sprd Sprd Imp Sprd Sprd Imp
Panel A: CDX.IG
Outright 0.191 0.118 0.073 0.103 0.118 -0.016 0.088∗∗ -0.001 0.089∗∗
Index roll 0.048 0.020 0.028 0.050 0.027 0.023 -0.002 -0.007 0.005
Panel B: CDX.HY
Outright 1.056 0.650 0.407 0.590 0.432 0.159 0.466∗∗ 0.218∗ 0.248∗
Index roll 0.392 0.239 0.153 0.354 0.131 0.223 0.038 0.108∗ -0.070
Table B.3: Effective Half-Spreads, Realized Half-Spreads, and Price Impacts by Trade Type.
Panels A and B show sample means of effective half-spreads (EffcSprd), realized half-spreads (RlzdSprd), and
price impacts (PrcImp) of dealer-to-customer (D2C) and dealer-to-dealer (D2D) trades in CDX.IG and CDX.HY,
respectively. Sample means are separately computed for outright trades in ﬁve-year immediate off-the-run index
CDSs, for index rolls between ﬁve-year on-the-run and immediate off-the-run index CDSs, and for delta exchanges
of index swaption and index tranche swap trades that reference the ﬁve-year immediate off-the-run index. EffcSprd
is deﬁned as qt × (pt −mt ), where pt is the transaction price (the difference between on-the-run and immediate
off-the-run transaction prices for index rolls) and mt is the latest mid-quote (the difference between the latest
on-the-run and immediate off-the-run mid-quotes for index rolls) in the 15-minute period prior to trade execution.
RlzdSprd is deﬁned as qt × (pt −mt+Δ), where mt+Δ is the ﬁrst mid-quote in the 15-minute period that follows
trade execution by 15 minutes. PrcImp is deﬁned as qt × (mt+Δ−mt ). Both transaction prices and quotes are in
terms of index CDS spreads and expressed in basis points. Trade direction, qt , is inferred by the Lee and Ready
(1991) algorithm. ∗∗ and ∗ denote rejection of a regression-based t test for the null hypothesis that D2C and
D2D means are identical at the 1% and 5% level, respectively, with inference based on the Newey and West (1987)
estimate of the covariance matrix of coefﬁcient estimates. The sample period is October 2, 2013 to October 16,
2015 and comprises 2,861 (85) and 3,875 (149) outright D2C (D2D) trades in ﬁve-year immediate off-the-run index
CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively, and 968 (344) and 1,283 (343) D2C (D2D) index rolls between ﬁve-year
on-the-run and immediate off-the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively.
index CDSs but less strong. Transaction costs tend to increase with trade size and quoted
bid-ask spread (as well as implied volatility in case of CDX.HY) and the price impact of trades
increases when bid-ask spreads widen and liquidity deteriorates. Transaction costs and price
impacts of D2C trades are signiﬁcantly higher than those of D2D trades, even after accounting
for trade characteristics and market conditions.49
B.7 Robustness Checks
This section contains the results of a variety of robustness checks that we conducted. These
include using an alternative mid-quote when computing and decomposing transaction costs,
using alternative time frames over which to compute realized half-spreads and price impacts,
Most of these trades come from index roll dates and are executed before the ﬁve-year on-the-run index is quoted
for the ﬁrst time.
49Signiﬁcance is marginal in case of the price impact regression for CDX.HY but the difference in price impacts
of D2C and D2D trades is of the same order of magnitude as the one for outright trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run
index CDSs (see Table 2.5 of the paper).
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CDX.IG CDX.HY
EffcSprd RlzdSprd PrcImp EffcSprd RlzdSprd PrcImp
D2C 0.161∗∗ 0.105∗∗ 0.056∗∗ 0.909∗∗ 0.533∗∗ 0.375∗∗
(21.82) (12.13) (6.54) (27.30) (11.72) (8.85)
D2D 0.092∗∗ 0.114∗∗ -0.022 0.511∗∗ 0.339∗ 0.171
(3.85) (3.58) (-1.10) (5.74) (2.25) (1.49)
MDM 0.016 -0.030 0.046∗∗ 0.033 -0.051 0.084
(1.65) (-1.82) (2.69) (0.97) (-0.74) (1.38)
LRG 0.009 -0.004 0.014 0.099∗ 0.045 0.054
(0.88) (-0.30) (0.89) (2.21) (0.60) (0.79)
BLCK 0.065∗∗ 0.060∗∗ 0.004 0.282∗∗ 0.293∗∗ -0.012
(4.54) (2.89) (0.36) (4.39) (3.40) (-0.19)
RFRNC 0.056 0.076 -0.020 0.603∗∗ 0.596∗∗ 0.007
(1.95) (1.94) (-1.18) (3.99) (3.63) (0.09)
BAS 0.785∗∗ 0.209 0.576∗ 0.339∗∗ -0.062 0.401∗∗
(4.47) (1.37) (2.30) (2.68) (-0.41) (3.87)
SPRD/100 0.156 0.157 -0.001 -0.082 -0.004 -0.079
(1.52) (1.37) (-0.01) (-1.25) (-0.04) (-1.02)
VLTLTY 0.102 -0.027 0.129 1.693∗∗ 0.942 0.752
(0.99) (-0.23) (0.97) (3.41) (1.31) (1.26)
N 2,919 2,919 2,919 3,953 3,953 3,953
D2C−D2D 0.069 -0.009 0.078 0.398 0.194 0.204
p-value <0.01 0.77 <0.01 <0.01 0.16 0.06
Table B.4: Regressions Controlling for Outright Trade Characteristics and Market Conditions.
The table shows OLS estimates of regression speciﬁcations that control for selection bias in the comparison of
effective half-spreads (EffcSprd), realized half-spreads (RlzdSprd), and price impacts (PrcImp) of outright dealer-
to-customer (D2C) and dealer-to-dealer (D2D) trades in ﬁve-year immediate off-the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG
and CDX.HY (t-statistics based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors are shown in parenthesis). EffcSprd is
deﬁned as qt × (pt −mt ), where pt is the transaction price and mt is the latest mid-quote in the 15-minute period
prior to trade execution. RlzdSprd is deﬁned as qt × (pt −mt+Δ), where mt+Δ is the ﬁrst mid-quote in the 15-
minute period that follows trade execution by 15 minutes. PrcImp is deﬁned as qt × (mt+Δ−mt ). Both transaction
prices and quotes are in terms of index CDS spreads and expressed in basis points (bps). Trade direction, qt , is
inferred by the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. The explanatory variables include dummy variables for D2C
trades (D2C), for D2D trades (D2D), for medium-sized trades (MDM; USD 20–50 MM for CDX.IG and USD 5–15
MM for CDX.HY), for large-sized trades (LRG; USD 50–100 MM for CDX.IG and USD 15–30 MM for CDX.HY),
for block-sized trades (BLCK; +USD 100 MM for CDX.IG and +USD 30 MM for CDX.HY), and for trades with
transaction prices at typical reference levels (RFRNC; index CDS spread multiples 0.5 bps for CDX.IG and price
multiples of 0.125% for CDX.HY), the bid-ask spread of the latest quote for the ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDS
(BAS), the corresponding mid-quote (SPRD), and the implied volatility of three-month at-the-money swaptions on
the ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDS (VLTLTY). Continuous explanatory variables are demeaned. The prior to last
row shows the difference between D2C and D2D coefﬁcient estimates and the last row shows the p-value of a Wald
test for the null hypothesis that D2C and D2D coefﬁcients are identical. ∗∗ and ∗ denote statistical signiﬁcance at
the 1% and 5% level, respectively. The sample period is October 2, 2013 to October 16, 2015 and comprises 2,834
(85) and 3,806 (147) outright D2C (D2D) trades in ﬁve-year immediate off-the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG and
CDX.HY, respectively.
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Dealer-To-Customer Dealer-To-Dealer D2C-D2D
Effc Rlzd Prc Effc Rlzd Prc Effc Rlzd Prc
Type Sprd Sprd Imp Sprd Sprd Imp Sprd Sprd Imp
Panel A: CDX.IG
Outright 0.139 0.030 0.109 0.090 0.024 0.065 0.049∗∗ 0.006 0.043∗∗
Index roll 0.052 0.020 0.031 0.063 0.044 0.019 -0.011 -0.024∗ 0.012
Panel B: CDX.HY
Outright 0.679 0.172 0.507 0.407 0.167 0.240 0.272∗∗ 0.005 0.267∗∗
Index roll 0.406 0.249 0.157 0.454 0.103 0.351 -0.049 0.146∗∗ -0.194∗∗
Table B.5: Effective Half-Spreads, Realized Half-Spreads, and Price Impacts by Trade Type.
Panels A and B show sample means of effective half-spreads (EffcSprd), realized half-spreads (RlzdSprd), and
price impacts (PrcImp) of dealer-to-customer (D2C) and dealer-to-dealer (D2D) trades in CDX.IG and CDX.HY,
respectively. Sample means are separately computed for outright trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs, for
index rolls between ﬁve-year on-the-run and immediate off-the-run index CDSs, and for delta exchanges of index
swaption and index tranche swap trades that reference the ﬁve-year on-the-run index. EffcSprd is deﬁned as
qt × (pt −mt ), where pt is the transaction price (the difference between on-the-run and immediate off-the-run
transaction prices for index rolls) and mt is the latest mid-quote (the difference between the latest on-the-run and
immediate off-the-run mid-quotes for index rolls) in the 15-minute period prior to trade execution. RlzdSprd is
deﬁned as qt ×(pt −mt+Δ), where mt+Δ is the ﬁrst mid-quote in the 15-minute period that follows trade execution
by 15 minutes. PrcImp is deﬁned as qt ×(mt+Δ−mt ). Both transaction prices and quotes are in terms of index CDS
spreads and expressed in basis points. Trade direction, qt , is inferred by the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. ∗∗
and ∗ denote rejection of a regression-based t test for the null hypothesis that D2C and D2D means are identical at
the 1% and 5% level, respectively, with inference is based on the Newey and West (1987) estimate of the covariance
matrix of coefﬁcient estimates. The sample period is October 2, 2013 to October 16, 2015 and comprises 51,108
(9,204) and 74,320 (10,720) outright D2C (D2D) trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY,
respectively, and 968 (344) and 1,283 (343) D2C (D2D) index rolls between ﬁve-year on-the-run and immediate
off-the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively.
and using alternative time windows when matching pairs of trades with the same characteris-
tics.
B.7.1 Robustness of Results to AlternativeMid-Quote
As a robustness check, we repeat Section 2.4 analyses using the mid-quote of a custom data
set that CMA made available to us. Table B.5 displays average effective half-spreads, realized
half-spreads, and price impacts of outright trades, index rolls, and delta exchanges that involve
ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs when using CMA mid-quotes to compute half-spreads and
price impacts. For outright trades, transaction costs based on CMA mid-quotes are almost
identical to those based on Markit mid-quotes. The main difference in comparison to Table 2.3
of the paper is the signiﬁcantly lower price impact of D2C index rolls in CDX.HY. This does not
seem to be due the different trades used because we obtain the same result when constraining
trades to be identical.
Table B.6 breaks down average effective half-spreads, realized half-spreads, and price impacts
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Dealer-To-Customer Dealer-To-Dealer D2C-D2D
Effc Rlzd Prc Effc Rlzd Prc Effc Rlzd Prc
Trade Size Sprd Sprd Imp Sprd Sprd Imp Sprd Sprd Imp
Panel A: CDX.IG
≤ 25 0.123 0.034 0.089 0.083 0.014 0.069 0.040∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.020∗∗
25–50 0.132 0.019 0.112 0.095 0.025 0.071 0.036∗∗ -0.006 0.042∗∗
50–100 0.146 0.016 0.130 0.095 0.049 0.046 0.051∗∗ -0.033∗∗ 0.084∗∗
> 100 0.170 0.049 0.121 0.121 0.133 -0.012 0.049∗∗ -0.084∗∗ 0.133∗∗
Panel B: CDX.HY
≤ 5 0.606 0.185 0.421 0.389 0.156 0.233 0.217∗∗ 0.029 0.188∗∗
5–10 0.644 0.134 0.511 0.410 0.135 0.275 0.235∗∗ -0.001 0.236∗∗
10–25 0.705 0.107 0.598 0.413 0.248 0.164 0.292∗∗ -0.141∗∗ 0.433∗∗
> 25 0.803 0.290 0.513 0.549 0.416 0.133 0.255∗∗ -0.126 0.381∗∗
Table B.6: Effective Half-Spreads, Realized Half-Spreads, and Price Impacts by Trade Size.
Panels A and B show sample means of effective half-spreads (EffcSprd), realized half-spreads (RlzdSprd), and price
impacts (PrcImp) of outright dealer-to-customer (D2C) and dealer-to-dealer (D2D) trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run
index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively. Sample means are separately computed for quartiles of the
trade size distribution. EffcSprd is deﬁned as qt × (pt −mt ), where pt is the transaction price and mt is the latest
mid-quote in the 15-minute period prior to trade execution. RlzdSprd is deﬁned as qt × (pt −mt+Δ), where mt+Δ
is the ﬁrst mid-quote in the 15-minute period that follows trade execution by 15 minutes. PrcImp is deﬁned as
qt × (mt+Δ−mt ). Both transaction prices and quotes are in terms of index CDS spreads and expressed in basis
points. Trade size is in USD million. Trade direction, qt , is inferred by the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. ∗∗ and
∗ denote rejection of a regression-based t test for the null hypothesis that D2C and D2D means are identical at
the 1% and 5% level, respectively, with inference based on the Newey and West (1987) estimate of the covariance
matrix of coefﬁcient estimates. The sample period is October 2, 2013 to October 16, 2015 and comprises 51,108
(9,204) and 74,320 (10,720) outright D2C (D2D) trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY,
respectively.
of outright trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs by quartiles of the trade size distribution.
Similar to what we observed for outright trades above, half-spreads and price impacts based on
CMA mid-quotes are quantitatively similar to those based on Markit mid-quotes and inference
regarding higher transaction costs and price impacts of D2C trades does not depend on the
particular mid-quote used.
Table B.7 displays regression results for outright trades. Qualitatively, we obtain the same
results as in the paper and, in case of some regression coefﬁcients, even quantitatively similar
estimates. Moreover, overall inference is unaltered, conﬁrming our earlier results that D2C
trades have both higher transaction costs and larger price impacts. The main difference in
comparison to Table 2.5 of the paper is the magnitude of coefﬁcient estimates on the bid-ask
spread and the mid-quote which suggest that, in comparison to Markit, CMA’s bid-ask spread
is a relatively less important explanatory variable while its mid-spread is a relatively more
important explanatory variable. This most likely reﬂects methodological differences.
Table B.8 displays regression results for index rolls. Results for CDX.IG index rolls are fairly
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CDX.IG CDX.HY
EffcSprd RlzdSprd PrcImp EffcSprd RlzdSprd PrcImp
D2C 0.122∗∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.093∗∗ 0.604∗∗ 0.174∗∗ 0.430∗∗
(60.43) (12.31) (29.99) (77.06) (16.29) (30.30)
D2D 0.088∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.066∗∗ 0.395∗∗ 0.183∗∗ 0.213∗∗
(32.30) (5.39) (14.84) (31.14) (8.23) (10.09)
MDM 0.008∗∗ -0.010∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.026∗∗ -0.053∗∗ 0.079∗∗
(5.14) (-3.61) (5.88) (3.83) (-4.38) (6.67)
LRG 0.018∗∗ -0.011∗∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.074∗∗ -0.067∗∗ 0.141∗∗
(8.45) (-3.15) (7.99) (9.15) (-5.03) (9.24)
BLCK 0.044∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.195∗∗ 0.105∗∗ 0.090∗∗
(16.45) (4.90) (6.97) (20.15) (6.17) (5.38)
RFRNC 0.020∗∗ 0.028∗∗ -0.008 0.123∗∗ 0.162∗∗ -0.040
(7.00) (5.60) (-1.61) (6.70) (5.50) (-1.40)
BAS 0.284∗∗ 0.051 0.233∗∗ 0.242∗∗ 0.083∗∗ 0.159∗∗
(5.77) (1.03) (3.44) (9.81) (2.64) (3.67)
SPRD/100 0.145∗∗ 0.036 0.108∗ 0.148∗∗ 0.002 0.146∗
(3.97) (1.05) (2.30) (3.72) (0.05) (2.35)
VLTLTY 0.209∗∗ -0.134∗∗ 0.343∗∗ 1.257∗∗ -0.249 1.507∗∗
(5.19) (-3.11) (5.78) (7.93) (-1.35) (5.53)
N 60,312 60,312 60,312 85,040 85,040 85,040
D2C−D2D 0.034 0.007 0.027 0.209 -0.009 0.218
p-value <0.01 0.08 <0.01 <0.01 0.67 <0.01
Table B.7: Regressions Controlling for Outright Trade Characteristics and Market Conditions.
The table shows OLS estimates of regression speciﬁcations that control for selection bias in the comparison of
effective half-spreads (EffcSprd), realized half-spreads (RlzdSprd), and price impacts (PrcImp) of outright dealer-
to-customer (D2C) and dealer-to-dealer (D2D) trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY
(t-statistics based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors are shown in parenthesis). EffcSprd is deﬁned as
qt × (pt −mt ), where pt is the transaction price and mt is the latest mid-quote in the 15-minute period prior
to trade execution. RlzdSprd is deﬁned as qt × (pt −mt+Δ), where mt+Δ is the ﬁrst mid-quote in the 15-minute
period that follows trade execution by 15 minutes. PrcImp is deﬁned as qt × (mt+Δ −mt ). Both transaction
prices and quotes are in terms of index CDS spreads and expressed in basis points (bps). Trade direction, qt , is
inferred by the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. The explanatory variables include dummy variables for D2C
trades (D2C), for D2D trades (D2D), for medium-sized trades (MDM; USD 25–50 MM for CDX.IG and USD 5–10
MM for CDX.HY), for large-sized trades (LRG; USD 50–100 MM for CDX.IG and USD 10–25 MM for CDX.HY),
for block-sized trades (BLCK; +USD 100 MM for CDX.IG and +USD 25 MM for CDX.HY), and for trades with
transaction prices at typical reference levels (RFRNC; index CDS spread multiples 0.5 bps for CDX.IG and price
multiples of 0.125% for CDX.HY), the bid-ask spread of the latest quote for the ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDS
(BAS), the corresponding mid-quote (SPRD), and the implied volatility of three-month at-the-money swaptions on
the ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDS (VLTLTY). Continuous explanatory variables are demeaned. The prior to last
row shows the difference between D2C and D2D coefﬁcient estimates and the last row shows the p-value of a Wald
test for the null hypothesis that D2C and D2D coefﬁcients are identical. ∗∗ and ∗ denote statistical signiﬁcance at
the 1% and 5% level, respectively. The sample period is October 2, 2013 to October 16, 2015 and comprises 51,108
(9,204) and 74,320 (10,720) outright D2C (D2D) trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY,
respectively.
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CDX.IG CDX.HY
EffcSprd RlzdSprd PrcImp EffcSprd RlzdSprd PrcImp
D2C 0.053∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.395∗∗ 0.255∗∗ 0.141∗∗
(12.01) (5.45) (5.02) (15.66) (9.56) (5.12)
D2D 0.066∗∗ 0.046∗∗ 0.019∗ 0.479∗∗ 0.125∗∗ 0.355∗∗
(8.36) (4.37) (2.23) (6.78) (2.86) (7.27)
BLCK -0.003 -0.007 0.004 0.005 -0.016 0.021
(-0.63) (-1.03) (0.62) (0.13) (-0.46) (0.65)
BAS 0.193∗∗ 0.109 0.085 0.081∗∗ 0.024 0.057
(2.83) (1.45) (1.22) (2.63) (0.50) (1.16)
SPRD/100 0.021 0.068 -0.047 0.069 0.057 0.012
(0.50) (1.04) (-0.92) (1.74) (1.09) (0.28)
VLTLTY 0.040 -0.106 0.145∗ 0.630∗∗ 0.309 0.321
(0.61) (-1.61) (2.08) (2.93) (1.05) (1.04)
N 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,626 1,626 1,626
D2C−D2D -0.013 -0.022 0.009 -0.084 0.130 -0.214
p-value 0.13 0.08 0.43 0.14 <0.01 <0.01
Table B.8: Regressions Controlling for Index Roll Characteristics and Market Conditions.
The table shows OLS estimates of regression speciﬁcations that control for selection bias in the comparison
of effective half-spreads (EffcSprd), realized half-spreads (RlzdSprd), and price impacts (PrcImp) of dealer-to-
customer (D2C) and dealer-to-dealer (D2D) index rolls between ﬁve-year on-the-run and immediate off-the-run
index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY (t-statistics based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors are shown in
parenthesis). EffcSprd is deﬁned as qt × (pt −mt ), where pt is the difference between on-the-run and immediate
off-the-run transaction prices and mt is the difference between the latest on-the-run and immediate off-the-run
mid-quotes in the 15-minute period prior to trade execution. RlzdSprd is deﬁned as qt × (pt −mt+Δ), where mt+Δ
is the ﬁrst mid-quote in the 15-minute period that follows trade execution by 15 minutes. PrcImp is deﬁned as
qt × (mt+Δ−mt ). Both transaction prices and quotes are in terms of index CDS spreads and expressed in basis
points (bps). Trade direction, qt , is inferred by the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. The explanatory variables
include dummy variables for D2C trades (D2C), for D2D trades (D2D), and for block-sized trades (BLCK;+USD 100
MM for CDX.IG and +USD 25 MM for CDX.HY), the bid-ask spread of the latest quote for the ﬁve-year on-the-run
index CDS (BAS), the corresponding mid-quote (SPRD), and the implied volatility of three-month at-the-money
swaptions on the ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDS (VLTLTY). Continuous explanatory variables are demeaned.
The prior to last row shows the difference between D2C and D2D coefﬁcient estimates and the last row shows
the p-value of a Wald test for the null hypothesis that D2C and D2D coefﬁcients are identical. ∗∗ and ∗ denote
statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. The sample period is October 2, 2013 to October 16,
2015 and comprises 968 (344) and 1,283 (343) D2C (D2D) index rolls between ﬁve-year on-the-run and immediate
off-the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively.
consistent with those of the paper, but there seem to be some differences between the index
roll mid-quotes that implied by Markit and CMA mid-quotes. Nevertheless, both sets of result
are qualitatively consistent, in that we either do not ﬁnd differences in transaction costs of D2C
and D2D index rolls or in that the difference are fully accounted for by trade characteristics
and market conditions. For CDX.HY index rolls, we note that the signiﬁcantly lower price
impact of D2C index rolls cannot be explained by roll characteristics and market conditions.
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Dealer-To-Customer Dealer-To-Dealer D2C-D2D
Matching Effc Rlzd Prc Effc Rlzd Prc Effc Rlzd Prc
Trade Size Sprd Sprd Imp Sprd Sprd Imp Sprd Sprd Imp
Panel A: CDX.IG
≤ 25 0.116 0.038 0.078 0.087 0.016 0.071 0.029∗∗ 0.022∗ 0.007
25–50 0.125 0.020 0.105 0.102 0.021 0.082 0.022∗∗ -0.001 0.023∗
50–100 0.127 -0.001 0.128 0.105 0.049 0.056 0.022∗ -0.050∗ 0.072∗∗
> 100 0.154 0.096 0.057 0.113 0.129 -0.016 0.041 -0.033 0.074∗
Exact 0.122 0.027 0.095 0.098 0.019 0.079 0.024∗∗ 0.008 0.016∗
Panel B: CDX.HY
≤ 5 0.567 0.160 0.408 0.393 0.147 0.246 0.175∗∗ 0.013 0.162∗∗
5–10 0.586 0.129 0.458 0.444 0.146 0.298 0.142∗∗ -0.018 0.160∗∗
10–25 0.622 0.071 0.551 0.437 0.228 0.209 0.185∗∗ -0.157∗∗ 0.342∗∗
> 25 0.621 0.152 0.469 0.484 0.349 0.135 0.137 -0.197 0.334∗
Exact 0.595 0.104 0.491 0.438 0.154 0.284 0.157∗∗ -0.049 0.206∗∗
Table B.9: Effective Half-Spreads, Realized Half-Spreads, and Price Impacts of Matched Pairs.
Panels A and B show sample means of effective half-spreads (EffcSprd), realized half-spreads (RlzdSprd), and price
impacts (PrcImp) of matched pairs of outright dealer-to-customer (D2C) and dealer-to-dealer (D2D) trades in
ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively. Sample means are separately computed for
quartiles of the trade size distribution. EffcSprd is deﬁned as qt × (pt −mt ), where pt is the transaction price and
mt is the latest mid-quote in the 15-minute period prior to trade execution. RlzdSprd is deﬁned as qt ×(pt −mt+Δ),
where mt+Δ is the ﬁrst mid-quote in the 15-minute period that follows trade execution by 15 minutes. PrcImp is
deﬁned as qt × (mt+Δ−mt ). Both transaction prices and quotes are in terms of index CDS spreads and expressed
in basis points. Trade size is in USD million. Trade direction, qt , is inferred by the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm.
A pair consists of a D2D trade and matching D2C trade in the same index CDS and with trade size in the same
quartile of the trade size distribution (or with identical trade size) that occur within a 15-minute window bracketing
the D2D trade. In case of more than one matching D2C trade, the EffcSprd, RlzdSprd, and PrcImp of the D2C trade
of the pair are averages of the matching D2C trades. ∗∗ and ∗ denote rejection of a regression-based t test for the
null hypothesis that the mean of the distribution of paired differences is zero at the 1% and 5% level, respectively,
with inference based on the Newey and West (1987) estimate of the covariance matrix of coefﬁcient estimates.
The sample period is October 2, 2013 to October 16, 2015 and comprises 4,794 (3,441) and 6,730 (5,314) (exactly)
matched pairs of outright D2C and D2D trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY,
respectively.
Table B.9 displays the results of the matched pair analysis. Results are consistent with both the
matched pair analysis based on Markit mid-quotes and the regression-based adjustment for
selection biases in Table B.7.
B.7.2 5- and 30-Minute Realized Half-Spreads and Price Impacts
Table B.10 displays average effective half-spreads, realized half-spreads, and price impacts
when we use 5- and 30-minute periods instead of 15-minute periods to compute realized half-
spreads and price impacts. Consistent with information getting gradually incorporated into
prices, shorter period price impacts are smaller than longer period price impacts. Regardless
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Dealer-To-Customer Dealer-To-Dealer D2C-D2D
Effc Rlzd Prc Effc Rlzd Prc Effc Rlzd Prc
Trade Size Sprd Sprd Imp Sprd Sprd Imp Sprd Sprd Imp
Panel A1: CDX.IG 5-Minute Period
≤ 25 0.121 0.060 0.061 0.082 0.041 0.042 0.039∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.019∗∗
25–50 0.131 0.057 0.074 0.096 0.047 0.049 0.035∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.025∗∗
50–100 0.143 0.059 0.084 0.091 0.069 0.021 0.052∗∗ -0.010 0.062∗∗
> 100 0.168 0.092 0.076 0.123 0.139 -0.016 0.044∗∗ -0.047∗∗ 0.092∗∗
Panel A2: CDX.IG 30-Minute Period
≤ 25 0.122 0.032 0.090 0.082 0.011 0.071 0.040∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.019∗∗
25–50 0.132 0.018 0.114 0.096 0.018 0.078 0.036∗∗ 0.000 0.036∗∗
50–100 0.143 0.022 0.122 0.090 0.045 0.045 0.053∗∗ -0.024 0.077∗∗
> 100 0.170 0.045 0.125 0.127 0.164 -0.037 0.042∗∗ -0.119∗∗ 0.162∗∗
Panel B1: CDX.HY 5-Minute Period
≤ 5 0.606 0.295 0.311 0.388 0.202 0.186 0.218∗∗ 0.093∗∗ 0.125∗∗
5–10 0.639 0.277 0.362 0.416 0.233 0.184 0.223∗∗ 0.044∗∗ 0.179∗∗
10–25 0.702 0.291 0.411 0.397 0.269 0.128 0.305∗∗ 0.022 0.283∗∗
> 25 0.803 0.466 0.337 0.505 0.553 -0.048 0.298∗∗ -0.087 0.385∗∗
Panel B2: CDX.HY 30-Minute Period
≤ 5 0.605 0.167 0.437 0.386 0.131 0.255 0.219∗∗ 0.036 0.183∗∗
5–10 0.637 0.118 0.520 0.414 0.139 0.274 0.224∗∗ -0.022 0.245∗∗
10–25 0.700 0.101 0.599 0.394 0.206 0.188 0.306∗∗ -0.105∗ 0.411∗∗
> 25 0.801 0.235 0.566 0.477 0.401 0.076 0.324∗∗ -0.166 0.490∗∗
Table B.10: Effective Half-Spreads, Realized Half-Spreads, and Price Impacts by Trade Size.
Panels A and B show sample means of effective half-spreads (EffcSprd), realized half-spreads (RlzdSprd), and price
impacts (PrcImp) of outright dealer-to-customer (D2C) and dealer-to-dealer (D2D) trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run
index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively. Sample means are separately computed for quartiles of the
trade size distribution. EffcSprd is deﬁned as qt × (pt −mt ), where pt is the transaction price and mt is the latest
mid-quote in the 5-minute (Panels A1 and B1) or 30-minute (Panels A2 or B2) period prior to trade execution.
RlzdSprd is deﬁned as qt × (pt −mt+Δ), where mt+Δ is the ﬁrst mid-quote in the 5-minute (Panels A1 and B1) or
30-minute (Panels A2 or B2) period that follows trade execution by 5 minutes (Panels A1 and B1) or 30 minute
(Panels A2 and B2). PrcImp is deﬁned as qt × (mt+Δ−mt ). Both transaction prices and quotes are in terms of
index CDS spreads and expressed in basis points. Trade size is in USD million. Trade direction, qt , is inferred by
the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. ∗∗ and ∗ denote rejection of a regression-based t test for the null hypothesis
that D2C and D2D means are identical at the 1% and 5% level, respectively, with inference based on the Newey
and West (1987) estimate of the covariance matrix of coefﬁcient estimates. The sample period is October 2, 2013
to October 16, 2015 and comprises 48,316 and 50,084 (8,559 and 8,864) and 68,264 and 71,603 (9,642 and 10,246)
outright D2C (D2D) trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY in case of 5- and 30-minute
periods, respectively.
of the period used, the price impact of D2C trades is signiﬁcantly larger than that of D2D trades.
When changing period lengths, we also adjust our deﬁnition of what constitutes a recent quote
in that we base mid-quote computation on the latest quote in the 5- and 30-minute period
prior to trade execution. As can be seen from Table B.10, it does not matter whether we require
the quote to come from the latest 5- or 30-minute period because quotes are revised frequently
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CDX.IG CDX.HY
EffcSprd RlzdSprd PrcImp EffcSprd RlzdSprd PrcImp
D2C 0.120∗∗ 0.057∗∗ 0.063∗∗ 0.612∗∗ 0.288∗∗ 0.323∗∗
(67.42) (43.49) (36.48) (72.58) (47.64) (37.57)
D2D 0.088∗∗ 0.045∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.395∗∗ 0.232∗∗ 0.163∗∗
(31.55) (17.57) (16.47) (27.72) (15.22) (13.65)
MDM 0.008∗∗ -0.002 0.010∗∗ 0.014 -0.020∗∗ 0.034∗∗
(5.58) (-1.30) (6.39) (1.90) (-2.74) (5.18)
LRG 0.016∗∗ 0.001 0.014∗∗ 0.062∗∗ -0.007 0.069∗∗
(8.29) (0.64) (7.90) (8.10) (-1.06) (9.27)
BLCK 0.042∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.188∗∗ 0.171∗∗ 0.017
(17.42) (13.34) (3.80) (19.39) (15.34) (1.88)
RFRNC 0.020∗∗ 0.022∗∗ -0.003 0.112∗∗ 0.136∗∗ -0.024
(7.73) (7.61) (-1.18) (5.94) (6.47) (-1.81)
BAS 0.442∗∗ 0.116∗∗ 0.325∗∗ 0.344∗∗ 0.139∗∗ 0.205∗∗
(7.78) (4.88) (6.14) (10.49) (6.78) (7.30)
SPRD/100 0.026 0.044∗ -0.018 0.071∗ 0.013 0.058
(0.71) (2.39) (-0.48) (2.12) (0.75) (1.88)
VLTLTY 0.196∗∗ -0.010 0.206∗∗ 1.182∗∗ 0.185∗ 0.997∗∗
(5.86) (-0.49) (6.15) (6.95) (1.98) (5.62)
N 56,875 56,875 56,875 77,906 77,906 77,906
D2C−D2D 0.032 0.013 0.020 0.217 0.056 0.161
p-value <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Table B.11: Regressions Controlling for Outright Trade Characteristics and Market Conditions.
The table shows OLS estimates of regression speciﬁcations that control for selection bias in the comparison of
effective half-spreads (EffcSprd), realized half-spreads (RlzdSprd), and price impacts (PrcImp) of outright dealer-
to-customer (D2C) and dealer-to-dealer (D2D) trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY
(t-statistics based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors are shown in parenthesis). EffcSprd is deﬁned as
qt×(pt−mt ), where pt is the transaction price andmt is the latest mid-quote in the 5-minute period prior to trade
execution. RlzdSprd is deﬁned as qt × (pt −mt+Δ), where mt+Δ is the ﬁrst mid-quote in the 5-minute period that
follows trade execution by 5 minutes. PrcImp is deﬁned as qt × (mt+Δ−mt ). Both transaction prices and quotes
are in terms of index CDS spreads and expressed in basis points (bps). Trade direction, qt , is inferred by the Lee and
Ready (1991) algorithm. The explanatory variables include dummy variables for D2C trades (D2C), for D2D trades
(D2D), for medium-sized trades (MDM; USD 25–50 MM for CDX.IG and USD 5–10 MM for CDX.HY), for large-sized
trades (LRG; USD 50–100 MM for CDX.IG and USD 10–25 MM for CDX.HY), for block-sized trades (BLCK; +USD
100 MM for CDX.IG and +USD 25 MM for CDX.HY), and for trades with transaction prices at typical reference
levels (RFRNC; index CDS spread multiples 0.5 bps for CDX.IG and price multiples of 0.125% for CDX.HY), the
bid-ask spread of the latest quote for the ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDS (BAS), the corresponding mid-quote
(SPRD), and the implied volatility of three-month at-the-money swaptions on the ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDS
(VLTLTY). Continuous explanatory variables are demeaned. The prior to last row shows the difference between
D2C and D2D coefﬁcient estimates and the last row shows the p-value of a Wald test for the null hypothesis that
D2C and D2D coefﬁcients are identical. ∗∗ and ∗ denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
The sample period is October 2, 2013 to October 16, 2015 and comprises 48,316 (8,559) and 68,264 (9,642) outright
D2C (D2D) trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively.
156
B.7. Robustness Checks
CDX.IG CDX.HY
EffcSprd RlzdSprd PrcImp EffcSprd RlzdSprd PrcImp
D2C 0.121∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.094∗∗ 0.611∗∗ 0.156∗∗ 0.455∗∗
(65.53) (7.90) (24.20) (73.64) (8.89) (27.49)
D2D 0.088∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.068∗∗ 0.393∗∗ 0.158∗∗ 0.235∗∗
(31.67) (3.44) (11.13) (28.74) (4.16) (7.09)
MDM 0.008∗∗ -0.010∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.013 -0.048∗∗ 0.061∗∗
(5.49) (-2.62) (4.57) (1.82) (-2.68) (3.49)
LRG 0.015∗∗ -0.005 0.020∗∗ 0.061∗∗ -0.059∗∗ 0.119∗∗
(7.86) (-1.21) (4.55) (7.83) (-3.15) (6.26)
BLCK 0.043∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.188∗∗ 0.066∗ 0.122∗∗
(17.20) (3.18) (5.09) (19.52) (2.56) (5.53)
RFRNC 0.021∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.002 0.108∗∗ 0.189∗∗ -0.081∗
(7.92) (2.62) (0.23) (5.94) (4.70) (-2.35)
BAS 0.444∗∗ 0.119 0.325∗∗ 0.346∗∗ 0.074 0.272∗∗
(8.36) (1.11) (2.73) (10.99) (0.80) (3.26)
SPRD/100 0.021 0.042 -0.021 0.065∗ -0.027 0.092
(0.60) (0.65) (-0.29) (2.00) (-0.50) (1.76)
VLTLTY 0.205∗∗ -0.131 0.335∗∗ 1.203∗∗ -0.395 1.599∗∗
(6.02) (-1.87) (4.02) (7.18) (-1.11) (4.45)
N 58,948 58,948 58,948 81,849 81,849 81,849
D2C−D2D 0.033 0.008 0.025 0.218 -0.002 0.220
p-value <0.01 0.20 <0.01 <0.01 0.95 <0.01
Table B.12: Regressions Controlling for Outright Trade Characteristics and Market Conditions.
The table shows OLS estimates of regression speciﬁcations that control for selection bias in the comparison of
effective half-spreads (EffcSprd), realized half-spreads (RlzdSprd), and price impacts (PrcImp) of outright dealer-
to-customer (D2C) and dealer-to-dealer (D2D) trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY
(t-statistics based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors are shown in parenthesis). EffcSprd is deﬁned as
qt × (pt −mt ), where pt is the transaction price and mt is the latest mid-quote in the 30-minute period prior
to trade execution. RlzdSprd is deﬁned as qt × (pt −mt+Δ), where mt+Δ is the ﬁrst mid-quote in the 30-minute
period that follows trade execution by 30 minutes. PrcImp is deﬁned as qt × (mt+Δ −mt ). Both transaction
prices and quotes are in terms of index CDS spreads and expressed in basis points (bps). Trade direction, qt , is
inferred by the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. The explanatory variables include dummy variables for D2C
trades (D2C), for D2D trades (D2D), for medium-sized trades (MDM; USD 25–50 MM for CDX.IG and USD 5–10
MM for CDX.HY), for large-sized trades (LRG; USD 50–100 MM for CDX.IG and USD 10–25 MM for CDX.HY),
for block-sized trades (BLCK; +USD 100 MM for CDX.IG and +USD 25 MM for CDX.HY), and for trades with
transaction prices at typical reference levels (RFRNC; index CDS spread multiples 0.5 bps for CDX.IG and price
multiples of 0.125% for CDX.HY), the bid-ask spread of the latest quote for the ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDS
(BAS), the corresponding mid-quote (SPRD), and the implied volatility of three-month at-the-money swaptions on
the ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDS (VLTLTY). Continuous explanatory variables are demeaned. The prior to last
row shows the difference between D2C and D2D coefﬁcient estimates and the last row shows the p-value of a Wald
test for the null hypothesis that D2C and D2D coefﬁcients are identical. ∗∗ and ∗ denote statistical signiﬁcance at
the 1% and 5% level, respectively. The sample period is October 2, 2013 to October 16, 2015 and comprises 50,084
(8,864) and 71,603 (10,246) outright D2C (D2D) trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY,
respectively.
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enough.50
Tables B.11 and B.12 show trade-by-trade regression results when we use 5- and 30-minute
periods to compute mid-quotes, realized half-spreads, and price impacts. The signs of coefﬁ-
cient estimates and their magnitudes are consistent with those based on a 15-minute period
and, generally speaking, inference is not affected either. The exception is the 30-minute price
impact of block-sized trades in CDX.HY index CDSs, which is no longer signiﬁcantly lower than
the one of trades with trade size in the third quartile of the trade size distribution. This is due
to the fact that many of the block-sized trades are block eligible and, therefore, disseminated
with a delay of usually 15 minutes.
B.7.3 TimeWindow inMatched Pair Analysis
The matched pairs of trades that we consider in the paper consist of a D2D trade and D2C
match with trade size in the same quartile of the trade size distribution that occurs within a
15-minute window bracketing the execution of the D2D trade. Table B.13 shows what happens
if instead we consider matches that occur within a 5- or 30-minute window bracketing trade
execution. In shorter windows there are less matches than in longer windows, but in general
the results for different window sizes are quite consistent. For most trade sizes that we consider
(and in case that we require trade sizes to match exactly), pairs consist of D2C trades that have
signiﬁcantly higher transaction costs and larger price impacts than the D2D trades whose
characteristics they are supposed to reﬂect.
B.8 Standard Error Computation
This section provides details about how we compute the standard errors of cumulative impulse
responses and their long-run limits in the vector autoregressive (VAR) model.
B.8.1 Standard Errors of Cumulative Impulse Responses
In order to simplify the presentation, we express the VAR system in Equations (2.3a) to (2.3c)
by a single (implicit) vector-valued equation; that is,
yt =Φ0yt +Φ1yt−1+·· ·+Φp yt−p +t (B.1)
where yt =
(
Δmt , xD2Ct , x
D2D
t
)′ ∈ RK , t = (Δmt , x,D2Ct , x,D2Dt )′ ∈ RK , K = 3, and p = 10. We
also generalize the presentation to allow for vector-valued trade-related variables, xD2Ct ∈RN
and xD2Dt ∈ RN , in which case yt =
(
Δmt ,
(
xD2Ct
)′, (xD2Dt )′)′ ∈ RK , K = 2N +1, and, similarly,
t =
(
Δmt ,
(
x,D2Ct
)′, (x,D2Dt )′)′ ∈ RK , with x,D2Ct and x,D2Dt having zero conditional means
50On average, there are 457.34 and 402.14 composite quotes per day for ﬁve-year on-the-run CDX.IG and CDX.HY,
respectively, around 97% of which occur in the ten-and-a-half-hour period from 7:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. New York
time. This suggest that during this period a composite quote is computed every one and a half minutes, on average.
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Dealer-To-Customer Dealer-To-Dealer D2C-D2D
Matching Effc Rlzd Prc Effc Rlzd Prc Effc Rlzd Prc
Trade Size Sprd Sprd Imp Sprd Sprd Imp Sprd Sprd Imp
Panel A1: CDX.IG 5-Minute Window
≤ 25 0.117 0.032 0.085 0.085 0.012 0.073 0.031∗∗ 0.020∗ 0.012
25–50 0.128 0.028 0.101 0.111 0.011 0.100 0.017∗ 0.017 0.001
50–100 0.136 0.014 0.121 0.118 0.084 0.034 0.018 -0.070∗ 0.087∗∗
> 100 0.162 0.115 0.047 0.092 0.120 -0.028 0.071∗∗ -0.005 0.075∗∗
Exact 0.127 0.028 0.099 0.101 0.013 0.089 0.026∗∗ 0.015 0.011
Panel A2: CDX.IG 30-Minute Window
≤ 25 0.115 0.036 0.079 0.084 0.017 0.067 0.031∗∗ 0.019∗ 0.012
25–50 0.120 0.029 0.091 0.101 0.017 0.084 0.020∗∗ 0.012 0.008
50–100 0.130 0.025 0.105 0.092 0.049 0.043 0.039∗∗ -0.024 0.063∗∗
> 100 0.143 0.100 0.043 0.115 0.159 -0.044 0.028 -0.060 0.088∗∗
Exact 0.120 0.026 0.094 0.095 0.022 0.073 0.025∗∗ 0.004 0.021∗∗
Panel B1: CDX.HY 5-Minute Window
≤ 5 0.602 0.114 0.488 0.417 0.088 0.329 0.185∗∗ 0.026 0.159∗∗
5–10 0.609 0.126 0.483 0.490 0.199 0.291 0.119∗∗ -0.073 0.193∗∗
10–25 0.601 0.098 0.503 0.463 0.306 0.157 0.137∗∗ -0.208∗ 0.346∗∗
> 25 0.696 -0.010 0.706 0.422 0.335 0.086 0.274 -0.345∗ 0.620∗
Exact 0.608 0.082 0.526 0.473 0.160 0.313 0.135∗∗ -0.078 0.213∗∗
Panel B2: CDX.HY 30-Minute Window
≤ 5 0.570 0.160 0.410 0.371 0.091 0.280 0.199∗∗ 0.069 0.131∗∗
5–10 0.572 0.135 0.436 0.433 0.161 0.272 0.139∗∗ -0.026 0.164∗∗
10–25 0.602 0.127 0.475 0.398 0.207 0.192 0.203∗∗ -0.080 0.283∗∗
> 25 0.661 0.223 0.438 0.457 0.514 -0.057 0.205∗∗ -0.291∗ 0.495∗∗
Exact 0.588 0.123 0.465 0.415 0.143 0.272 0.174∗∗ -0.020 0.193∗∗
Table B.13: Effective Half-Spreads, Realized Half-Spreads, and Price Impacts of Matched Pairs.
Panels A and B show sample means of effective half-spreads (EffcSprd), realized half-spreads (RlzdSprd), and price
impacts (PrcImp) of matched pairs of outright dealer-to-customer (D2C) and dealer-to-dealer (D2D) trades in
ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively. Sample means are separately computed for
quartiles of the trade size distribution. EffcSprd is deﬁned as qt × (pt −mt ), where pt is the transaction price and
mt is the latest mid-quote in the 15-minute period prior to trade execution. RlzdSprd is deﬁned as qt ×(pt −mt+Δ),
where mt+Δ is the ﬁrst mid-quote in the 15-minute period that follows trade execution by 15 minutes. PrcImp is
deﬁned as qt × (mt+Δ−mt ). Both transaction prices and quotes are in terms of index CDS spreads and expressed
in basis points. Trade size is in USD million. Trade direction, qt , is inferred by the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm.
A pair consists of a D2D trade and matching D2C trade in the same index CDS and with trade size in the same
quartile of the trade size distribution (or with identical trade size) that occur within a 5-minute (Panels A1 and B1)
or 30-minute (Panels A2 and B2) window bracketing the D2D trade. In case of more than one matching D2C
trade, the EffcSprd, RlzdSprd, and PrcImp of the D2C trade of the pair are averages of the matching D2C trades.
∗∗ and ∗ denote rejection of a regression-based t test for the null hypothesis that the mean of the distribution of
paired differences is zero at the 1% and 5% level, respectively, with inference based on the Newey and West (1987)
estimate of the covariance matrix of coefﬁcient estimates. The sample period is October 2, 2013 to October 16,
2015 and comprises 2,331 and 6,392 (1,548 and 4,939) and 3,437 and 8,249 (2,502 and 7,047) (exactly) matched
pairs of outright D2C and D2D trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY within 5- and
30-minute windows, respectively.
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and conditional covariances given by Σx,D2C and Σx,D2D, respectively.
The K ×K -dimensional coefﬁcient matrices in Equation (B.1) are given by
Φ0 =
⎛⎜⎝ 0 β
′
0 γ
′
0
0N 0N×N 0N×N
0N λ0 0N×N
⎞⎟⎠ and Φ j =
⎛⎜⎝ α j β
′
j γ
′
j
δ j ζ j η j
κ j λ j ρ j
⎞⎟⎠ , j = 1, . . . , p, (B.2)
where 0n and 0n×m denote a n-dimensional vector and a m×n matrix of zeros, respectively,
β j , γ j , δ j , and κ j are N-dimensional vectors, and ζ j , η j , λ j , and ρ j are N ×N matrices.
Let θΔm = (β′0, γ′0, α1, β′1, γ′1, . . . , αp , β′p , γ′p ) ∈ RnΔm , nΔm = K − 1+ pK = 2N + pK , be
the coefﬁcients of Equation (2.3a), let θx,D2C = vec([δ1, ζ1, η1, . . . , δp , ζp , ηp ]′) ∈ Rnx,D2C ,
nx,D2C = pKN, be the coefﬁcients of the vector-valued generalization of Equation (2.3b), and
let θx,D2D = vec([λ0, κ1, λ1, ρ1, . . . , κp , λp , ρp ]′) ∈ Rnx,D2D , nx,D2D = N2+pKN, be the coefﬁ-
cients of the vector-valued generalization of Equation (2.3c). (Note that θx,D2C and θx,D2D
stack coefﬁcients of the N equations of the vector-valued generalizations of Equations (2.3b)
and (2.3c), respectively.) We further collect individual coefﬁcients in a n-dimensional coefﬁ-
cient vector θ = (θ′Δm , θ′x,D2C, θ′x,D2D)′ ∈Rn , n =K −1+pK 2+N2 = 2N +pK 2+N2.
Coefﬁcient estimates are obtained by separately estimating each equation of the VAR system by
OLS. We assume that the stacked single-equation OLS coefﬁcient estimates are asymptotically
normal

T (θ̂−θ) d−→
T→∞
N (0n ,V ), (B.3)
with block-diagonal covariance matrix V given by51
V =
⎛⎜⎝ VΔm 0nΔm×nx,D2C 0nΔm×nx,D2D0nx,D2C×nΔm Vx,D2C 0nx,D2C×nx,D2D
0nx,D2D×nΔm 0nx,D2D×nx,D2C Vx,D2D
⎞⎟⎠ , (B.4)
where VΔm , Vx,D2C, and Vx,D2D are the asymptotic covariance matrices of θ̂Δm , θ̂x,D2C, and
θ̂x,D2D, respectively.
The impulse response function,Ψs , s = 0, 1, . . . , of the VAR system in Equation (B.1) tracks
how an isolated unit-sized shock to one of the system variables propagates through the system.
Speciﬁcally, (Ψs)i , j is the value of the i-th system variable s periods after a one unit shock
of the j -the variable under the assumption that the system is in steady state initially, i.e.,
yt−1 = ·· · = yt−p = 0K .52 Because Equation (B.1) deﬁnes yt implicitly, contemporaneous
51V is block diagonal because we resolve contemporaneous effects between quote changes, Δmt , and trade-
related variables, xD2Ct and x
D2D
t , while contemporaneous effects between the elements thatmake up trade-related
variables are not resolved, i.e., Σx,D2C and Σx,D2D are non-diagonal.
52As mentioned above, contemporaneous effects between the elements that make up trade-related variables
are not resolved. Thus, the (Ψs )i , j in case that N > 3 ignore the fact that shocks to elements that make up xD2Ct
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responses are given by
Ψ0 = (IK −Φ0)−1. (B.5)
First-period responses take into account that the previous-period response isΨ0. Solving for
the implicitly deﬁned yt+1s (one for each unit-sized shock) gives
Ψ1 =Ψ0Φ1Ψ0. (B.6)
Similarly, second-period responses take into account that previous-period responses areΨ1
andΨ0, respectively. Solving for the implicitly deﬁned yt+2s gives
Ψ2 =Ψ0(Φ1Ψ1+Φ2Ψ0). (B.7)
Continuing in this fashion shows that the impulse response function of the VAR system in
Equation (B.1) satisﬁes the following recursive relation
Ψs =Ψ0(Φ1Ψs−1+Φ2Ψs−2+·· ·+ΦpΨs−p ), s = 1, 2, . . . , (B.8)
with initial valuesΨ0 = (IK −Φ0)−1 andΨs = 0K×K for all s < 0.53
Equations (B.5) to (B.8) show that the elements of eachΨs are continuous functions of the
parameter vector θ. Given an estimate of the latter,Ψs can be estimated and the estimate’s
asymptotic distribution follows by an application of the delta method. Speciﬁcally, the asymp-
totic distribution of the estimate ofψs = vec(Ψ′s) is given by

T (ψ̂s −ψs) d−→
T→∞
N (0K 2 ,GsVG
′
s), (B.9)
where the K 2×n matrixGs = ∂ψs/∂θ′ denotes the Jacobian.
Due to Equation (B.8), Jacobian matrices satisfy a recursive relation as well; that is,
Gs =(Ψ0⊗ [Ψ′s−1, Ψ′s−2, . . . , Ψ′s−p ])
∂vec([Φ1, Φ2, . . . , Φp ]′)
∂θ′
+ (Ψ0[Φ1, Φ2, . . . , Φp ]⊗ IK )[G ′s−1, G ′s−2, . . . , G ′s−p ]′
+ (IK ⊗ (Ψ′s−1Φ′1+Ψ′s−2Φ′2+·· ·+Ψ′s−pΦ′p ))G0
(B.10)
for s > 0,
G0 = (Ψ0⊗Ψ′0)
∂vec(Φ′0)
∂θ′
, (B.11)
(xD2Dt ) are contemporaneously correlated with shocks to the remaining elements of x
D2C
t (x
D2D
t ). This is not an
issue because in our application we only consider simultaneous shocks to all D2C (D2D) trade-related variables.
53Note thatΨs , s = 0, 1, . . . , are the coefﬁcient matrices of the vector moving average representation of the VAR
system in Equations (2.4a) to (2.4c).
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andGs = 0K 2×n for s < 0.
Finally, note that cumulative impulse responses,Λs =∑su=0Ψu , s = 0, 1, . . . , are linear combi-
nations ofΨu with 0≤ u ≤ s. Thus, s = vec(Λ′s)=Rsπs , where Rs = (1′s+1⊗ IK 2 ), 1n denotes a
n-dimensional vector of ones, and πs denotes the ns-dimensional vector of stackedψus with
0≤u ≤ s, i.e., πs = [ψ′0, ψ′1, . . . , ψ′s]′, where ns = (s+1)K 2. It follows from Equation (B.9) that

T (π̂s −πs) d−→
T→∞
N (0ns ,HsV H
′
s), (B.12)
where Hs = [G ′0, G ′1, . . . , G ′s]′ and, consequently,

T (̂s −s) d−→
T→∞
N (0,RsHsV H
′
sR
′
s). (B.13)
B.8.2 Standard Error of Price Impact
In the VAR system, price impact is captured by the long-run cumulative impulse response
of mid-quote revisions in response to unit-sized shocks of trade-related variables. Long-run
cumulative impulse responses of the VAR system in Equation (B.1) are given by
Λ= lim
s→∞
s∑
u=0
Ψu = (IK −Φ0−Φ1−·· ·−Φp )−1. (B.14)
As before, the elements ofΛ are continuous functions of θ and, therefore, an application of
the delta method yields the asymptotic distribution of the θ̂-based estimate ofΛ. Speciﬁcally,
the asymptotic distribution of the estimate of λ= vec(Λ′) is given by

T (λ̂−λ) d−→
T→∞
N (0K 2 ,GVG
′), (B.15)
with Jacobian
G = ∂λ
∂θ′
= (Λ⊗Λ′ [IK , IK , . . . , IK ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=(1′p+1⊗IK ), p+1 times
)
∂vec([Φ0, Φ1, . . . , Φp ]′)
∂θ′
. (B.16)
B.9 VARModels in Trade Size
In this section, we re-estimate the VAR system in Equations (2.3a) to (2.3c) using additional
D2C- and D2D-trade-related variables that take trade size into account. Speciﬁcally, we esti-
mate the VAR system in Equations (2.3a) to (2.3c) with vector-valued generalizations of Equa-
tions (2.3b) and (2.3c) in which xτt = (nτt , vτt )′ or xτt = (nτt , sτt )′, τ ∈ {D2C, D2D}, where vτt (sτt ) is
the aggregate signed trade size (square-root trade size) of all τ-type trades that occur between
the t −1-th and t-th quote revisions (i.e., vτt and sτt are sums of products of trade direction in-
dicators, qu , and trade sizes, sizeu , or square-root trade sizes,

sizeu , withu between the calen-
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Coefﬁcient Estimates Granger Causality Tests
Δm nD2C vD2C nD2D vD2D Δm D2C D2D
Panel A1: CDX.IG
Δmt 0.342 0.018 0.1×10−3 0.011 -0.1×10−3 4936.9 160.8
(66.40) (24.80) (11.58) (6.16) (-1.51) [<0.01] [<0.01]
nD2Ct 2.030 0.157 0.001 0.020 0.000 1064.5 23.1
(21.61) (12.04) (7.29) (0.64) (0.06) [<0.01] [0.28]
vD2Ct 119.931 5.464 0.139 1.240 0.005 873.3 25.8
(19.74) (6.49) (10.55) (0.60) (0.10) [<0.01] [0.17]
nD2Dt -0.175 0.049 0.1×10−3 0.136 0.000 27.8 117.5
(-3.41) (6.66) (0.66) (7.87) (0.06) [<0.01] [<0.01]
vD2Dt -10.366 1.711 0.009 3.753 0.045 44.3 111.2
(-4.51) (5.15) (1.67) (4.81) (2.54) [<0.01] [<0.01]
Panel A2: CDX.HY
Δmt 0.254 0.104 0.7×10−3 0.038 -0.001 5419.5 88.7
(42.51) (44.26) (6.93) (5.11) (-1.26) [<0.01] [<0.01]
nD2Ct 0.410 0.295 0.002 -0.057 0.005 846.0 25.0
(15.26) (29.10) (3.46) (-1.75) (1.69) [<0.01] [0.20]
vD2Ct 7.045 3.711 0.096 -1.067 0.082 383.0 30.7
(11.02) (15.36) (9.15) (-1.38) (1.26) [<0.01] [0.06]
nD2Dt -0.070 0.041 0.5×10−3 0.073 0.006 48.5 136.3
(-5.62) (8.48) (2.20) (4.89) (4.37) [<0.01] [<0.01]
vD2Dt -0.869 0.381 0.007 -0.124 0.135 52.8 112.9
(-5.86) (6.56) (2.62) (-0.69) (8.93) [<0.01] [<0.01]
Panel B: Price Impact
CDX.IG CDX.HY
D2C D2D D2C−D2D D2C D2D D2C−D2D
Λ 0.057 0.018 0.039 0.244 0.048 0.196
(62.74) (10.48) (20.87) (60.91) (6.70) (23.90)
Panel C: Price Discovery
CDX.IG CDX.HY
D2C D2D Trade-Unrelated D2C D2D Trade-Unrelated
R2 29.29 0.84 69.87 37.94 0.29 61.77
Table B.14: VAR Estimates.
The table shows coefﬁcient estimates of event-time vector autoregressive (VAR) models for mid-quote revisions
(Δm) and signed numbers (nD2C and nD2D, resp.) and signed volumes (vD2C and vD2D, resp.) of dealer-to-
customer (D2C) and dealer-to-dealer (D2D) trades, respectively, that occur between quote revisions. Panels A1
and A2 show sums of VAR coefﬁcient estimates (t-statistics are shown in parenthesis) and Wald test statistics
(p-values are shown in brackets) for the null hypothesis that the column variable does not Granger-cause the
row variable. Panel B shows price impact estimates (Λ; t-statistics based on OLS standard errors are shown in
parenthesis) as captured by the model-implied long-run cumulative quote revision in response to median-sized
protection-buyer-initiated D2C and D2D trades. Panel C shows a model-implied variance decomposition of
efﬁcient price innovations into trade-related and trade-unrelated components (in percent of variance). Quotes are
in terms of index CDS spreads and expressed in basis points. The sample period is October 2, 2013 to October 16,
2015 and comprises 216,280 and 187,871 quote revisions for CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively.
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dar time of the t −1-th and t-th quote revision) and nτt is the number of signed τ-type trades,
i.e., the trade-related variable that we use in Section 2.5 of the paper. As a consequence of
including the additional trade-related variables, price impacts, as captured by the long-run
cumulative quote revisions in response to isolated D2C and D2D trades, become afﬁne linear
in trade size (square-root trade size).
Table B.14 displays VAR coefﬁcient estimates, estimated price impacts, and contributions to
price discovery in case that trade-related variables consists of the number of signed trades
and the aggregate signed trade size, i.e., xτt = (nτt , vτt )′. The results in Panels A1 and A2 of
the table qualitatively mirror those in Table 2.8 of the paper in all aspects. The price impact
estimates in Panel B are in response to median-sized protection-buyer-initiated trades, i.e.,
trades of USD 50 million in CDX.IG and trades of USD 10 million in CDX.HY. As before, D2C
trades have signiﬁcantly larger price impacts than D2D trades. Panel C shows contributions
of trade-related and trade-unrelated components to price discovery that are quantitatively
similar to those reported in the paper. The coefﬁcients on vD2Ct and v
D2D
t in Equation (2.3a)
suggest that price impact of D2C trades increases with trade whereas price impact of D2D
trades is insensitive to trade size.
Table B.15 displays results in case that trade-related variables consists of the number of signed
trades and the aggregate signed square-root trade size, i.e., xτt = (nτt , sτt )′. The table conﬁrms
that our results do not hinge on the particular speciﬁcation of the VAR and indicate that
not much additional insight can be gained from including trade size among trade-related
variables. As before, price discovery shares are quantitatively similar to those reported in the
paper which are based on trade-related variables consisting of the number of signed trades
only, i.e., xτt = nτt . This suggests that it is the occurrence of trades rather than their size that
accounts for most of the information content of trades. This is consistent with evidence from
the equity market where trade occurrence and not trade size generates volatility (see, e.g.,
Jones et al. (1994)). Moreover, approximating non-linearities in the relation between quote
changes and trade-related variables by means of non-linear transformations of trade size
seems to be of minor importance.54
Finally, Figure B.2 shows that the cumulative quote revisions implied by the VAR models that
include additional size-based trade-related variables. In line with the above, the implied
cumulative quote revisions are almost identical and similar to the one implied by the VAR
speciﬁcation that does not include the additional trade-related variables.
54In a VAR model with trade-related variables consisting of the number of signed trades, the aggregate signed
trade size, and the aggregate signed square-root trade size (i.e., xτt = (nτt , vτt , sτt )′, τ ∈ {D2C, D2D}), D2D-(D2C-
)trade-related variables account for is 29.28% (0.94%) of the variance of CDX.IG efﬁcient price innovations with the
remaining 69.78% being trade-unrelated. The corresponding numbers for CDX.HY are 38.45% (0.30%) and 61.25%.
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Coefﬁcient Estimates Granger Causality Tests
Δm nD2C sD2C nD2D sD2D Δm D2C D2D
Panel A1: CDX.IG
Δmt 0.341 0.013 0.002 0.012 -0.001 4939.9 158.8
(66.37) (11.36) (11.68) (3.28) (-0.97) [<0.01] [<0.01]
nD2Ct 2.030 0.104 0.019 0.006 0.002 1063.3 21.7
(21.61) (5.13) (7.07) (0.10) (0.24) [<0.01] [0.35]
sD2Ct 14.708 0.346 0.189 0.041 0.021 1016.1 24.7
(21.23) (2.32) (9.31) (0.09) (0.28) [<0.01] [0.21]
nD2Dt -0.174 0.050 0.000 0.134 0.001 27.7 118.6
(-3.40) (4.36) (0.31) (3.77) (0.11) [<0.01] [<0.01]
sD2Dt -1.291 0.283 0.007 0.545 0.049 35.5 118.8
(-3.96) (3.87) (0.71) (2.41) (1.38) [<0.01] [<0.01]
Panel A2: CDX.HY
Δmt 0.253 0.080 0.010 0.044 -0.004 5450.2 88.9
(42.30) (19.56) (9.42) (2.61) (-0.83) [<0.01] [<0.01]
nD2Ct 0.407 0.243 0.021 -0.125 0.037 842.1 26.2
(15.15) (13.74) (4.83) (-1.73) (1.66) [<0.01] [0.16]
sD2Ct 1.578 0.637 0.147 -0.475 0.138 682.8 29.0
(14.32) (8.79) (8.22) (-1.61) (1.49) [<0.01] [0.09]
nD2Dt -0.070 0.036 0.004 -0.016 0.047 48.9 134.2
(-5.66) (4.20) (1.74) (-0.48) (4.55) [<0.01] [<0.01]
sD2Dt -0.236 0.099 0.014 -0.253 0.208 53.0 127.7
(-5.93) (3.65) (2.05) (-2.38) (6.27) [<0.01] [<0.01]
Panel B: Price Impact
CDX.IG CDX.HY
D2C D2D D2C−D2D D2C D2D D2C−D2D
Λ 0.060 0.018 0.042 0.243 0.048 0.194
(65.66) (9.83) (20.71) (62.34) (6.73) (23.94)
Panel C: Price Discovery
CDX.IG CDX.HY
D2C D2D Trade-Unrelated D2C D2D Trade-Unrelated
R2 29.29 0.84 69.87 38.12 0.29 61.59
Table B.15: VAR Estimates.
The table shows coefﬁcient estimates of event-time vector autoregressive (VAR) models for mid-quote revisions
(Δm) and signed numbers (nD2C and nD2D, resp.) and signed square-root volumes (sD2C and sD2D, resp.) of
dealer-to-customer (D2C) and dealer-to-dealer (D2D) trades, respectively, that occur between quote revisions.
Panels A1 and A2 show sums of VAR coefﬁcient estimates (t-statistics are shown in parenthesis) and Wald test
statistics (p-values are shown in brackets) for the null hypothesis that the column variable does not Granger-cause
the row variable. Panel B shows price impact estimates (Λ; t-statistics based on OLS standard errors are shown in
parenthesis) as captured by the model-implied long-run cumulative quote revision in response to median-sized
protection-buyer-initiated D2C and D2D trades. Panel C shows a model-implied variance decomposition of
efﬁcient price innovations into trade-related and trade-unrelated components (in percent of the variance). Quotes
are in terms of index CDS spreads and expressed in basis points. The sample period is October 2, 2013 to October
16, 2015 and comprises 216,280 and 187,871 quote revisions for CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively.
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Panel A: CDX.IG 5Y on-the-run
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Panel B: CDX.HY 5Y on-the-run
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Panel C: CDX.IG 5Y on-the-run
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Panel D: CDX.HY 5Y on-the-run
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Figure B.2: VAR-Model-Implied Price Impact.
The panels show cumulative quote revisions in response to either a single median-sized protection-buyer-initiated
dealer-to-customer (D2C; solid black lines) trade or a single median-sized protection-buyer-initiated dealer-to-
dealer (D2D; solid light gray lines) trade. The trades are outright ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDS trades in CDX.IG
(Panels A and C) and CDX.HY (Panels B and D). Cumulative quote revisions in Panels A and B (Panels C and D)
are implied by event-time vector autoregressive models for mid-quote revisions, the sum of signed D2C trades
that occur between quote revisions and their signed (square-root) volume, and the sum of signed D2D trades
that occur between quote revisions and their signed (square-root) volume. Dashed lines mark 95% conﬁdence
intervals based on OLS standard errors. Quotes are in terms of index CDS spreads and expressed in basis points
(bps). Median size of trades in CDX.IG (CDX.HY) index CDSs is USD 50 million (USD 10 million). The sample
period is October 2, 2013 to October 16, 2015 and comprises 216,280 and 187,871 quote revisions for CDX.IG and
CDX.HY, respectively.
B.10 Additional Figures and Tables
Panels A and B of Figure B.3 display mid-quote changes, mt+Δ−mt , following the execution
of non-block trades as function of Δ. The panels distinguish between D2C and D2D trades
as well as protection-buyer- and protection-seller-initiated trades. In particular, the panels
show the average mid-quote change in one-minute periods following trade execution where
the average is taken over all pairs of trades and quotes for which the difference between trade
execution and quotation times falls within the respective one-minute period. Because we
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Panel A: CDX.IG 5Y on-the-run
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Panel B: CDX.HY 5Y on-the-run
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Figure B.3: Mid-Quote Changes as a Function of Time.
Panels A and B show mid-quote changes following non-block outright dealer-to-customer (D2C) and dealer-to-
dealer (D2D) trades in ﬁve-year on-the-run index CDSs on CDX.IG and CDX.HY, respectively, as a function of time.
Mid-quote changes are deﬁned as c(Δ)=mt+Δ−mt , where mt is the latest mid-quote in the 15-minute period
prior to trade execution and mt+Δ is any mid-quote Δ seconds after trade execution. Mid-quotes are in terms of
index CDS spreads and expressed in basis points (bps). The upper (lower) of equally colored straight lines is the
minute-by-minute average mid-quote change of protection-buyer-initiated (protection-seller-initiated) trades,
with trade direction inferred by the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. The average mid-quote change in minute i is
the sample mean over all c(Δ) such that (i −1)<Δ/60≤ i (a trade that is followed by multiple quotes in minute i
contributes multiples terms to the computation of the sample mean). Dashed lines mark 95% conﬁdence intervals
based on standard errors clustered by trade dissemination identiﬁer and quote timestamp. The sample period is
October 2, 2013 to October 16, 2015.
separate the mid-quote changes of protection-buyer- and protection-seller-initiated trades,
mid-quote changes have the interpretation of Δ-minute price impacts. Consistent with what
we observed in Section B.7.2, the Δ-minute price impacts of D2C trades are signiﬁcantly larger
than those of D2D trades for most values of Δ.
Moreover, Figure B.3 shows that price impacts seem to have converged 15 minutes after trade
execution and that there seems to be no difference between the price impacts of protection-
buyer- and protection-seller-initiated trades. This is the reason why we choose to work with
15-minute price impacts in the paper and why the VAR models that we estimate do not
distinguish between protection-buyer- and protection-seller-initiated trades.
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C.1 Sample Construction
I collect all trade reports of credit asset class swaps that were disseminated between December
31, 2012 and June 30, 2015 by the swap data repositories (SDRs) of Bloomberg (the Bloomberg
Swap Data Repository, henceforth BSDR), the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (the
DTCC Data Repository, henceforth DDR), and the Intercontinental Exchange (the ICE Trade
Vault, henceforth ICETV), and remove all trade reports with identical dissemination identiﬁers
at the SDR level (i.e., among trade reports disseminated by the same SDR).1
In the ﬁrst step, I remove all canceled trade reports and the corresponding cancelations at the
SDR level. Occasionally, a trade report is canceled by both counterparties, and there are some
cancelations of trade reports that are not contained in the data. This can lead to removal of a
larger number of cancelations than canceled trade reports. I also remove duplicate corrections
when a trade report is corrected by both counterparties, and corrections of trade reports that
are not contained in the data (this includes corrections without dissemination identiﬁer of the
original trade report). Finally, I remove corrections and the original trade reports when the
original trade report has not previously been canceled as required by CFTC rules.
In the second step, I remove all historical trade reports and trade reports of non-index-CDS
transactions, such as, index options, index tranche swaps, and more exotic credit derivatives.
Then, I remove all trade reports (at the SDR level) that are disseminated with insufﬁcient
information regarding the underlying credit index. These include trade reports where the
underlying is a bespoke basket or where the ﬁelds used to identify the underlying are missing
or incompletely populated. For trade reports disseminated by the BSDR this concerns the
“Ticker” and “CDSVersion” ﬁelds that contain the index’s Bloomberg ticker and versionnumber,
respectively.2 For trade reports disseminated by the DDR this concerns the last nine digits
1I do not collect the 65 trade reports of credit asset class swaps that were disseminated by the SDR of the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange because most of them are for historical transactions (i.e., transaction executed prior the
effective date of the CFTC’s real-time public reporting requirement) or for indices that are not focus of the paper.
2The BSDR did not disseminate Bloomberg tickers and CDS version numbers during the ﬁrst two weeks of
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of the “Underlying_Asset_1” ﬁeld that contains the index’s Markit RED code, and for trade
reports disseminated by the ICETV this concern the “TVProductMnemonic” ﬁeld that contains
the index’s Trade Vault Product Mnemonic. Bloomberg tickers together with version numbers,
Markit RED codes, and Trade Vault Product Mnemonics are individually sufﬁcient to uniquely
identify the names, series, and versions of synthetic credit indices composed of corporate,
municipality, or sovereign reference names. They are also sufﬁcient to uniquely identify non-
synthetic indices composed of agency pools (the MBX, IOS, and PO indices), commercial
mortgage-backed securities (the CMBX and TRX indices), or prime and sub-prime residential
mortgage-backed securities (the PRIMEX and ABX indices). Because the focus of the paper is
on synthetic credit indices, I remove the trade reports of non-synthetic credit indices together
with all trade reports for which I am unable to identify the mapping between Markit RED codes
and names, series, and versions. I also remove all trade reports with non-standard maturities
and incomplete transaction data (i.e., all trade reports with missing execution timestamp,
missing price notation type, missing price notation, missing currency denomination, missing
notional amount, or missing transaction type). Among the remaining trade reports, I focus on
those of the main indices of the CDX North American family: CDX North American Investment
Grade (CDX.IG) and CDX North American High Yield (CDX.HY).
Before merging the trade reports from the three SDRs, I remove duplicate trade reports at the
SDR level. Duplicate trade reports are deﬁned as trade reports of off-SEF transactions with
identical transaction data but different dissemination identiﬁers, and I remove all duplicate
trade reports other than the one that was submitted ﬁrst (i.e., the one with the smallest
dissemination identiﬁer).3 I only remove duplicate trade reports of off-SEF transactions
because it is possible that multiple transactions with the same terms occur within a second
(the precision of trade report timestamps) on the electronic order book of a SEF.
In the third step, I remove trade reports of transactions executed prior to index launch or after
maturity, trade reports with zero price notations, trade reports with 00:00:00 timestamps, and
trade reports with non-standard currency denominations.4,5
In the fourth step, I account for reporting errors and ﬁlter the data for outliers. For both tasks,
operation. Assuming that the underlying index is not a sub-index of the index whose name is contained in the trade
report, it is possible to identify the underlying of transactions in CDX family indices. The identifying assumption
may not be unreasonable given that in the remainder of the sample period the BSDR did not disseminate a single
trade report of a transaction in which the underlying was a sub-index. Assuming that the version of the underlying
index is the one with the maximum number of contributing dealers to Markit’s end-of-day composite computation
(Markit depth), it is possible to identify the version number. The identifying assumption may not be unreasonable
given the industry’s convention to shift trading from one version to the next on the day after the respective credit
event auctions have taken place (which tends to be reﬂected by a shift in Markit depth).
3I exclude the original dissemination identiﬁer when identifying duplicates because these may mismatch due
to correction of erroneous transaction data.
4To determine whether a transaction is executed prior to index launch (i.e., the start of trading) or after maturity,
I convert Universal Coordinated Time (UTC) timestamps into New York time. According to Markit’s index roll
timetables, indices of the CDX North American family start trading at 7:30 New York time on the index launch
dates.
5I remove both 00:00:00 UTC and 00:00:00 New York time timestamps.
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I use Markit composite prices and spreads as reference points. When available, the reference
point will be the mid-point of the most recent Markit intraday composite bid and ask quotes
prior to trade execution. I only consider two-sided quotes that are available in both price
notation types and require quotes to be from the same trading day.6 Otherwise, the reference
point is either the end-of-day composite from the trading day prior to trade execution, the
mid-point of the ﬁrst intraday composite bid and ask quotes from the same trading day that
occur after trade execution, or the end-of-day composite from the day of trade execution.
Trade reports for which I am unable to ﬁnd a reference point are removed from the data.
There are three common reporting errors. First, reporting parties frequently submit trade
reports that show the index CDS contracts’ ﬁxed spreads (i.e., the rates that determine ﬁxed leg
payments of the index CDS contracts) instead of the price notations at which counterparties
agreed to settle their trades (trades settle at upfront payments that are exchanged between
index CDS counterparties at the inception and close of trade; price and spread price notations
uniquely determine these upfront payments). Second, reporting parties frequently fail to
express prices in percent and spreads in basis points. Third, reporting parties frequently
submit trade reports with incorrect price notation types (e.g., indicating that the price notation
type is a spread when in fact the reported price notation is a price).
In order to address the ﬁrst type of reporting error, I remove all trade reports with price
notations that are equal to ﬁxed spreads or scaled (by 1/10000, 1/100, 100, or 10000) multiples
therefore and all trade reports with price notations equal to 0.01, 1, 100, 10000, 1000000, 0.05,
5, 500, 50000, 5000000 (note that 100 bps and 500 bps are the most common ﬁxed spreads of
index CDS contracts).7 In order to address the second type of reporting error, I ﬁrst remove
amount price notations and replace the price notation types of the remaining trade reports
with those in which the respective index CDSs are conventionally quoted.8 This leaves me
with only two price notation types in the data, namely, price and spread. For each of the two
price notation types, I deﬁne an outlier as a price notation with a percentage difference from
the respective reference point that exceeds q% in absolute value; that is,
|Pk −P (nk ,uk , tk )|
P (nk ,uk , tk )
> q(nk ), (C.1)
where Pk denotes the price notation of the k-th trade report, nk denotes its price notation type,
uk denotes the transaction’s underlying, tk denotes its execution timestamp, and P (n,u, t)
denotes index u’s reference point (Markit intraday or end-of-day) composite of price notation
6Unless otherwise speciﬁed, trading day refers to a local time trading day.
7Scaling by 1/10000, 1/100, 100, or 10000 addresses the second type of reporting error. Note that the scaling
factors correspond to those operations that would be used when changing units to decimals, percentages, or basis
points. Price notations of 0.000001, 0.0001, 0.000005, and 0.0005 do not appear in the data and are therefore not
contained in the above list.
8In principle, prices could be backed out from amount price notations. However, I refrain from doing so because
disseminated notional amounts are rounded and may be capped, resulting in prices that potentially differ from
those agreed upon by index CDS counterparties.
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type n associated with timestamp t .9 Then, I identify trade reports with incorrectly expressed
price notations by outlier price notations (i.e., trade reports with Pk satisfying Equation (C.1))
for which I can ﬁnd a scaling factor s ∈Σ= {1/10000,1/100,100,10000} such that
|sPk −P (nk ,uk , tk )|
P (nk ,uk , tk )
≤ q(nk ). (C.2)
I replace incorrectly expressed price notations by s∗Pk with s∗ having minimal percentage
distance (as deﬁned by the left hand side of Equation (C.2)) among all s ∈ Σ that satisfy
Equation (C.2).
In order to address the third type of reporting error, I identify trade reports with incorrectly
expressed price notation types by outlier price notations for which I can ﬁnd a scaling factor
s ∈ {1}∪Σ such that
|sPk −P (n,uk , tk )|
P (n,uk , tk )
≤ q(n), (C.3)
for a price notation type n other than nk (in fact, there is only one such price notation type for
each trade report because at this stage the data only contains trade reports with two different
price notation types). I replace incorrectly expressed price notation types by n and eventually
replace the corresponding price notations by s∗Pk with s∗ havingminimal percentage distance
(as deﬁned by the left hand side of Equation (C.3)) among all s ∈ {1}∪Σ that satisfy Equation
(C.3).
For those trade reports without outlier price notations, I proceed with homogenizing price
notation types further in that I use the ISDA CDS standard model to convert price notations
of spread type into price notations of price type and vice versa.10 After conversion, I remove
all trade reports with outlier price notations with respect to either price notation type and all
trade reports for which conversion failed.
Finally, I remove all trade reports of transactions with notional amounts less than USD 10,000
and all trade reports of transactions executed on non-full trading days (i.e., SIFMA recom-
mended full or early close trading days).
I identify the SEF on which the trade was executed from the trade report format (the identiﬁca-
tion algorithm is described in detail in the Internet Appendix to Collin-Dufresne et al. (2016)).
As described in Collin-Dufresne et al. (2016), the structure of the SEF market is such that the
9I use cutoffs of 1% and 5% for price notations of price and spread type, respectively.
10The model input are standardized contract terms (not the ones contained in the trade reports), including
the index’s effective date, payment frequency, and day count convention (note that neither Bloomberg’s nor
Markit’s converter allows to modify those terms for the sake of standardization—although they might misvalue
contracts with other terms, these converters are still valid tools that index CDS counterparties use to agree on
upfront amounts; moreover, there are just a few trade reports with non-standard payment frequencies and for the
signiﬁcant number of trade reports with “1/1” day-count convention conversion would not be possible because
the converter does not recognize this type of day count convention). The valuation date is the trading day (T) and
the protection effective date is T+1.
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SEF on which the trade was executed reveals whether the trade was between an end-user and
a liquidity providing dealer or whether it was an interdealer trade. For trade reports for which
I can identify the SEF, I aggregate trade sizes of transactions with identical terms and the same
execution timestamp.
By convention dealers price index-related instruments, such as, index options and index
tranche swaps, in reference to the corresponding index CDS and with the implicit understand-
ing that trade execution includes an offsetting index CDS trade of a delta neutralizing notional
amount (the so-called “delta exchange”). The transaction price at which the delta exchange
takes place is called the “reference level” and included in dealer runs for index options and
index tranche swaps.11 But in contrast to the option or tranche swap quote, the reference level
does not necessarily reﬂect the current index level because it is usually ﬁxed at market opening
(see, e.g., Hünseler (2013)). When reference levels change throughout the trading day, they
tend to change by much coarser increments than quotes of the corresponding index CDSs.12 I
make use of this fact for identifying delta exchanges from the transaction data. Speciﬁcally,
I collect the reference levels of end-of-day index option composites from Markit and those
of intraday tranche swap quotes from Credit Market Analysis and, on a given trading day
(UTC trading day in case of the intraday tranche swap quotes), I identify all transactions with
reference level transaction prices as delta exchanges.
11Credit derivatives dealers provide their institutional clients with quotes for index CDSs and index-related
instruments by instant messaging, e-mails, or via single-dealer screens. A quote update distributed to a wide
variety of clients by one of these means is referred to as a dealer run.
12For instance, CDX.IG reference levels increment by 0.5 bps while order books in the interdealer market typically
employ 0.0625 bps tick sizes. Similarly, CDX.HY reference levels increment by 0.125% while order books typically
employ 0.01% increments.
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